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1 Introduction
Like many other countries, Switzerland has benefited from three waves of epoch-making inno-
vations in transport and communication technologies (see Figure 1.1). It started in the 1850s
with the triumphant success of the railway and the telegraph. Being a small export-oriented
market with few natural resources, efficiency gains in the transport sector were of particular
importance for Switzerland. Railway made overland transport not only faster but also more
reliable, reducing costs by a factor of almost ten. The 20th century was characterised by the
rise of cars, planes, landline telephones, and broadcasting. These innovations have been mainly
introduced in the early 1900s, yet they were not accessible to the masses before the second half
of the century. At the turn of the millennium, a third wave of communication technologies con-
quered Switzerland, namely mobile phones and the internet. While only a small minority used
these technologies around 1995, both mobile phones and internet achieved a very high market
penetration by 2010.
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Figure 1.1: Market Penetration of Transport and Communication Technologies, 1850–2015.
Data Sources: FSO, BAKOM, HSSO.
In principal, transport and communication infrastructure serve the same purpose: overco-
ming distance.1 The financial costs and time required to move goods, people, and information
crucially shapes the location decision of companies and people. Without a doubt, the continuous
technological progress drove down the costs of transport and communication. For instance, Swiss
ICT-providers have increasingly shifted to flat-rate schemes for domestic telephone services and
1It is interesting to note that in the 19th century, the movement of goods or people and the movement
of information were seen as identical processes, both being described by the common noun “communication”
(Carey, 2009, p. 12).
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internet subscriptions, the later making international calls via Voice Over IP at practically no
charge possible. Quickly melting distance premia in the transport and communication sector
gave rise to the “Death of Distance”-Hypothesis (Cairncross, 2001), arguing that frictions in
economic exchange due to physical distance continuously loose importance. This thesis contri-
butes to the debate on how transport and communication innovations have been affecting the
spatial distribution of economic activity in general and the role of cities in particular.
Chapter 2, which is joint work with Stephan Kyburz, studies the impact of railway access
on the spatial distribution of population and economic activity in the second half of the 19th
century. The small-scale municipalities of Switzerland present a unique setup that allows to
analyse the impact of the railway expansion at a level of geographic detail not seen in other
studies. We compile a data set that combines geo-referenced railway network information and
various proxies for regional economic development, including population growth rates for more
than 2800 municipalities, as well as data on sectoral work shares and the body height of conscripts
in 178 districts.
The analysis takes into account that railway companies might have specifically targeted fast
developing towns and villages. Linking topographic features and railway construction expenses,
we simulate hypothetical railway lines that connect the major towns at the least cost possible,
and then use these lines to instrument actual railway access. This so-called inconsequential units
IV approach and the careful analysis of pre-railway data allow us to infer whether transportation
infrastructure indeed promoted growth or just followed favourable regional developments.
The main results show that the growth of urban centres quickly accelerated after the adoption
of the railway technology, while the impact was considerably smaller in rural municipalities along
the rail tracks. Moreover, the positive effect of railway in rural areas was markedly localised,
as municipalities situated more than 2 km from the railway network experienced a slowdown in
growth. The negative effect of railway was largest for municipalities at 6 to 8 km distance from
the railway tracks and reversed back to zero for places at least 20 km away. This pattern was
primarily driven by the migration balance, as fertility rates were hardly impacted. Apparently,
people living in an intermediary distance to the railway dislocated to places right at the railway
tracks.
Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the question of how information disseminates in the modern
world. These two chapters build on the distinction between codifiable and uncodifiable informa-
tion (see Storper and Venables, 2004, p. 353–354): Codifiable information has a stable clearly
defined meaning. Such information is cheap and easily transferable, because its underlying
symbol system can be widely disseminated through communication infrastructure. In contrast,
uncodifiable information is only loosely related to the symbol system in which it is expressed,
such that a successful transmission often requires face-to-face contact. Relative to electronically
mediated exchange, direct social contact offers the capacity for instantaneous interruptions,
feedback, and body language cues. These advantages are of particular relevance in the context
of social learning and the exchange of messages that require some degree of trust or involve
emotions.
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Chapter 3 provides an implicit test of the hypothesis that modern communication techno-
logies make a frictionless dissemination of codifiable information possible. It documents how
statements by European policy-makers affected the price of securities issued by five peripheral
European countries, namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
The timing and content of statements are determined based on a comprehensive collection
of newswire reports issued between January 2009 and August 2011. Using content-analysis
techniques, each statement is either recorded as signal of strong determination in the rescue of
indebted countries, or as signal indicating limited commitment to support the heavily indebted
peripheral countries and protect their creditors. This approach yields a very rich communication
measure including 600 statements by about 70 different policy-makers.
The examination of daily financial market fluctuations reveals that statements by European
policy-makers impacted CDS and bond yield spreads on the same day. Without an immediate
dissemination of the statements via radio, television and internet such quick reactions of globally
traded assets would not be observable. The strongest market reactions occurred on days with
statements by representatives of Germany, France and the EU institutions in Brussels. Regarding
communication by ECB officials, the statistical analysis shows that alongside the source of a
message, its content played an important role as well. Whereas no coherent effects on CDS
and bond yield spreads are found for ECB statements on matters within the political domain,
there is some evidence that communication on government bond purchases and the collateral
framework moved financial markets.
Chapter 4, which is joint work with Maximilian von Ehrlich, analyses whether the dense
concentration of cities provide a favourable environment for social interactions, and therefore
better conditions for social learning and the flow of uncodifiable information in general. This idea
lies at the core of one of the classic agglomeration forces described by Alfred Marshall (1890),
who argues that the dense concentration in cities facilitates the flow of knowledge, since social
interactions diminish over space. Despite being a core idea in urban economics, the underlying
mechanisms have hardly been studied so far, or in the words of Edward Glaeser (2000, 104):
“Urban economics needs to increase its focus on non-market interactions because they are central
to an understanding of causes and effects of cities.”
The analysis builds on anonymised mobile phone calls between June 2015 and May 2016,
covering 7 million devices that transmitted 15 million calls and text messages per day. Along
with the anonymised CDRs, the operator also provided monthly updated customer information
including billing address, language of correspondence, age, and gender. Based on this rich
dataset and concepts from the network literature, three main questions are investigated. First,
how does geographical distance impact social interactions? Second, what is the relation between
population density and the size of an individual’s social network? Third, does population density
affect the quality / efficiency of social interactions in terms of matching quality, clustering and
network perimeter?
The identification strategy employed in this study rests on two complementary approaches.
The first approach aims to identify factors that predict the likelihood of individuals i and j
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forming a link. The second approach estimates the effect of local characteristics on individual-
level network measures. Sorting of individuals with specific characteristics can affect the results
of both types of regression analyses. As the data encompasses the full social network for one
year, changes in the address of mobile phone customers can be exploited; this allows to isolate
the role of systematic sorting and to obtain causal estimates of geography and population density
on network formation and network topography.
The main results suggest that distance is highly detrimental to social interactions. Despite
epoch-making progress in communication technologies, more than 60 percent of ties occur be-
tween individuals that reside within less than 10 km distance of each other. Contrary to the
conventional view, this does not translate into larger networks in cities compared to the pe-
riphery. Density-related externalities rather arise in terms of network efficiency, namely better
matching quality, lower clustering, and smaller distance costs. Evidently, modern communica-
tion technologies do not render cities obsolete. Our analysis has illustrated that they remain
important as catalyst of valuable social exchange and, consequently, as potential engines of
growth.
2 Fast Track to Growth? The Impact of Railway
Access on Regional Economic Development in 19th
Century Switzerland*
2.1 Introduction
The rapid advance of railways is widely seen as a major driving force of economic development
in the 19th century. It made overland transport at competitive rates possible, which facilitated
the integration of formerly isolated areas into the regional and global economy. As this market
widening enabled increased regional specialisation and gains from trade, it is argued that railway
substantially accelerated aggregate economic growth.1
Then as now, investments in transportation infrastructure have repeatedly been endorsed by
policy makers as a means to promote regional economic development. Economic considerations,
both from a national growth and regional development point of view, also dominated the political
debate on the foundation of a national railway network in 19th century Switzerland. Being a
small export-oriented market with few natural resources, Switzerland was particularly dependent
on fast and reliable means of transport. For this reason the federal government emphasized that
a well designed railway network was critical to the country’s welfare.2 In 1852 the provision of
railway infrastructure was mandated to private companies. From a regional economic growth
perspective this raised concerns that domestic disparities would widen, if underdeveloped and
thinly populated areas were neglected by railway entrepreneurs.3
1Based on the concept of social savings, first proposed by Fogel (1962, 1964), the impact of railway infra-
structure on aggregate output has been calculated to range between 5% and 10% for the US, and between 1%
and 11% for European countries (Leunig, 2010). In a recent study, Donaldson and Hornbeck (forthcoming) show
that extensions to internal waterways and roads would have mitigated at most 20% of the losses from removing
railways in the US, refuting the famous argument by Fogel (1964) that railways could have been easily substituted
by other available means of transport.
2Original quote from the federal council’s statement delivered to the national assembly on 7th April 1851
[BBl 1851, Vol. 1(19):352]: “Was wir [...] vor Allem als Hauptzweck eines schweizerischen Eisenbahnnetzes
betrachten, besteht in Erleichterung des Verkehrs im Innern. Auf dem europa¨ischen Kontinent ist kaum ein
Land wie die Schweiz, das so wenig im Stande ist, seine Bedu¨rfnisse auf eigenem Boden zu erzeugen, das daher
in so hohem Grade interessiert ist, dass es seine Konsumgegensta¨nde, seine Rohprodukte wohlfeil beziehen und
seine Fabrikate wohlfeil ausfu¨hren kann. Kaum ein Land [...] wo die Schnelligkeit des Personenverkehrs und der
Warensendungen von so hohem Werthe ist, wo das Englische Sprichwort ‘Zeit ist Geld’ in gleichem Masse seine
praktische Anwendung findet.”
3Opponents of a private provision fiercely warned that railway companies will cherry-pick the most profitable
*This chapter is joint work with Stephan Kyburz.
6 Railway Access and Regional Economic Development
How early railway access impacted regional growth in Switzerland has not yet been studied
quantitatively. We compile a data set that combines geo-referenced railway network information
and various proxies for regional economic development, including population growth rates for
more than 2 800 municipalities as well as data on sectoral work shares and the body height of
conscripts in 178 districts. The small-scale municipalities of Switzerland present a unique setup,
that allows us to analyse the impact of railway at a level of detail not seen in other studies.
Particular attention is paid to potential selection effects induced through strategic routing: An
inconsequential units IV approach and placebo tests based on data from the pre-railway era
allow us to infer whether transportation infrastructure indeed promoted growth or just followed
favourable regional developments.
The empirical evaluation of how transport infrastructure affects economic activity has re-
cently attracted increased attention (see Redding and Turner, 2014).4 Fishlow (1965) was one
of the first economic historians who systematically analysed the direction of causation in this
context. Based on his study of 19th century USA, he concludes that railway construction seems
to have followed demand rather than cause regional population growth. Combining GIS-tools
and econometric methods, Atack et al. (2010) revisited Fishlow’s analysis for counties in the
American Midwest from 1850 to 1860. They find that railway access increased population den-
sity by about 3 percentage points within the decade studied. The impact of railway access in
Switzerland was of comparable magnitude, as our preferred models yield an average railway
induced growth effect of 0.4 percentage points per year. While Atack et al. (2010) explore the
impact of railway on population growth in a mostly rural environment similar to our case, US
counties are rather coarse units of analysis in comparison to Swiss municipalities. Exploiting
the fine granular level of our data, we cannot only investigate the direct impact of railway
access; we can also examine local displacement effects of railway infrastructure as well as effect
heterogeneity along various dimensions.5 Our results show a non-monotonic functional relation
between distance to the railway network and population growth: The positive effect of railway
was markedly localised, as municipalities situated more than 2 km from the railway network
experienced a slowdown in growth. The negative effect of railway was largest for municipalities
at 6 to 8 km distance from the railway tracks and reversed back to zero for places at least 20 km
away.
A well-researched consequence of expanding railway infrastructure is the faster growth of
cities, as documented by studies for Prussia (Hornung, 2015), Sweden (Berger and Enflo, fort-
hcoming), and Africa (Jedwabi and Moradi, 2016). Switzerland also experienced rapid urba-
lines, as the majority report by the parliamentary railway commission in 1852 illustrates [BBl 1852, Vol. 2(27):
49-127].
4In the main text, we only discuss studies on railways built in the 19th century. Comparable questions were
also studied for highway infrastructure built in the 20th century, for instance by Duranton and Turner (2012)
or Faber (2014). For Switzerland, Dessemontet (2011) documents in detail how the spatial pattern transformed
from a very strong centre-periphery specialisation in 1939 to a much more sprawled distribution in 2000, with
road-accessibility being an important determinant of employment density. In addition, Mu¨ller, Steinmeier and
Ku¨chler (2010) show that the rate of urban growth increases with proximity to a motorway exit.
5Another spatially detailed analysis was conducted by Koopmans, Rietveld and Huijg (2012) who study acces-
sibility and population growth in Dutch municipalities. Whether their results have a causal interpretation is
questionable, however, as they neither provide placebo tests nor exploit exogenous variation.
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nisation during the early railway era, yet the vast majority of people lived in markedly small
rural municipalities throughout the 19th century. Hence, our analysis naturally complements
studies on railway and city growth, bringing the demographic developments in peripheral areas
into focus. Our estimated effect of railway access on population growth is considerably smaller
than the impact reported for cities, which typically ranges between 1 and 2 percentage points
per year. This substantiates the notion that railway access primarily promoted growth in cities
and regional centres, while the impact was considerably smaller in rural municipalities along the
rail tracks. Nonetheless, our findings do not lend support to the home market effect hypothesis
as in Krugman (1980), since we find little evidence for negative growth effects of transportation
infrastructure, even in the least populous communities.
Population growth often serves as a proxy for regional development, because comprehensive
income and production statistics for the 19th century are scarce. On theoretical grounds, freedom
of movement facilitates migration flows that equalise real wages across space, implying migration
from uncompetitive to competitive areas (e.g. Redding and Sturm, 2008). Indeed, our analysis
of birth, death, and migration statistics shows that railway access primarily had an impact
on population growth via the local migration balance. Reduced trading costs are considered
to be the main mechanism that links railway – and transportation infrastructure in general –
to competitive advantages and economic activity. Donaldson (forthcoming) reports conclusive
evidence for this channel; based on data for India between 1853 to 1930, he shows that the
advance of railways substantially lowered trade costs and promoted intra-Indian trade flows.
Improved trading conditions due to railway access caused a significant increase in agricultural
income, as is documented for the US (Donaldson and Hornbeck, forthcoming), India (Donaldson,
forthcoming), and Ghana (Jedwabi and Moradi, 2016). Other studies provide evidence that
obtaining railway access accelerated industrialisation, since it promoted capital investments in
manufacturing companies (Tang, 2014) and increased the average firm size (Atack, Haines and
Margo, 2008; Hornung, 2015). These findings for the agricultural and industrial sector raise
the question of what the net effect was of railway on structural change. We show that districts
with average railway access experienced an additional 9 percentage point shift in labour shares
from the agricultural to the manufacturing sector within 40 years compared to unconnected
districts. This evidently suggests that improved railway infrastructure was an important driver
of industrialisation in Switzerland. Considering that the (sparsely available) income records
document higher wages in the manufacturing than in agriculture (see Brugger, 1978; Gruner,
1987), railway-induced industrialisation may have been a key pulling factor shaping migration
patterns. Although we lack the data to investigate this claim in detail, an analysis of body
height records provides evidence that railway indeed had a positive net effect on the population’s
(biological) well-being, most likely through improvements in nutrition and labour conditions.
The next section describes the historical setting. Section 3 introduces the data used in the
empirical analysis. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy to identify the causal effect of
railway access on regional development. Section 5 discusses the results for the municipality and
district level. Section 6 concludes.
8 Railway Access and Regional Economic Development
2.2 Historical Background
Although Switzerland was one of Europe’s most industrialised countries in the early 19th cen-
tury, railway technology caught up relatively late.6 Since 1836 entrepreneurs in Zurich sought to
connect Switzerland’s largest city to the foreign railway network at the German border in Ko-
blenz and the French border in Basel, but since they failed to raise enough funds their endeavour
stopped halfway in Baden. The first 23 km of railway tracks in Switzerland, which are known
as “Spanisch-Bro¨tli-Bahn”, were opened in 1847, at a time when Great Britain (9 800 km), Ger-
many (5 800 km), France (2 900 km), and the US (13 500 km) had already built several thousand
kilometres of railway.7
When the Swiss federal state was founded in 1848, the formation of a national railway network
soon became one of the main priorities on the political agenda. Alfred Escher, president of the
national council, forcefully warned his fellow members of parliament in 1849 that Switzerland
would run the risk of becoming isolated within Europe if it failed to build a railway network
quickly.8 In 1850, the government commissioned two English engineers, Robert Stephenson and
Henry Swinburne, to provide a technical expertise for the construction of a national railway
system. After fierce debates and a close vote, the plan submitted by the English engineers
for a state-run railway network was rejected by the national assembly. The Railway Act of
1852 authorised cantonal administrations to grant concessions to private companies, which were
supposed to build and run Switzerland’s railway network without public funding (Weissenbach,
1913, 6). This new legal framework along with the introduction of a single currency and the
elimination of internal tariffs in 1848 evidently reassured previously reluctant investors, and
within a decade private railway companies connected Switzerland’s major cities north of the
Alps. By the end of the century Switzerland had one of the world’s densest railway networks
with a total length of around 3 700 km (see Table 2.1).
Switzerland is a land-locked country with no navigable rivers except for the Rhine in the
border town of Basel. Before railway became available, carts were the main means of transpor-
tation complemented by inland navigation on lakes.9 It has been estimated that railway reduced
6Bairoch (1965) compares nine European countries, the US, and Japan in terms of industrial development
between 1800 and 1900, with Switzerland coming in fourth or fifth place throughout the 19th century.
7Humair (2008) cites the fragmented system of tariffs, currencies and jurisdictions of the pre-modern Swiss
confederation as key institutional barriers that inhibited adequate funding by (foreign) investors. Furthermore,
he points to the opposition of various social and economic stakeholders, as well as disputes about route planning
that delayed railway investments. The international rail network statistics represent total track length in 1850
and are taken from Sperber (2009, 10) and Adams (1895, 6).
8Original quote from Alfred Escher’s speech delivered in the national assembly on 12th November 1849 [BBl
1849, Vol. 3(6):161]: “Es tauchen Pla¨ne auf, gema¨ss denen die [europa¨ischen] Bahnen um die Schweiz herum-
gefu¨hrt werden sollen. Der Schweiz droht somit die Gefahr, ga¨nzlich umgangen zu werden und in Folge dessen in
der Zukunft das traurige Bild einer europa¨ischen Einsiedelei darbieten zu mu¨ssen.”
9The relative importance of inland navigation prior to 1848 has not yet been conclusively determined, as
detailed transport statistics are not available for that period. The historical research available suggests that inland
navigation was a regionally important – but secondary – complement to overland transport. First, Switzerland
only had 25 steamboats in 1850 (Schiedt, 2009, 172). Second, costs for transshipping were significant, which
limited potential savings on the relatively short portage routes on lakes (Schiedt, 2009, 173). Third, estimates by
Frey (2010) suggest that the accessibility of Swiss municipalities in 1850 was almost entirely determined by roads
(93%-100%), and hardly influenced by inland navigation (0%-7%). Fourth, Schiedt (2007) documents the broad
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Table 2.1: Railway Density in Selected Countries, 1900
Railway Network in km
per 10tsd per 100
Inhabitants Sq-Km
Germany 9.7 9.3
Austria-Hungary 8.2 5.4
France 10.9 7.9
Italy 5.0 5.5
Great Britain 8.6 11.0
USA 42.2 3.8
Switzerland 12.4 9.1
Lowland (excluding alpine area)1 11.6 18.4
1: Railway lines and population of districts with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.,
representing the area of our robustness analysis. Source: Geering and Hotz (1903, 105-
106).
land transport costs by a factor of eight (Donaldson, forthcoming), which stimulated two ma-
jor developments in Switzerland: First, the agricultural sector started shifting production from
grain to dairy products. While the production of milk increased by more than 70% until the end
of the century, the production of grain decreased by 40%, a drop that was compensated by the
quadrupling of grain imports (Frey and Vogel, 1997, chapter 8). Second, railway triggered large
quantities of coal imports from Germany and France, which increased from 1 360 tons in 1851
to 16 000 tons ten years later, and more than 200 000 tons at the end of the century, represen-
ting 15% to 20% of the freight transported by rail between 1850 and 1900. Coal promoted an
improved mechanisation of the Swiss industry, and cleared the way for energy-intensive sectors
such as steel works, salterns, and cement production (Marek, 1991, chapter 6).
Besides lowering the transportation costs of cargo, railway substantially shortened travel-
times. Frey (2006) illustrates on the basis of detailed stagecoach and train schedules that the
time required to visit all cantonal capitals was halved between 1850 and 1870. By the end of the
century, travel-times were even reduced by 80% compared to the pre-railway period. Despite
these substantial improvements in accessibility, Frey and Schiedt (2005, 57) argue that railway
contributed little to the public’s mobility during the first 40 years, as it was unaffordable for
the vast majority.10 In 1880, Swiss railway companies only carried 25 million passengers, which
corresponds to an average of nine train journeys per person per year. A gradual decline in fares
during the 1890s and rising incomes made train travel more widespread, with yearly passenger
numbers rapidly increasing to 63 million in 1900 and 110 million in 1910.11 For most of the 19th
century, however, rail journeys remained a privilege for the wealthy and commuting by train
was rather insignificant.
modernisation of Switzerland’s road infrastructure from 1740 to 1780 (around 1 000 km) and from 1830 to 1840
(around 6 000 km). The fact that these investments accounted for up to 40% of cantonal finances underlines the
importance attributed to roads by policy-makers in pre-modern Switzerland.
10A look at fares and wages in the 1880s illustrates this point: An average worker, who earned about 0.30 CHF
per hour, had to pay 0.90 to 1.40 CHF for a return-ticket on a 10 km railway route (NOB, 1883).
11Passenger statistics were obtained from the Schweizerische Eisenbahnstatistik (SPE, 1900), which is partly
accessible online at http://www.bahndaten.ch/ (last access: 01.02.2016).
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Figure 2.1: Urbanisation and Railway in Switzerland. Source: Own calculations based on the
HSSO database, www.fsw.uzh.ch/histstat/
Notes:The sample of cities includes Zurich, Geneva, Bern, Basel, Winterthur, Thun, and Biel. Cities were selected only if their population
statistics for 1800 and 1837 reflect the territorial borders of the 1850–1900 sample. Graph (b) shows difference-in-difference annual growth
rates: The differences between national and city growth rates from 1837 to 1850 were subtracted from the annual growth rate differences
between 1850 to 1900 .
The advent of railway took place in a period characterised by strong growth: Swiss GDP
estimates available for the period after 1850 reveal that real output grew by approximately 250%
within 50 years, while the population increased from 1 665 000 inhabitants in 1800 to 2 393 000 in
1850, and 3 315 000 by the end of the 19th century. This growth was not uniformly distributed
across the country, however, as Switzerland witnessed substantial domestic migration typically
from peripheral regions to the fast growing urban centres (e.g. Rey, 2003). The acceleration of
urban growth in Switzerland coincides with the construction of the earliest railway lines. To
illustrate this point, Figure 2.1 part (a) plots population statistics (1850=100) for a sample of
seven cities with comparable population data for 1800 and 1836/37. While cities grew at a
similar rate to other municipalities prior to railway construction (i.e. between 1800 and 1847),
the picture changed completely in the second half of the 19th century. Urban population started
increasing tremendously while the rest of the country kept growing at a relatively constant rate.
Part (b) of Figure 2.1 presents a simple difference-in-differences analysis of the annual population
growth rate of the seven cities compared to the national population growth rate using periods
before and after the introduction of railway technology. Except for Thun, the growth rates of
the cities increased by 0.5 to 3 percentage points relative to the national trend after the railway
network was established. Of course this simple analysis cannot establish a causal relation, since
early railway construction coincides with improved market integration following the birth of the
modern federal state in 1848. Nonetheless, it reveals a suggestive pattern that fits well with
recent findings on urbanisation and railway access in other countries.12
Although urban centres experienced rapid growth, Switzerland remained a rurally dominated
12For instance, Hornung (2015) shows that railway access accelerated population growth in Prussian cities by
an additional 1 to 2 percentage points per year, which is quantitatively similar to the increase in Switzerland’s
urban growth rates after 1850.
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country throughout the 19th century. In 1850, less than 10% of Switzerland’s population lived
in towns of more than 10 000 inhabitants, a ratio that remained decidedly below the 50% mark
until the end of the century. In the following, we primarily analyse how demographic dynamics
in Switzerland’s rural areas were affected by railway access.
2.3 Data
We track the expansion of Switzerland’s railway network using data from the “GIS Dufour”
project, which developed a digitial map of historic roads, railway, and waterway lines based on
the first national map commissioned by Henri Dufour in 1850 (source: Egli et al., 2005). In
addition to mapping traffic routes, the GIS Dufour project also collected information on their
opening and closing dates from various historical sources. Based on this rich data set, we define
a binary indicator, referred to as railway access, that takes the value 1 if one or more railway
lines cross over the territory of a municipality.13 Accordingly, we call municipalities “treated”
after they received their first railway access, and “untreated” if no railway line passed through.
Column 5 in Table 2.2 shows the percentage of treated municipalities for each decade and column
6 reports the population share that was connected to the railway.
Municipalities are the lowest administrative unit in Switzerland, with 1 to 40 municipalities
forming a district, and 1 to 30 districts forming a canton, the equivalent of a US state. In order to
evaluate the impact of railways at the district level, we calculate the population weighted share
of municipalities that had direct access to the railway network for each district and decade.
Our main outcome of interest is annual population growth. Population statistics are ta-
ken from the census (“Eidgeno¨ssische Volksza¨hlung”) which has been conducted by the Swiss
Statistical Office (and its precursor) since 1850.14 The national census has always surveyed the
population on the municipality level in intervals of 10 years, with the exception of the 1890-wave,
which was collected in 1888. We infer the population for 1890 by performing an extrapolation
of growth rates in the adjacent periods, i.e. 1880 to 1888 and 1888 to 1900, respectively.15 In
order to account for territorial reorganisations, we use the municipality classification for 2000
and clean population figures based on the data set’s documentation on territorial mergers and
divisions.16 For the cantons of Zurich, Bern, Aargau and Solothurn, we complement the census
data with population statistics from the “Helvetische Za¨hlung” conducted around 1800 and the
“Tagsatzung” in 1837. These early population counts are currently being harmonised with the
post-1850 census data in an ongoing project by Schuler and Schluchter (in progress). In what
13We use municipal boundaries from official administrative maps of Switzerland valid from January 2000. This
ensures that the spatial administrative division used to determine a municipality’s railway access is congruent
with the classification employed in the census data.
14Detailed information on the data set, which can be downloaded from www.bfs.admin.ch, is provided in
Schuler, Ullmann and Haug (2002).
15Mathematically, we calculated the population count (POP90) of 1890 as follows:
PGR80,88 = (
POP88
POP80
)1/8; PGR88,00 = (
POP00
POP88
)1/12; POP90 =
1
2
POP88 · (PGR80,88)2 + 12POP88 · (PGR88,00)2.
16For instance, the municipality of Turgi (ID=4042) with a population of 645 in 1888, was part of the mu-
nicipality Gebenstorf (ID=4029) until 1883. When calculating annual growth rates between 1880 and 1890 for
Gebenstorf, we subtracted 645 from its population in 1880.
12 Railway Access and Regional Economic Development
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics: Population and Railway Access in Swiss Municipalities
Swiss Pop. Municipalities: Average Population Rail Access: %-Share of
(in mio.) All With Rail Access Municipalities Population
1850 2.39 840 8603 0.3 3.2
1860 2.51 877 2049 12.9 30.0
1870 2.66 927 2006 17.4 37.5
1880 2.83 986 1817 29.3 53.9
1890 2.92 1013 1797 35.1 62.4
1900 3.32 1150 2067 39.0 70.3
Source: Own calculations based on Swiss census data and GIS-Dufour data.
follows, we refer to this subset of municipalities, representing around 900 of the 2700 municipa-
lities, as the pre-railway sample or pre-treatment sample (see Figure 2.3). District population
figures between 1850 and 1900 are derived by aggregating up municipality statistics, and are
then complemented with district-level data for 1800 collected by Schluchter (1988). We con-
struct our main dependent variable, the annual population growth rate for each municipality
and each district based on the population figures for 1800, 1837 (municipalities only), and 1850
to 1900.17
A concern may be that population changes caused by railway-related construction work is
falsely attributed to improvements in a municipality’s or district’s accessibility. In order to ad-
dress such concerns, we resort to Rey (2003, 147–149) who compiled a list of Swiss municipalities
and districts that experienced extraordinary demographic volatility due to railway construction
work (mainly tunnelling). These observations are removed from our sample in all steps of the
analysis that evaluate the affected time period.18
The population and railway access data is complemented with district statistics on surpluses
of births over deaths so that migration balances can be calculated (source: census since 1870), as
well as sectoral work shares (source: census since 1860) and the body height of conscripts (source:
Staub, 2010) which we interpret as complementary proxies for regional development. In order to
merge the data sets reliably, we define a common district identifier and compare the population
figures as reported in the various sources. Differences in population counts are retraced using
the documentation on territorial reorganisations from the Swiss Statistical Office. Whenever
applicable, district population figures are equalised between the data sources, for instance by
changing the assignment of municipalities to districts. Districts where the revised population
statistics differ by more than 2% are excluded from the statistical analysis.19
17Annual population growth is computed as follows: APGt = 100 · (ln(POPt1) − ln(POPt0))/(t1 − t0).
18In this respect it is important to note that we evaluate the impact of railway access on population growth rates
in the short- and long-term: While railway construction work may have had a confounding effect on short-term
population growth rates, it is unlikely that long-term growth trends were affected by the inflow and outflow of
construction workers.
19Table A.3 in the appendix provides a complete list of districts that are included in and excluded from the
analysis, respectively.
Chapter 2 13
2.4 Empirical Strategy: Instrumental Variable Approach
Railway access is not randomly assigned to municipalities, but may be correlated with numerous
observable and unobservable characteristics such as population size, growth potential, economic
structure, or the availability of cheap land. Since Switzerland’s main railway infrastructure was
built and run by private entrepreneurs until 1902, concerns related to targeted and selective
routing cannot be ignored. Although a number of control variables are available, cross-sectional
OLS regression may not be sufficient to account for these endogeneity issues. A priori, it is
unclear whether an upward or downward bias dominates, thus making it difficult to interpret
plain regression estimates.
We address these concerns by adopting an inconsequential units IV approach first proposed
by Banerjee, Duflo and Qian (2004; 2012) and later used in several studies on transport infra-
structure, including Hornung (2015) and Atack et al. (2010). The underlying idea is compelling:
In the early stages of transport infrastructure developments, major cities – hereinafter “main
nodes” – are typically connected first. If railway companies built their routes such that two
main nodes are connected as directly as possible, railway access would be randomly assigned
to municipalities lying along these inter-node connections. It is likely, however, that railway
companies deliberately take detours, for instance to connect municipalities with a high growth
potential or to avoid expensive land acquisitions in dense areas. As these targeted detours in-
duce selection effects, it is not sufficient to restrict the analysis to inter-node lines as they were
actually built. Instrumental variables based on least-cost paths between nodes solve this issue.
The IV approach bases inference on the randomly chosen subset of municipalities that received
railway access because they lie on the most direct route between nodes, i.e. on a least-cost path.
2.4.1 Main Nodes
Main nodes are selected along two dimensions in this study, namely economic and transport
strategic importance. As a first group, we chose the 20 most populous municipalities in 1850
that held the historical town status.20 In medieval times, towns privileges included judicial
liberties, coinage, the right to collect tariffs, and the right to hold markets, which we consider
a good proxy for historically grown economic importance. These 20 nodes are supplemented by
23 locations listed as central traffic junctions in plans delivered to the federal government by
Robert Stephenson and Henry Swinburne in 1850.21 Since 10 municipalities are included in both
sets, this yields 33 main nodes, that we believe were of primary economic or transport strategic
importance, thus making them attractive to railway companies. These 33 municipalities are
excluded from the sample in all steps of the statistical analysis, as they have gained access to
the railway for reasons potentially endogenous to population growth.
Table 2.3 shows that 30 out of 33 municipalities selected as main nodes were connected
20Whether or not a municipality held the historical town status is determined based on Guyer (1960).
21Figure A.1 in the appendix displays the original plan outlined by the two English engineers, including the set
of main nodes used in our analysis.
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Table 2.3: Main Nodes
Municipality
Population
in 1850
RW
Access Municipality
Population
in 1850
RW
Access
Among 20 Largest Towns & Listed as Node in 1850-Expertise
Zurich 41585 1847 Luzern 10068 1859
Bern 29670 1857 Schaffhausen 8477 1857
Basel 27844 1844/54 Chur 6183 1858
Lausanne 17108 1856 Thun 6019 1859
Winterthur 13651 1855 Solothurn 5370 1857
Among 20 Largest Towns Listed as Node in 1850-Expertise
Geneva 37724 1858 Aarau 4657 1856
St. Gallen 17858 1856 Yverdon 3619 1855
Chaux-de-Fonds 12638 1857 Morges 3241 1855
Fribourg 9065 1862 Bellinzona 3209 1874
Le Locle 8514 1857 Baden 3159 1847
Neuchatel 7901 1859 Locarno 2944 1874
Altstaetten 6492 1858 Biasca 2035 1874
Lugano 5939 1874 Walenstadt 1868 1859
Biel 5609 1857 Rorschach 1751 1856
Vevey 5201 1861 Olten 1634 1856
Brugg 1581 1856
Lyss 1568 1864
Romanshorn 1408 1855
Notes: The 20 largest towns are selected based on the Swiss census and an index of municipalities with
historical town privilege from Guyer (1960). The list of nodes as suggested in the 1850-expertise by R. Ste-
phenson and H. Swinburne is taken from Weissenbach (1913). Population figures are based on municipality
border zoning from January 2000.
to the railway network by the early 1860s, which we consider to be the first wave of railway
construction. The remaining four nodes, which are all located south of the Alps, received railway
access in the 1870s, constituting the second wave of railway development in Switzerland.
2.4.2 Least-Cost Paths
Whether or not a least-cost path is drawn between two nodes is determined based on records
of actual railway openings (source: Wa¨gli, 1998; Weissenbach, 1913). Lines are selected only if
the primary intention of the railway company was to connect two nodes, excluding routes that
established inter-node connections gradually over long periods of time.22 For the selected inter-
node lines, we draw cost efficient routes on a 200 m x 200 m grid with the ArcGIS-tool “Least
Cost Path” factoring in three cost parameters: distance, slope, and river crossings. In order
to estimate the cost parameters, we extract information from the Swiss Traffic Atlas (source:
NOB, 1883) on the total construction costs of 48 railway lines built by 1881, and combine it with
information on mileage as well as slopes covered by the actual route of the tracks using a 25 m x
25 m height model for Switzerland (source: Swisstopo, 2004). A regression of total construction
22This excludes, for instance, the railway line connecting the nodes Bern and Luzern: Its first part was finished
in 1864, connecting Bern with Langnau, while the section Langnau–Luzern opened 11 years later in 1875.
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costs per kilometre on the routes’ average slope yields average construction costs of 180 000 CHF
per kilometre and an additional 15 000 CHF penalty per degree climbed. The costs of building
bridges are determined based on the regression’s residual for a 2 km track section that includes
a 216 m long bridge over the river Rhine in Basel. We obtain costs of 800 000 CHF for the rail
bridge in Basel, which we linearly scale down for smaller rivers based on federal water quantity
statistics (source: Pfaundler and Scho¨nenberger, 2013).
This procedure results in a least-cost path for every inter-node railway connection built in
19th century Switzerland, including information on the original route’s opening date. Finally,
we intersect the least-cost paths with municipal boundaries, giving us a measure, LCPw, coded
1 if a municipality is traversed by a least-cost path during the construction wave w, and coded
0 if all the least-cost paths bypass outside the municipality in the given time span.
2.4.3 Estimation and Identifying Assumption
The data and instrumental variable, LCPwic , described in the previous sections are used to
estimate the effects of railway access, RAwic, established during construction wave w, on annual
population growth, APGtic, in municipality i of canton c during decade t. The first and second
stage regressions take the form
RAwic = α1 + β1LCP
w
ic + ϕ1X
1850
ic + κ1c + ic, and (2.1)
APGtic = α2 + β2R̂A
w
ic + ϕ2X
1850
ic + κ2c + ηic (2.2)
where κc denotes cantonal fixed effects, and X
1850
ic is a vector of municipality control variables
described below.
A word on timing. The cross-sectional analysis exploits the fact that the construction of
Switzerland’s railway was carried out in three waves (see Figure 2.2): Between 1847 and 1864
the main trunk lines were established, including the east-west connection linking Geneva (wes-
ternmost city), Bern (capital), Zurich (largest city), and St. Gallen (easternmost city). During
the second wave, 1869 to 1882, further inter-city lines were completed and the first north-south
route through the Alps was opened. After 1882, the ramification advanced and mostly small
branch lines were added. The focus of the analysis lies on the first wave, i.e. w=1847–1864, and
the second wave, i.e. w=1869–1882. Equations (1) and (2) are estimated separately for both
waves, and five decades of annual population growth available, i.e. t=1850–60; 1860–70; 1880–
90; 1890–1900. When the second wave of railway constructions is analysed, all municipalities
with access prior to 1869 are excluded from the sample.
Two assumptions are needed in order to allow for a causal interpretation of βˆ2: First, the
instrumental variable and the treatment have to be correlated (i.e. β1 6= 0), which can be
tested formally based on the first stage correlation. Second, the exclusion restriction must hold,
implying that the instrument needs to be as good as randomly assigned conditional on control
16 Railway Access and Regional Economic Development
1st wave: 1847-64 2nd wave: 1869-82 3rd wave: 1883-1900
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
Le
ng
th
of
R
ai
lw
ay
N
et
w
or
k
(k
m
)
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900
Year
(a) Length of Swiss Railway Network
1st wave: 1847-64 2nd wave: 1869-82 3rd wave: 1883-1900
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
P
er
ce
nt
of
In
te
rn
od
e-
Li
ne
K
ilo
m
et
re
s
O
pe
ne
d
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900
Year
(b) Share of Inter-Node Tracks Operating
Figure 2.2: Construction of the Swiss Railway Network: 1st Wave 1847–64, 2nd Wave 1869–82,
3rd Wave 1883–1900. Source: Own calculations based on GIS-Dufour data
variables, and may affect the outcome only through the first stage (e.g. Angrist and Pischke,
2009, 117). While our large and highly statistically significant estimates for β1 verify the first
assumption, the exclusion restriction could be violated if locations along the least-cost path
are correlated with municipality characteristics due to history or geography. In order to justify
the exclusion restrictions, we include a number of control variables, which are briefly motivated
hereafter (further information on the controls are presented in the Appendix, 2.6).
By construction, municipalities nearby nodes are more likely to lie on a least-cost path than
municipalities farther away. If proximity to a city or major traffic junction is correlated with
population growth, the exclusion restriction would be violated. We therefore include the log
distances of each municipality to its closest town node and to its closest Stephenson-Swinburne
node as controls in our regressions.
The least-cost paths reflect direct routes between main nodes that avoid steep slopes and
unnecessary river crossings. Location along these paths could be correlated with the econo-
mic structure of municipalities since they potentially coincide with historical trade routes that
affected business prior to adoption of the railway technology. To account for this issue, we in-
clude a road access variable that measures whether a municipality is passed through by a major
inter-cantonal road (source: GIS-Dufour, Egli et al., 2005). Before railway became available,
these paved roads constituted the main inter-regional transport routes within Switzerland, and
therefore should pick up possible confounding effects due to the potential correlation between
historical trade routes and our instrument. Additionally, we include an indicator for medieval
town privileges (source: Guyer, 1960), which were – amongst others – given to municipalities
of trade strategic importance, and therefore may be correlated with both the likelihood of a
municipality being crossed by a least-cost path and its population growth.
Naturally, our least-cost path algorithm tends to favour riversides, lake fronts, and low
altitudes, as such terrain is often characterized by low gradients. A concern could be, that
these places are also advantageous to economic development: Water turbines along rivers, for
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instance, were an important energy source in 19th century Switzerland, shipping on lakes was
a regionally important complement to overland transport, while low altitudes pose favourable
climatic conditions compared to higher elevations. Therefore, we include measures for hydro
power potential, adjacency to lakes, and the log of elevation in our regressions.
A last set of controls is supposed to account for growth effects of subsequent railway access,
and pre-determined population dynamics, namely annual population growth prior to railway
access, the log of population size in 1850, as well as a municipality’s log area in square kilometres.
Despite this broad set of control variables, it may still be possible that unobserved charac-
teristics are correlated with both our instrument and the growth potential of municipalities,
which would confound our estimate of β2. We therefore follow an approach recently suggested
in a similar setting by Hornung (2015), and complement our cross-sectional analysis with panel-
models that take care of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity by including municipality fixed
effects, pii. We regress the annual population growth rate of municipality i in decade t, APGict,
on the instrumented dummy variable indicating railway access in the previous decade, RAict−1.
The first and second stage IV panel-regressions are specified as
RAict = pi3i + β3LCPict + λ3t + λ3t · κ3c + ξict, and (2.3)
APGict = pi4i + β4R̂Aict−1 + λ4t + λ4t · κ4c + εict (2.4)
where time fixed effects, λt, control for population growth cycles on the national level, and
cantonal-time fixed effects, λt · κc, account for cycles on the regional level.23
While the advantage of this approach is the elimination of potentially unobserved time-
constant confounders, it washes out a lot of variance in the variables of interest and identifies
the effect of railway access based on within-municipality variation only. Since the Swiss census
was conducted with a periodicity of ten years, the timing of treatment and effect is rather
imprecise in our setting: To eliminate concerns of reverse causality and because main lines were
mostly built in the second half of the 1850s and 1870s, we use the first lag of railway access in
our preferred panel specification, e.g. railway access between 1851 and 1860 affects population
growth during the decade 1860 to 1870 and onwards. The following section reports and discusses
the estimation results for both the cross-sectional and the panel-data analysis.
2.5 Results on Railway Access and Regional Development
Suggestive evidence for the impact of railway access on population growth is presented in Table
2.4, which compares the mean population growth rates for municipalities gaining railway access
during the earliest wave of railway construction (1847–1864) to the growth rates of municipalities
bypassed by these railway lines. While a two-sided T-test of differences in means (see column 4)
23Map A.4 in the appendix depicts the time-variation in our instrument.
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suggests that population growth rates were not statistically different in the two groups during
the pre-railway period, growth rates significantly diverged with the construction of the earliest
railway lines during the 1850s and subsequent decades. Overall, this simple comparison in means
suggest that municipalities with railway access grew on average 0.25 to 0.55 percentage points
faster per year than unconnected municipalities.
Table 2.4: Annual Population Growth Rates by Railway Access Status in 1864
Pre-Railway Samplea Whole Switzerlanda Nodesb
Rail No Rail Rail No Rail
Obs. Mean Mean Diff. Obs. Mean Mean Diff. Obs. Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1800–37 903 0.89 0.92 =0.03
(0.49) (0.48) (0.04)
1837–50 903 0.60 0.66 =0.07
(0.71) (0.89) (0.08)
1850–60 903 0.13 =0.017 0.30∗∗ 2811 0.57 0.02 0.55∗∗∗ 33 1.63
(0.87) (1.06) (0.09) (1.26) (1.14) (0.06) (1.32)
1860–70 903 0.59 0.20 0.39∗∗∗ 2827 0.47 0.22 0.25∗∗∗ 33 1.60
(0.88) (1.26) (0.09) (1.25) (1.04) (0.06) (1.16)
1870–80 898 0.46 =0.06 0.52∗∗∗ 2788 0.45 =0.02 0.47∗∗∗ 33 1.34
(0.96) (1.03) (0.09) (1.11) (1.09) (0.06) (1.04)
Notes: Means and comparison of means for the first wave of railway construction (1847-1864). Columns (4) and (8) present a two-sided
T-test of the difference in means of municipalities with railway access to those without railway access. a: Sample excludes nodes and
municipalities strongly affected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). b: Sample includes all 20 largest towns nodes
and Stephenson & Swinburne nodes. Standard deviations in parentheses in columns (2), (3), (6), (7), and (10). Standard errors in
parentheses in columns (4) and (8). + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
In order to identify the causal impact of railway access on population growth rates, we now
turn to our econometric analysis which is discussed in four subsections. The main evaluation
concerns annual population growth at the municipal level, which is presented first. Discussing
results on cross-section (section 2.5.1) and panel data (section 2.5.2) regressions, we complement
the advantages of both approaches. In section 2.5.3 we attempt to get a clearer grasp of the
heterogeneity of effects. The obvious question that arises is whether the construction of the
railway infrastructure benefited all connected communes equally or led to a concentration of
economic activity and divergence in the municipalities’ growth rates. Furthermore, we analyse
displacement effects of railway access on nearby municipalities. Finally, section 2.5.4 completes
the municipality analysis by evaluating the robustness of results for population growth at the
district level, and examining whether the railway induced population growth is due to migration
or birth surpluses. It also presents evidence of railway access accelerating structural change and
increasing the body height of conscripts.
2.5.1 Cross-Sectional Analysis: Population Growth in Municipalities
The cross-sectional analysis focusing on railway lines constructed between 1847 and 1864 is
presented first, followed by a discussion on the second wave of railway development that lasted
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from 1869 to 1882. Our benchmark results are based on a sample including all the municipalities
of Switzerland, except for the 33 main transport nodes and municipalities that experienced
extraordinary demographic volatility due to railway construction work.
Table 2.5 presents the findings for the first wave of railway expansion (1847–1864), illustrated
in Figure 2.3. The first column reports results for a placebo test based on the pre-railway period
between 1800 and 1850. Both the OLS and IV coefficients for the pretreatment period are close
to zero and statistically insignificant. This indicates that conditional on our control variables,
population growth rates in treated and untreated municipalities were similar previous to the
railway era. This changed following the construction of the railway network. Column (2)
captures the effects of railway lines on long-term population growth between 1850 and 1900.
Municipalities that were connected to the railway network between 1847 and 1864 experienced
a significant increase in population growth during the second half of the 19th century.
Table 2.5: The Impact of Railway Access (1847–64) on Annual Population Growth Rates, Cross-
Sectional Estimates at the Municipal Level
Long Run 10 Year Periods
1800–50a 1850–1900 1850–60 1860–70 1870–80 1880–90 1890–1900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1847–64 0.00 0.41∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
R2 0.26 0.28 0.17 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.12
Observations 903 2770 2791 2790 2748 2743 2769
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1847–64 0.15 0.39∗∗∗ =0.06 0.31∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.32+ 0.47∗
(0.15) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22)
Observations 903 2770 2791 2790 2748 2743 2769
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 1847–64 and Least-Cost Paths
LCP 1847–64 0.25∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
R2 0.29 0.39 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.39
Observations 903 2770 2791 2790 2748 2743 2769
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest town node (log),
distance to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to
navigable water (binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2
(log), annual district population growth 1800–1850, and cantonal fixed effects. Sample: All municipalities of Switzerland, excluding nodes and
municipalities strongly affected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). a: Pre-railway sample available for four cantons
(ZH, BE, SO, AG). The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne
nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
The IV estimates, shown in the middle panel of Table 2.5, imply an additional annual
growth of 0.39 percentage points, which translates into a relative population increase of over
20% within 50 years. An average municipality with early railway access and 750 inhabitants in
1850 would therefore have gained around 160 additional inhabitants by 1900 compared to an
identical municipality without railway access. Note that the first stage, which is presented in the
table’s bottom panel, yields a strong and highly significant correlation between the instrument
and the railway access variable. This alleviates concerns related to weak instruments.
Looking at every decade individually, we obtain fairly stable coefficients. According to our
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Table 2.6: The Impact of Railway Access (1869–82) on Annual Population Growth Rates, Cross-
Sectional Estimates at the Municipal Level
Long Run 10 Year Periods
1850–70a 1870–1900 1850–60a 1860–70 1870–80 1880–90 1890–1900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1869–82 0.24∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
R2 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.11
Observations 2344 2344 2365 2364 2324 2320 2344
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1869–82 =0.08 0.51∗∗ 0.01 =0.19 0.37 0.60∗ 0.49
(0.19) (0.18) (0.27) (0.23) (0.29) (0.26) (0.35)
Observations 2344 2344 2365 2364 2324 2320 2344
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 1869–82 and Least-Cost Paths
LCP 1869–82 0.36∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
R2 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.32
Observations 2344 2344 2365 2364 2324 2320 2344
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest town node (log),
distance to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to
navigable water (binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2
(log), cantonal fixed effects, and population growth 1850–1860 (except for columns a, where district population growth 1800–1850 is used).
Sample: All municipalities, excluding nodes and municipalities strongly affected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149).
The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. Huber-White
standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
preferred IV estimates in columns (4) to (7), municipalities with railway access experienced
additional annual growth of 0.31 to 0.58 percentage points compared to municipalities without
a railway connection. This effect is significant at the 10% level or higher, except for the first
decade of railway construction from 1850 to 1860 suggesting that railway access impacted po-
pulation growth with a time lag. The OLS and IV coefficients are similar in magnitude, which
substantiates the claim that early railway companies prioritised direct connections between large
cities, and did not necessarily target fast growing municipalities along the way.
The results for the second wave of railway construction (1869–1882), which expanded the
network by another 1 500 km of tracks, are presented in Table 2.6. Municipalities that gained
railway access by 1864 were excluded from these regressions. Again, the first stage results for
the IV models yield large and highly significant correlations between our instrument and railway
access.
Columns (1), (3), and (4) display placebo tests based on an analysis of population growth
rates from 1850 to 1870 and railway access obtained between 1869 and 1882. The OLS regressions
produce a positive and statistically significant correlation, indicating that municipalities with a
higher population growth rate in this pre-treatment period were more likely to receive railway
access between 1869 to 1882. The IV approach seems to mitigate this issue, with coefficients
being close to zero or negative and statistically insignificant in both the short (1850–60; 1860–70)
and long run perspective (1850–70).
While pre-treatment annual growth rates are not correlated with the instrumented railway
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access indicator, we obtain strong correlations for the post-treatment period. Estimates for
the long run effect spanning 30 years from 1870 to 1900 are displayed in the second column
and show a positive and highly significant effect of railway access on population growth, with
the IV estimate amounting to 0.51. Columns (5) to (7) report the analogous results for each
decade separately, which display positive effects of railway access across all specifications, while
in two cases the coefficients are insignificant with t-values between 1.3 and 1.4. The effects of
railway access on population growth rates vary between 0.37 and 0.6 percentage points. As
for the results on the first wave of railway expansion, the post-treatment IV estimates are not
statistically different from the OLS estimates in this second set of cross-sectional regressions.
Tables B.2 and B.3 in the appendix (section 2.6) present the same set of results for munici-
palities belonging to districts with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l. Although population
growth dynamics might be different in the barren alpine regions, the main estimates are not
substantially affected by this robustness exercise.
Taken together, the results for both waves of railway construction suggest that railway access
caused an increase in annual population growth rates, with the average effect lying between 0.39
and 0.51 percentage points for our preferred long run IV specifications. The following section
analyses the impact of railway access on population growth based on panel data techniques.
2.5.2 Panel Data Analysis: Population Growth in Municipalities
The cross-section estimations include various control variables that account for municipality spe-
cific characteristics. Nevertheless, unobserved characteristics may still influence the particular
growth potential of a municipality. The fixed effect estimation allows us to base inference on
within municipality variation, which eliminates biases from time-invariant unobserved characte-
ristics. Table 2.7 presents our preferred panel estimations that use the lag of railway access as
main explanatory variable.
We provide results for OLS and IV fixed effects estimations for three different samples. The
first sample includes all the municipalities in Switzerland (see column 1 & 2). The second
sample excludes municipalities where the mean district elevation is higher than 1 000 m.a.s.l. in
order to remove the barren alpine region (see column 2 & 3). The third sample is restricted to
municipalities for which pre-railway population data is available, so that the decade from 1840
to 1850 can be included in the estimation as well (see column 3 & 4). For all samples the main
nodes and municipalities affected by railway construction work are excluded.
The IV coefficients in columns (2), (4) and (6) range between 0.41 to 0.44 for all three
samples and are statistically significant at the 5% level or higher. Remarkably, they are also
very close to the long run effects estimated in the cross section (first wave: 0.39, second wave:
0.51). Although this effect is less than half of the estimates reported for cities (see Hornung,
2015; Berger and Enflo, forthcoming), it is not negligible. A coefficient of 0.42 translates into
an additional population count of 23% after 50 years for municipalities that got connected
to the railway infrastructure compared to municipalities without railway access. In the next
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Table 2.7: The Impact of Railway Access on Annual Population Growth Rates, Panel Estimates
at the Municipal Level
Whole Switzerlanda Below 1 000 mb Pre-Treatment Samplec
OLS FE IV FE OLS FE IV FE OLS FE IV FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Annual Population Growth Rates in Decade t and Railway Access in Decade t− 1
Lag Railway Access 0.08∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.41∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.44∗
(0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.13) (0.06) (0.18)
R2 0.05 – 0.05 – 0.17 –
Municipalities 2731 2731 2020 2020 821 821
Observations 13651 13651 10100 10100 4926 4926
Municpality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth rate in percent. Full sample, a: All municipalities of Switzerland, excluding
nodes and municipalities strongly affected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). Below 1 000 m sample, b: All
municipalities of districts with mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., excluding nodes and municipalities strongly affected by railway con-
struction work (see Rey, 2003, 147-149). c: This estimation additionally includes the pre-treatment period 1837–1850, but is restricted to
a smaller sample of municipalities for which pre-railway population data is available (four cantons: ZH, BE, SO, AG), excluding nodes and
municipalities strongly affected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path
for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10,
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
section, we explore local displacement effects of railway and impact heterogeneity across treated
municipalities.
2.5.3 Displacement Effects and Heterogeneity across Municipalities
Compared to other studies that investigate the impact of railway infrastructure, the small size
of Swiss municipalities allows for a detailed spatial evaluation of growth effects. For example,
both Atack et al. (2010) and Donaldson and Hornbeck (forthcoming) use US counties as units
of analysis, which have a median land area of 1 610 km2 compared to less than 7 km2 of a
median-sized Swiss municipality.24 Hornung (2015), on the other hand, uses Prussian cities as
unit of analysis, and therefore provides no insights for railway effects in rural areas.
One important question that can be addressed based on the spatially small-scaled data
relates to the local displacement effects of transportation infrastructure. For instance, Chandra
and Thompson (2000) find that US highways led to a local shift of production from unconnected
regions to neighbouring regions with highway access. If railway caused such local reorganisations,
we would expect negative population growth effects in close proximity to the railway. Figure
2.5 shows two local polynomial regression of residual growth on the log distance to the railway
in 1864, covering the periods from 1850 to 1870 and from 1850 to 1900. Both graphs are indeed
hump-shaped, supporting the hypothesis of local displacement effects from nearby municipalities
to those with direct railway access.
To further investigate this claim, Table B.8 in the appendix reconstructs our baseline cross-
section results, yet provides a spatially disaggregated analysis by including a set of distance
24Information on the area of US counties is based on the US Census 2000 available at http://factfinder.
census.gov/; the area of Swiss municipalities is based on our own calculations in GIS using the Swiss boundary
files.
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Figure 2.5: Distance to Railway and Population Growth, Local Polynomial with 95% Confidence
Band. Settings: Kernel: Epanechnikov, Degree=0, Bandwith (a)=0.46 (b)=0.43, Pwidth (a)=0.7 (b)=0.64
Residuals: Calculated based on OLS regression of population growth (1850–1870; 1850–1900) on control variables, i.e. distance to the nearest
town node (log), distance to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water (binary),
elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2 (log), and annual district
population growth 1800–1850, and cantonal fixed effects.
dummies. Distance to the railway is calculated as distance between a municipality’s geographic
centroid and the closest railway track, with each distance dummy covering a band with a width
of 2 km.25 Railway only had a positive growth impact on municipalities that either had direct
access to the railway network, or were very close to the railway line. Reproducing the results
from the local polynomial regressions, municipalities located more than 2 km from the railway
network experienced a slowdown in population growth with the negative effect peaking at 6 to
8 km. Taken together, this strongly points towards a local reorganisation of economic activity
as municipalities in the direct vicinity of railway tracks (2 km–10 km) experienced slowing
population growth, suggesting that people moved closer to the railway line after it went into
service.
With regard to effect heterogeneity, it is interesting to investigate whether large municipali-
ties benefited more from railway access in terms of population growth than small ones, as the
home-market channel from economic geography models would suggest. In Table 2.8 we therefore
add an interaction term of railway access with population size prior to the railway construction
in 1850. Column (2) presents both OLS and IV estimates including that interaction term.
The estimated coefficient turns out to be small and insignificant at conventional levels. Conse-
quently, one may conclude that municipality size was not a key moderating factor for the impact
of railway access, thus rejecting implications related to the home-market effect.
Urbanisation in Switzerland advanced quickly in the second half of the 19th century, as Figure
2.1a unambiguously illustrates. This may raise concerns that the effect of railway access was
25We only present OLS results for this part, since instrumenting a series of distance dummies is beyond the
power of our instrument. Considering the results in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 we are not too concerned about selection
issues. Moreover, selection is probably even less likely for the set of municipalities that were close to the railway
tracks but did not gain direct access. Indeed, the results in column (1) of Table B.8 do not point towards selection
effects.
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Table 2.8: The Impact of Railway Access (1847–64) and Interaction Terms on Annual Population
Growth Rates, Cross-Sectional Estimates at the Municipal Level
Long Run 1850–1900
(1) (2) (3)
OLS: Annual Population Growth and Railway Access
Rail Access 1847–64 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Rail Access 1847–64 x Population 1850 0.05
(0.04)
Rail Access 1847–64 x Distance 20 Cities =0.07
(0.06)
R2 0.28 0.28 0.28
Observations 2770 2770 2770
IV: Annual Population Growth and Railway Access
Rail Access 1847-64 0.39∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
Rail Access 1847–64 x Population 1850 0.08
(0.10)
Rail Access 1847–64 x Distance 20 Cities =0.05
(0.14)
Observations 2770 2770 2770
FS 1: F-statistic 146.87 81.99 86.01
FS 2: F-statistic – 67.62 76.78
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual population growth rate in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest town
node(log), distance to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary),
access to navigable water (binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log),
area in km2 (log), annual district population growth 1800–1850, and cantonal fixed effects. Sample: All municipalities of Switzerland,
excluding nodes and municipalities strongly affected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based
on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. Huber-White standard errors in
parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
mainly driven by urbanisation forces. We therefore check whether the impact of railway access
varies with distance to the urban centres. While distance to the 20 largest cities certainly has a
strongly negative impact on population growth rates as seen in Table B.1 in the appendix, the
interaction of distance to the 20 largest cities with railway access has no significant effect on the
population growth rate. This alleviates concerns that the railway access dummy primarily picks
up urbanisation effects, and suggests that railway access was equally beneficial in peripheral
areas and in the direct vicinity of the main urban centres.
Finally, we investigate the impact of railway access at different percentiles of the population
growth distribution using quantile regressions. As Figure B.1 in the appendix reveals, railway
access increased population growth across all percentiles evaluated, with somewhat stronger
effects on faster growing municipalities.
Overall, our results at the municipal level show that railway moderately increased popula-
tion growth in directly connected municipalities. This impact was fairly homogeneous across
municipalities of different sizes, different geographical locations, and different percentiles of the
growth distribution. However, our findings also suggest that unconnected municipalities in the
close vicinity of railway lines experienced a slump in population growth rates, probably due to
displacement effects, as reported for highways by Chandra and Thompson (2000) for instance.
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2.5.4 District Level: Population Growth, Migration, Sectoral Work Shares,
and Body Height
This section reports and discusses the estimation results based on district data. While studying
the municipal level provides a cleaner setup for identification, district data allows for a number
of extensions. First, the previously discussed results raise the question of whether railway had a
positive net impact on local population growth, or simply led to a local zero-sum-shift from mu-
nicipalities without railway access to municipalities with railway access. District level data can
shed light on this question, as one would expect a positive impact of railway access on district
population growth in the first scenario only. Second, Swiss municipality data does not reveal
whether changes in the population count are driven by changes in migration, birth surpluses, or
both. Census data including district birth and death statistics can be used to examine the two
channels separately. Third, one may test the hypothesis that railway access promoted regional
economic development based on further indicators alongside population growth. District statis-
tics on sectoral work shares and the body height of conscripts allow us to gain insights into the
impact of railway on structural change and the biological well-being of the Swiss population.
This last step may also provide answers to the question why railway expansion affected popula-
tion dynamics, since shifts in labour demand and altered living conditions are potential drivers
of migrations flows.
We use the population weighted share of municipalities directly connected to the railway
network as our main explanatory variable on the district level. Reflecting the three waves of
railway constructions in 19th century Switzerland, we define three measures that indicate the ad-
ditional railway access gained by districts in each period, i.e. RASHR1847−64, RASHR1865−82,
and RASHR1883−99.26 These three railway variables are used as main explanatory variables in
our OLS regressions of the form
Y tic = α5 + γ1RASHR
47−64
ic + γ2RASHR
65−82
ic + γ3RASHR
83−99
ic + ϕ5D
1850
ic + κ5c + ϑic, (2.5)
where Yic stands for the outcome of interest in period t, κc denotes cantonal fixed effects,
and D1850ic is a vector of district control variables, including the population weighted log distance
to the nearest city, population weighted access to a main road, log mean district elevation, log
population in 1850, and population growth between 1800 and 1850. We do not report the results
for the IV equivalent of equation (2.5), since a test for weak instruments along Stock and Yogo
(2005) suggests that instrumenting RASHR47−64ic and RASHR
65−82
ic would be unreliable due to
low first stage correlations.
26We calculate the population weighted share of municipalities with railway access for each year and district.
RASHR1847−64i stands for district’s i population weighted share of municipalities with railway access in 1864.
RASHR1865−82i gives district’s i population weighted share of municipalities with railway access in 1882 minus
its population weighted share of municipalities with railway access in 1864. Finally, RASHR1883−99i is district’s
i population weighted share of municipalities with railway access in 1899 minus its population weighted share of
municipalities with railway access in 1882.
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We complement the cross-sectional analysis with OLS and IV district fixed effects panel
estimations, the latter being specified as
RASHRict = pi6i + β6LCPSHRict + λ6t + λ6t · κ6c + ξict, and (2.6)
Yict = pi7i + β7RASHR
∧
ict−1 + λ7t + λ7t · κ7c + εict (2.7)
where time fixed effects, λt, control for population growth cycles on the national level, and
cantonal-time fixed effects, λt · κc, account for cycles on the regional level. LCPSHRict serves
as instrument, which is defined as the population weighted share of municipalities in district i
and decade t that lie on the least-cost path explained in section 2.4.2.
Table 2.9 shows the district level distribution of railway access. During the first wave of
railway construction 84 of the 178 Swiss districts were connected to the railway network, and by
1900 this number increased to 158. The districts’ average share of people living in a municipality
with railway access climbed to 26% by 1864, and reached 55% by the end of the century. With
respect to our main explanatory variable RASHRw, this translates into district averages of 26%
for the first wave, 19% for the second wave, and 10% for the third wave. These numbers are used
in the remainder of this study for back-of-the-envelope calculations of impact magnitudes for
districts with average railway access compared to identical districts without a railway connection.
Table 2.9: Share of Population with RW-Access, District Level Distribution
Mean across Districts Number of Districts with
w Marginala Cumulative No Access (=0) Full Access (=1)
1847–64 0.26 0.26 84 3
1865–82 0.19 0.45 34 8
1883–99 0.10 0.55 20 10
Notes: a This column shows the mean across the explanatory variable RASHRt.
Did these railway improvements affect population growth at the district level, as observed
for municipalities? The results in Table 2.10 indeed suggest that railway access had a positive
net-impact on district population growth, and did not simply lead to a local zero-sum-shift from
municipalities without railway access to municipalities with railway access. A district that was
fully connected to the railway network experienced an average increase in the annual population
growth rate of 0.4 to 0.8 percentage points compared to districts without railway access, which
is slightly larger than the effects found at the municipal level. The panel-IV coefficient is rather
imprecisely estimated, however, and is insignificantly different from our preferred municipality
estimates, which range from 0.4 to 0.5. Furthermore, the equivalent coefficient for the sub-sample
of districts with mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l. is 0.63 (see Table C.1 in the appendix),
and therefore halves the gap to the municipality estimates. While we find significant and robust
correlations between railway access and population growth across different models and sub-
samples, a placebo test based on district population growth prior to the railway era in column
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Table 2.10: The Impact of Railway Access on Annual Population Growth Rates, Cross-Sectional
and Panel Estimates at the District Level
Cross Section Panel FE Panel IV FE IV FS
1800–50 1850–1900 1850–1900 1850–1900 1850–1900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RASHR 1847–64 0.18 0.52∗∗∗ Lag RASHR 0.41∗∗ 0.84+
(0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.43)
RASHR 1865–82 0.14 0.70∗∗∗ LCPSHR 0.43∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.17) (0.09)
RASHR 1883–99 0.05 0.61∗∗
(0.12) (0.22)
R2 0.58 0.49 R2 (within) 0.33 – 0.73
Observations 136 126 Observations 600 600 600
Districts 120 120 120
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual population growth rate in percent. RASHR is defined as the share of a district’s population
that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network. The controls used are distance to the nearest node (log, population
weighted), access to main road (population weighted), mean district elevation (log), population in 1850 (log), and population growth
1800–1850. The sample comprises all districts, except for districts including one of the 33 nodes, and districts strongly affected by railway
construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest
cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. The first stage regression is shown in the last column. LCPSHR is the population weighted
share of municipalities in a district that lie on the least-cost path. Panel estimations include district fixed effects, year fixed effects and
year-cantonal fixed effects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
(1) does not yield significant coefficients for the railway access variables.
The previous findings unequivocally suggest that gaining railway access increased population
growth. In a next step, we explore whether the additional growth is driven by larger birth
surpluses or the migration balance. Based on the districts’ birth and death statistics as reported
in the Swiss census since 1870, we calculate the birth surplus as well as the migration balance for
each decade and district as a share of the districts’ populations. The cross-sectional and panel
OLS regressions presented in Table 2.11 yield a positive correlation between railway access and
the migration balance as well as the excess of birth over death counts. Comparing a district
without railway infrastructure to an identical district with average railway access, the cross
sectional estimates in column (1) translate into a railway induced increase in the net migration
rate of 2.1% of the initial population within 10 years.27 The panel estimates in column (3)
are quantitatively similar to the cross-sectional results and suggest that connecting 55% of a
district’s population to the railway network would cause an increase in the net migration balance
of 2.8 percentage points in the following decade. Turning to the second measure, average railway
access is associated with an increase in the district’s birth surplus of 0.5% to 1% of its initial
population depending on the regression model used.28
As both dependent variables are measured in terms of a district’s population, these results
indicate that railway access had a considerably larger impact on the migration balance than on
the birth surplus. Having said this, it should be noted that the migration balance was negative
for three out of four districts between 1870 and 1900. Hence, improved railway access had a
positive impact of population growth rates because it cushioned the outflow of people to urban
centres rather than causing a net inflow. In summary, one may conclude that railway access had
27Based on the cross-sectional results, the ten-year effect of railway access on the migration balance of an
average district is calculated based on Table 2.9 and 2.11 as follows: (0.26 ·10.18+0.19 ·15.44+0.1 ·7.26)/3 = 2.1.
28Based on the cross-sectional results, the ten-year effect of railway access on the birth surplus of an average
district is calculated based on Table 2.9 and 2.11: (0.26 · 3.52 + 0.19 · 3.68 + 0.1 · 0.83)/3 = 0.5.
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Table 2.11: The Impact of Railway Access on Migration and Birth Surplus, Cross-Sectional and
Panel Estimates at the District Level
Cross Section (1870–1900) Panel FE (1870–1900)
Migrationa Birth Surplusb Migrationa Birth Surplusb
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RASHR 1847–64 10.18+ 3.52∗∗ Lag RASHR 5.06∗ 1.79∗
(5.82) (1.22) (2.02) (0.84)
RASHR 1865–82 15.44∗ 3.68∗∗
(6.36) (1.32)
RASHR 1883–99 7.26 0.83
(5.90) (2.08)
R2 0.54 0.63 R2 (within) 0.30 0.32
Observations 112 112 Observations 327 327
Districts 109 109
Notes: RASHR is defined as the share of a district’s population that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network.
Dependent variable, a: A district’s net balance of migration flow, indicates inflow - outflow. b: A district’s birth surplus as a share of
average population. Railway access is measured by the share of the population that has access (municipalities with railway line) to the
railway network. The sample comprises all districts, except for districts including one of the 33 main nodes, and districts strongly affected
by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The controls used in the cross-section estimation are distance to the nearest
city (log, population weighted), access to main road (population weighted), mean district elevation (log), population in 1850 (log), and
population growth 1800–1850. Cross-section estimations include cantonal fixed effects. Panel estimations include district fixed effects, year
fixed effects and year-cantonal fixed effects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
a weakly positive impact on the birth surplus and at the same time significantly improved the
migration balance by attenuating the net outflow of people. Overall, these two effects translate
on average into an additional annual population growth rate of 0.4 to 0.8 percentage points
caused by full railway access.
In a last step, we complement the analysis of population growth by examining the impact of
railway infrastructure on the sectoral composition and the biological standard of living. These two
variables allow us to evaluate whether the conclusions derived from the population statistics are
robust to the use of other proxies of regional economic development. Furthermore, we may learn
why railway expansion affected population dynamics; railway induced changes in labour demand
and living conditions could have been two potential factors shaping Switzerland’s domestic
migration flows.
While historians have discussed various channels through which railway infrastructure poten-
tially accelerated structural change, to our knowledge no study has so far aimed to quantify these
effects in the Swiss context. One important consequence of railway expansion in Switzerland
was the shift in agricultural production from grain to dairy products, as explained in section 2.2.
Frey and Vogel (e.g. 1997, chapter 8) point out that international demand for dairy products
and the availability of cheap grain from abroad made dairy farming financially more attractive.
Since milk is highly perishable, quick and reliable transport from producers to the processing
industry was crucial, making accessible regions better suited to this type of farming.29 At the
same time animal husbandry was less labour intensive than grain cultivation, meaning that the
shift to dairy farming led to stagnating or even decreasing agricultural workforce numbers. On
top of that, employees in the agricultural sector traditionally supplemented their income with
29Consider the first condensed milk producer in Switzerland as an illustrative example. It started operating in
Cham, 20 km south of Zurich, two years after being connected to the railway network in 1864. In around 1880, it
was supplied by 1350 farmers, absorbing more milk than Switzerland’s largest city Zurich (Frey and Vogel, 1997,
279).
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Table 2.12: The Impact of Railway Access on Sectoral Work Shares, Panel Estimates at the
District Level
Panel FE (1860–1900) Panel IV FE (1860–1900)
Agriculture Manufact. Services Agriculture Manufact. Services
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Lag RASHR =7.74∗∗∗ 6.26∗∗∗ 1.48 =9.69+ 9.14+ 0.55
(1.72) (1.36) (0.99) (5.16) (4.72) (1.59)
R2 (within) 0.54 0.48 0.51 – – –
Districts 117 117 117 117 117 117
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550
Notes: RASHR is defined as the share of a district’s population that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network.
Dependent variable: A district’s sectoral work share in percent (agriculture, manufacturing, services). The sample comprises all districts,
except for districts including one of the 33 main nodes, and districts strongly affected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003,
147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne
nodes. Panel estimations include district fixed effects, year fixed effects and year-cantonal fixed effects. Huber-White standard errors in
parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
home-based manufacturing work. With the advance of industrial mechanisation, driven among
other things by large-scale coal imports via rail, this source of supplemental income began to
vanish continuously. This process made farming jobs less attractive, and therefore potentially
accelerated the decline in agricultural workforce numbers. On the other hand, railway access
arguably offered opportunities in the manufacturing sector and service industry. For instance,
the availability of cheap coal not only accelerated mechanisation, but also cleared the way for
energy-intensive sectors such as steel works, salterns, and cement production (see section 2.2).
Furthermore, railway infrastructure allowed industrial entrepreneurs to relocate to areas that
offered cheap land and labour, without being penalised by uncompetitively high transport costs.
The quintupling of freight volumes from 1870 to 1900 and the more than 350 privately owned –
typically very short – interchange rail tracks illustrate how heavily manufacturers relied on this
new means of transport.30 Regarding services, the railway expansion coincided with a growing
popularity of tourism and leisure activities. Early travel books such as “Baedeker’s Schweiz”
provide detailed accounts of train connections, documenting their attractiveness for (wealthy)
tourists.31 It is certainly no coincidence that nowadays well-known alpine sights like the “Rigi”
(1 795 m.a.s.l.) at the Lake of Lucerne or the “Jungfraujoch” (3 466 m.a.s.l.) in Grindelwald
were connected by rack railways from as early as 1871 and 1912.
We measure sectoral composition based on work shares of the agricultural, manufacturing,
and service sector. The cross-sectional regressions aim to explain the percentage point change
in sectoral work shares between 1860 to 1900 using our period specific district level measures
for railway access along a set of controls. In the panel data models, the sectoral work shares for
each decade are regressed on the lagged value of the time-variant railway access indicator, or its
first-stage prediction in the IV setup.
30Statistics on freight and privately owned interchange tracks were obtained from the Schweizerische Eisenbahn-
statik (SPE, 1900), which is partly accessible online from http://www.bahndaten.ch/ (last access: 01.02.2016).
31Baedeker’s Schweiz, which appeared in 31 revised editions between 1840 and 1905, began offering descriptions
of localities and recommended routes with detailed travel directions, typically information on train connections
such as train operator, journey time, fares, and interchange facilities. It also included a map of Switzerland’s
railway network, as well as a general section on traveling by train with information on fares, circular tickets, and
Switzerland’s official railway guide.
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The cross-sectional regressions (see Table 2.13) and the panel models (see Table 2.12) reveal
an unambiguous pattern. Improvements in the railway access of districts are associated with a
shift from the agricultural sector to the manufacturing and services industries. The estimated
coefficients imply that in districts with average railway access the agricultural work share decli-
ned by an additional 4.6 to 8.3 percentage points between 1860 and 1900 compared to districts
without a railway connection.32 At least two-thirds of this railway induced drop in agricultural
employment were absorbed by an increase in the industrial workforce, while employment gains
in the service sector compensated for one-third or less. Considering that the average drop in
the agricultural work share was 9.2 percentage points in the same period, the drop explained by
railway infrastructure improvements at the district level is substantial.
Although very few sources document industry-specific wages paid during the 19th century in
Switzerland, the available records suggest that wages in the secondary sector were higher than in
the primary sector.33 Since better connected localities experienced on average a faster shift from
agricultural employment to better paid manufacturing jobs, railway related sectoral change may
explain why districts with well-developed railway infrastructure experienced higher population
growth than districts with poor railway access. This notion also reflects a common narrative
within the agrarian community at the time, which claimed that employment opportunities in
the manufacturing sector and the promise of higher living standards in the city were responsible
for the rural exodus, thus jeopardising the traditional social order (Gruner, 1987, 1404).
While fragmentary income data makes it impossible to investigate these claims further, the
body height data of conscripts allow us to directly compare improvements in living standards
across Switzerland. Since the 1970s, interdisciplinary research – known as new anthropome-
tric history – established body height and other anthropometric measures as indicators for the
biological standard of living.34 The adult height of a population serves as a measure of the popu-
lation’s nutritional status from birth through adolescence. Early childhood and the adolescent
growth spurt are considered sensitive periods, during which a person’s stature is most keenly af-
fected by nutritional abundance or scarcity (Steckel, 2009, 8). A broad list of factors influencing
nutritional status and physical growth have been studied, including social class (e.g. Schoch,
Staub and Pfister, 2012), business cycles (e.g. Sunder and Woitek, 2005), industrialisation (e.g.
Steckel and Floud, 1997) and public infrastructure, such as sanitary and electric facilities (e.g.
Thomas and Strauss, 1992) or road access (e.g. Gibson and Rozelle, 2003). These studies find
32Based on the cross-sectional results, the 40 year effect of railway access on the agricultural work share of an
average district is calculated based on Table 2.9 and 2.13: 0.26 · (−14.6) + 0.19 · (−17.2) + 0.1 · (−12.2) = −8.3.
33The database Historical Statistics of Switzerland Online (www.fsw.uzh.ch/histstat/) compiles all industry
specific income statistics available for the 19th century, its main sources being Brugger (1978) for the primary sec-
tor and Gruner (1987) for the secondary sector. While the database is relatively comprehensive for manufacturing
jobs, wages paid in the agricultural sector are only available for the cantons of Geneva and Thurgau. A compa-
rison of average incomes earned in various occupations and regions yields wage differences between the primary
and secondary sector ranging from -20% (construction worker vs. senior farm labourer) to +250% (worker in
horology industry vs. herdsman). By far most of these comparisons suggest that manufacturing jobs were better
paid, even though we did not discount wages in the primary sector for the very poor employment opportunities
during the winter months.
34Steckel (1995) reviews 145 articles on body height and human welfare written between the late 1970s and
1994, while Steckel (2009) covers 326 studies on this topic published between 1995 and 2008.
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Table 2.13: The Impact of Railway Access on Sectoral Work Shares and Body Height, Cross-
Sectional Estimates at the District Level
Sectoral Shares (1860–1900)a Body Heightb
Agriculture Manufacturing Services 1890–1910
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RASHR 1847–64 =14.56∗∗ 9.16∗∗ 4.89∗
(4.48) (3.44) (2.32)
RASHR 1865–82 =17.20∗∗∗ 12.35∗∗∗ 4.25∗ RASHR 1847–82 0.17
(4.65) (3.61) (2.14) (0.29)
RASHR 1883–99 =12.22∗ 2.46 8.82∗ RASHR 1882–99 0.93∗∗
(5.83) (3.46) (4.16) (0.29)
R2 0.49 0.54 0.39 R2 0.73
Observations 123 123 123 Observations 125
Notes: RASHR is defined as the share of a district’s population that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network.
Dependent variable, a: Percentage point change in a district’s sectoral work share (agriculture, manufacturing, services). b: Centimeter
change in a district’s conscripts average body height between 1884/91 and 1908/12. The controls used are distance to the nearest city
(log, population weighted), access to main road (population weighted), mean district elevation (log), population in 1850 (log), population
growth 1800–1850, and cantonal fixed effects. Additionally, models in columns a control for the district’s sectoral work share in 1860
(agric., indust., services), while column b includes the district’s average body height for the 1884/91 conscription. The sample comprises
all districts, except for districts including one of the 33 main nodes, and districts strongly affected by railway construction work (source:
Rey, 2003, 147-149). Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
that economically favourable conditions and well-developed infrastructure are positively corre-
lated with nutrition intake and body height. The study closest to our analysis of body height is
Solakoglu (2007), who evaluates the effect of railway on nutritional intake in the US postbellum
period. Her findings suggest that railway infrastructure increased nutritional intake significantly.
Relating her estimates to findings on calorie intake and body height by Craig and Weiss (1998),
she computes a railway-induced average stature growth of an additional 1.1 cm between 1867
and 1906.
Railway access may have an impact on body height through various channels, including
the price and availability of nutrition and medical treatment, the quantity and physical nature
of labour during adolescence, as well as the dissemination of infectious diseases. To quantify
the net impact of railway infrastructure on body height, we study body height data from two
conscription periods (source: Staub, 2010). The first cross-section comprises the body height of
men physically examined between 1884 and 1891, with their year of birth ranging from 1865 to
1872. The second cross-section includes the body height of men physically examined between
1908 and 1912, with their year of birth ranging from 1889 to 1893.35 We intend to explain the
change in body height of recruits between these two periods using the change in district railway
access and a set of controls (Figure C.1 in the appendix illustrates the timing for this test). Since
we use the change in body height between two conscription periods and control for the initial
body height of recruits, one would expect that only the third wave of railway constructions,
i.e. between 1883 to 1899, has explanatory value. On one hand, recruits registered in the first
military survey available (1884 to 1891) were at least 11 years old by the time the earliest of
these railway lines went into service so that possible railway induced improvements in their
nutritional status were hardly sufficient to translate into body height gains. On the other hand,
35Although the Swiss military authorities surveyed conscripts’ body measurements every year, regional averages
were computed and documented by the statistical office for multi-year periods only. The data from the years 1884
to 1891 and 1908 to 1912 are the earliest records available that can be used in a district comparison; see Staub
(2010, 101–102) for details.
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men recruited in the second period (1908 to 1912) were at most 10 years old when the last third-
wave lines entered into operation, which allowed their stature to be affected by the benefits of
improved railway access during childhood and the adolescent growth spurt.
The last column of Table 2.13 shows the results for the regression of body height changes in
centimetres on railway access at the district level. As hypothesised, railway access prior to 1883
is not significantly correlated with changes in the districts’ average body height between the two
conscription rounds, while railway improvements between 1883 to 1899 are associated with a
highly statistically significant growth effect. According to the coefficient for RASHR 1883–99,
the average body height of young men increased by an additional 9.3 mm if they were domiciled
in a district that gained full railway access between 1883 and 1899 compared to contemporaries
living in a district without improvements in railway access.36 This implies an additional gain
in the conscripts’ average body height of 1 mm for districts with average railway improvements
between 1883 and 1899 relative to districts without additional railway connections in the same
period. Compared to the average increase in body height across districts in the same period,
which is 2.2 cm, these railway induced gains in body height were only marginal, however.
In summary, the regression results for all indicators of regional economic development analy-
sed in this section indicate that railway improvements had a positive and statistically significant
impact. In comparison to districts without any railway connections, those districts with average
railway access experienced a moderate increase in population growth per year (around 0.2 to 0.4
percentage points), a substantially accelerated structural change in the economy (additional 4.6
to 8.3 percentage point shift in work shares from the primary to the secondary/tertiary sector),
and a minor gain in biological well-being. Hence, the results for both the municipal and district
levels support the hypothesis that railway access promoted regional economic development.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates how railway infrastructure affects regional development by studying
railway expansion and population growth in Switzerland during the second half of the 19th
century. We find that the annual population growth rates of municipalities with access to
the railway network were about 0.4 percentage points higher than annual the growth rates of
municipalities without a railway connection. This result proves to be very robust to adjustments
in the econometric framework (cross-section and panel IV ), changes in the sample (whole of
Switzerland and lowlands), examinations of different construction periods (1847–1864 and 1869–
1882 ), as well as adaptations in the spatial units considered (municipalities and districts). The
positive effect of railway access on population growth was markedly localised, however, as we
find strong evidence for displacement effects: Municipalities in the vicinity of railway tracks but
without direct access experienced the lowest population growth, suggesting that people moved
closer to the railway line after it went into service. The district analysis of birth, death, and
36Restricting the sample to districts with a mean elevation of less than 1 000 m.a.s.l. (see column 4 in Table
C.3 in the appendix) yields almost identical results.
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migration statistics confirm that railway primarily had an impact on population growth via the
local migration balance.
We supplement the analysis on population growth with an evaluation of two potential dri-
vers behind migration flows, namely industrialisation inferred from sectoral work shares and
improved living conditions measured via the body height of conscripts. Our estimates consis-
tently show that the share of agricultural labour decreased substantially faster in districts with
above-average railway access, while the same districts experienced an accelerated growth in ma-
nufacturing employment. Concerning body height, our estimations based on recruitment data
yield a weakly positive but highly statistically significant effect of railway improvements between
two conscription rounds and the gain in the recruits’ average body height per district during
that period. These findings signify that railway facilitated industrialisation and improved living
conditions. Both factors – themselves indicators of regional development – likely drove migration
towards better connected localities, as highlighted both by our municipality and district results
on population growth.
Adding to the well-established findings on railway access and city growth, our study of
Switzerland complements the recent literature on the impact of early railway lines in western
countries. We show that not only urban centres but also small rural municipalities along the
main lines benefited from railway access. While the estimated effects in rural areas are less than
half that reported for cities, our findings do not strictly support the home-market hypothesis,
as we find no evidence pointing towards a growth slowdown in peripheral municipalities after
they received access to the railway network.
A. Appendix: Data
Control Variables
Table A.1: Variable Description & Data Sources
Municipal Level
Annual Population Growth 100 · (log(POPi,t2)− log(POPi,t1))/(t2− t1) Census (1850, 60, 70, 80, 88,
1900), Schuler and Schluchter
(in progress)
Treatment Variable
Railway Access Binary indicator. Equals one if railway intersects a municipality’s boun-
dary.
GIS-Dufour (Egli et al., 2005)
Control Variables
Distance to Town Node Natural logarithm of the distance between a municipality’s centroid and
the closest town node’s centroid in kilometers. Town nodes are defined
as Switzerland’s 20 largest towns in 1850.
Swisstopo (2007)
Distance to Stephenson-
Swinburne Node
Natural logarithm of the distance between a municipality’s centroid
and the closest Stephenson-Swinburne node in kilometers. If the clo-
sest Stephenson-Swinburne node is also a town node, we compute the
distance based on the second closest Stephenson-Swinburne node.
Swisstopo (2007)
Access to Main Road in 1850 Binary indicator. Equals one if road of primary importance intersects
a municipality’s boundary, see 2.6.
GIS-Dufour (Egli et al., 2005)
Access to Navigable Water Binary indicator. Equals one if municipality adjoins navigable water. Swisstopo (2007)
Elevation Natural logarithm of the mean elevation (in 100m) calculated based on
a 25 m x 25 m height model.
Swisstopo (2004)
Water Power Potential Binary indicator. Equals one if a river with a water flow of at least
1 m3/s crosses a municipality and – in doing so – overcomes a height
difference of 10m or more, see 2.6.
Swisstopo (2007), Pfaundler
and Scho¨nenberger (2013)
Town Privilege Binary indicator. Equals one if municipality holds the historical town
status.
Guyer (1960)
Population in 1850 Natural logarithm of a municipality’s population in 1850. Census (1850)
Municipal Area Natural logarithm of municipal area in square kilometers. Swisstopo (2007)
District Pop. Growth 1800–50 100 · (log(POPd,t2)− log(POPd,t1))/50 Schluchter (1988), Census
District Level
Annual Population Growth 100 · (log(POPd,t2)− log(POPd,t1))/(t2− t1) Census (1850, 60, 70, 80, 88,
1900)
Migration Balance 100 · (POPd,t2 − POPd,t1 − Birthsurplusd,t1−2)/(POPd,t1) Census (since 1870)
Birth Surplus 100 · (#Birthsd,t1−2 −#Deathsd,t1−2)/( 12POPd,t1 + 12POPd,t2) Census (since 1870)
Work Share: Agriculture Cross-Section: Percentage point change in work share of agric. sector
1860–1900; Panel: Work share in agric. sector
Census (since 1860)
Work Share: Manufacturing Cross-Section: Percentage point change in work share of industrial sec-
tor 1860–1900; Panel: Work share in industrial sector
Census (since 1860)
Work Share: Services Cross-Section: Percentage point change in work share of service industry
1860–1900; Panel: Work share in service industry
Census (since 1860)
Change in Body Height of Con-
scripts
Centimeter change in a district’s conscripts average body height bet-
ween 1884/91 and 1908/12
Staub (2010)
Treatment Variable
Pop. Share with Railway Access Population (as per 1850) weighted share of municipalities that had di-
rect access to the railway network
GIS-Dufour (Egli et al., 2005)
Standard Control Variables
Mean Distance to Town Node Population weighted (as per 1850) minimal distances from a district’s
municipalities to the nearest city-node.
Swisstopo (2007), Census
Pop. Share with Road Access Share of population (as per 1850) with direct access to road of primary
importance.
GIS-Dufour (Egli et al., 2005)
Elevation Mean elevation (in 100m) of district calculated based on a 25 m x 25 m
height model.
Swisstopo (2004)
Population in 1850 Natural logarithm of a district’s population in 1850. Census (1850)
District Pop. Growth 1800–50 100 · (log(POPd,t2)− log(POPd,t1))/50 Schluchter (1988), Census
Additional Control Variables
Work Share in 1860 A district’s work share in agriculture/industry/services in 1860 Census (since 1860)
Body Height of Conscripts in
1884/91
A district’s conscripts average body height as measured between 1884–
91.
Staub (2010)
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics
Municipal Level Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Annual Population Growth, 1850–1900 (cross-section) 2844 0.15 0.66 =2.43 5.90
Annual Population Growth, 1850–1900 (pooled) 14 330 0.15 1.27 =16.05 22.23
Treatment Variable
Railway Access, 1850–1900 (pooled) 17 322 0.22 - 0 1
Control Variables
LN(Distance to Town Node) 2854 2.90 0.63 0.68 4.44
LN(Distance to Stephenson-Swinburne Node) 2854 3.08 0.74 0.21 4.64
Access to Main Road in 1850 2887 0.38 - 0 1
Access to Navigable Water 2887 0.06 - 0 1
LN(Elevation in 100m) 2887 1.97 0.49 0.78 3.40
Water Power Potential 2887 0.42 - 0 1
Town Privilege 2887 0.04 - 0 1
LN(Population) in 1850 2847 6.25 0.92 3.56 10.64
LN(Municipal Area) 2887 2.00 1.04 =1.14 5.64
District Level Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Annual Population Growth, 1850–1900 (cross-section) 178 0.35 0.48 =6.00 2.36
Annual Population Growth, 1850–1900 (pooled) 944 0.51 1.85 =4.50 51.10
Migration Balance, 1870–1900 (cross-section) 143 =12.11 16.39 =44.83 40.12
Migration Balance, 1870–1900 (pooled) 429 =4.09 6.59 =29.30 24.60
Birth Surplus, 1870–1900 (cross-section) 143 7.40 3.40 =9.60 15.59
Birth Surplus, 1870–1900 (pooled) 429 7.40 3.72 =13.42 20.02
∆ Work Share: Agricult., 1860–1900 (cross-section) 161 =9.17 9.70 =36.22 14.97
Work Share: Agricult., 1860–1900 (pooled) 784 51.27 19.23 2.18 96.24
∆ Work Share: Manuf., 1860–1900 (cross-section) 161 4.09 8.49 =16.34 29.04
Work Share: Manuf., 1860–1900 (pooled) 784 36.32 17.15 2.43 84.12
∆ Work Share: Services, 1860-1900 (cross-section) 161 5.07 4.00 =2.28 26.96
Work Share: Services, 1860–1900 (pooled) 784 12.41 6.59 1.33 50.17
∆ Body Height of Conscripts, 1884/91–1908/12 176 2.16 0.99 0.00 6.00
Treatment Variable
Pop. Share with Railway Access, 1850–1900 (pooled) 1068 0.35 0.34 0 1
Standard Control Variables
LN(Mean Distance to Town Node) in 1850 158 3.00 0.57 1.59 4.27
Pop. Share with Road Access in 1850 178 0.76 0.21 0 1
LN(Elevation in 100m) 178 2.12 0.52 1.20 3.26
LN(Population) in 1850 178 9.32 0.62 7.30 11.07
Annual Population Growth, 1800–1850 (cross-section) 175 0.69 0.31 =0.30 1.49
Additional Control Variables
Work Share: Agriculture in 1860 149 55.06 17.57 7.85 92.84
Work Share: Manufacturing in 1860 149 35.45 15.95 4.64 76.58
Work Share: Services in 1860 149 9.49 4.72 2.52 32.39
Body Height of Conscripts in 1884/91 176 163.40 1.47 159.4 166.9
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Road Network
We use information on the development of the road network in the 18th and 19th century
from the GIS-Dufour project (Egli et al., 2005). GIS-Dufour documents all roads and their
classification according to the cantonal road laws. The road laws were enacted in most cantons
in the years 1830–1840 and they differ from canton to canton. However, most cantonal laws
include at least a classification on roads of primary importance, i.e. class 1 roads. To control
for road accessibility we use information on the class 1 road network, and identify municipalities
with access to a class 1 road. Figure A.2 shows the first class road network in the year 1850.
Potential for Water Power Generation
Early Swiss industrial development used hydropower as an important source to run industrial
machines. Since Switzerland itself had no coal deposits, wood was a limited power source
and there was no high-capacity means of transportation for fossil fuels, water was the main
source of power for industrial development prior to the railway era (Schnitter, 1992). By the
year 1876 Switzerland had hydroelectric power plants installed with a capacity of 70 350 horse
power (Weissenbach, 1876). For each municipality we define a potential for hydroelectric power
based on existing hydropower technologies. The main parameters determining the potential for
hydropower are the water cumulative flows and the gradient that the water falls. The Francis
Turbine was invented in the year 1849 by James B. Francis and the most advanced technology at
the beginning of the railway era in Switzerland. Taking the technical constraints of the Francis
Turbine into account, we define a simplified indicator for hydro power potential based on two
conditions: First, the water flow has to reach a minimum of at least 1 m3/s. Second, the height
difference between the point of entry and exit of a river flowing through a municipality has to
be at least 10 m. If a watercourse satisfying both conditions runs through a municipality, it is
assigned value 1, and otherwise 0. We construct this variable based on detailed information on
water drain measured for each water body in Switzerland combined with data on larger river
water flows measured by metering stations.1 Using GIS we determine for every water body the
point of entry and exit for each municipality and the height difference between entry and exit
point. We then code municipalities as having the potential for industrial hydropower generation
using the parameters mentioned above.
1Data on water drain is available at http://www.bafu.admin.ch/wasser/13462/13496/15016/index.html?lang=de
(Pfaundler and Scho¨nenberger, 2013); data from metering stations along larger Swiss rivers is available at
http://www.hydrodaten.admin.ch/de/stationen-und-daten.html.
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Figure A.1: Original Stephenson & Swinburne Plan with Main Nodes
Notes: The figure displays the original Stephenson & Swinburne railway plan and the selected main nodes. The selection
of nodes is based on the proposed traffic hubs of Stephenson & Swinburne and the 20 largest municipalities in the year 1850
that had the town privilege. Some towns were both a hub in the original Stephenson & Swinburne plan and belonged to
the 20 largest cities in 1850.
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Roads 1st Class 1850
District above 1000m
Figure A.2: Roads of Primary Importance in 1850
Notes: Road network displaying roads with a classification 1 according to the cantonal road laws in 1850, based on the
GIS-Dufour project (Egli et al., 2005).
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Sample of Districts
Table A.3: Sample of Districts across Different Dependent Variables
ID District ID District ID District ID District
Canton Zurich Canton of Schwyz Canton of St. Gallen Canton of Ticino
101 Affoltern 501 Einsiedeln 1701 St. Gallenn,s,b 2101 Bellinzonan,c
102 Andelfingen 502 Gersau 1702 Rorschachn 2102 Blenio
103 Bu¨lach 503 Ho¨fe 1703 Unterrheintal 2103 Leventinac
104 Dielsdorfs,b 504 Ku¨snacht 1704 Oberrheintaln 2104 Locarnon,c
105 Hinwil 505 March 1705 Werdenberg 2105 Luganon,c
106 Horgen 506 Schwyzc,b 1706 Sargansn 2106 Mendrisio
107 Meilen Canton of Obwalden 1707 Gaster 2107 Rivieran,c
108 Pfa¨ffikon 600 Obwalden 1708 See 2108 Vallemaggia
109 Uster Canton of Nidwalden 1709 Obertoggenburg Canton of Vaud
110 Winterthurn,b 700 Nidwalden 1710 Neutoggenburg 2201 Aigle
111 Zu¨richn,s,b Canton of Glarus 1711 Alttoggenburg 2202 Aubonne
Canton of Bern 800 Glarus 1712 Untertoggenburg 2203 Avenches
201 Aarbergn Canton of Zug 1713 Wil 2204 Cossonay
202 Aarwangens,b 900 Zugc 1714 Gossaun,s,b 2205 Echallens
203 Bernn,b Canton of Fribourg Canton of Grisons 2206 Grandson
204 Bieln,s,b 1001 Broye 1801 Albulac 2207 Lausannen,b
205 Bu¨ren 1002 Glane 1802 Bernina 2208 Lavaux
206 Burgdorf 1003 Gruyere 1803 Glennerc,s 2209 Morgesn
207 Courtelary 1004 Saanen 1804 Heinzenbergc 2210 Moudonn,b
208 Delemontb 1005 See 1805 Hinterrheinc 2211 Nyon
209 Erlach 1006 Sense 1806 Imbodenc,s 2212 Orbe
210 Franches-Montagne 1007 Veveyse 1807 Inn 2213 Oron
211 Fraubrunnen Canton of Solothurn 1808 Malojac 2214 Payerne
212 Frutigenc 1101 Balsthal 1809 Moesa 2215 Enhaut
213 Interlaken 1102 Bucheggb.-Kriegst. 1810 Mu¨stair 2216 Rolle
214 Konolfingens 1103 Dorneck-Thierstein 1811 Oberlandquart 2217 Valle´e
215 Laufen 1104 Olten-Goesgenn 1812 Plessurn 2218 Veveyn
216 Laupen 1105 Solothurn-Lebernn 1813 Unterlandquartc 2219 Yverdonn
217 Moutier Canton of Basel-Stadt 1814 Vorderrheins Canton of Valais
218 La Neuveville 1200 Baseln,b Canton of Aargau 2301 Brigc
219 Nidaus,b Canton of Basel-Land 1901 Aaraun 2302 Conthey
220 Oberhasli 1301 Arlesheimb 1902 Badenn 2303 Entremont
221 Porrentruy 1302 Liestal 1903 Bremgarten 2304 Goms
222 Saanen 1303 Sissach 1904 Bruggn 2305 He´rens
223 Schwarzenburg 1304 Waldenburg 1905 Kulm 2306 Leuk
224 Seftigen Canton of Schaffhausen 1906 Laufenburgs 2307 Martigny
225 Signau 1401 Oberklettgaus 1907 Lenzburgc 2308 Monthey
226 Simmental, Nieder-c 1402 Reiats 1908 Muric 2309 Raronc
227 Simmental, Ober- 1403 Schaffhausenn,s 1909 Rheinfelden 2310 Saint-Maurice
228 Thunn,s,b 1404 Schleitheim 1910 Zofingen 2311 Sierre
229 Trachselwald 1405 Stein 1911 Zurzachs 2312 Sion
230 Wangens,b 1406 Unterklettgaus Canton of Thurgau 2313 Visp
Canton of Lucerne Canton of Appenzell (AR) 2001 Arbonn,s Canton of Neuchatel
301 Entlebuchs,b 1501 Hinterlandp 2002 Bischofszellp,s,b,h 2401 Boudrys
302 Hochdorf 1502 Mittellandp 2003 Diessenhofen 2402 Chaux-de-Fondsn
303 Luzernn,b 1503 Vorderlandp 2004 Frauenfeldp,s,b,h 2403 Loclen
304 Sursees,b Canton of Appenzell (AI) 2005 Kreuzlingenp,s,b,h 2404 Neuchateln
305 Willisau 1600 Appenzell 2006 Mu¨nchwilenp 2405 Val-de-Ruzs
Canton of Uri 2007 Steckbornp,s,b,h 2406 Val-de-Travers
400 Uric 2008 Weinfeldenp,s,b,h Canton of Geneva
2500 Genevan,b
Notes: n: Districts including one of the 33 main nodes. Excluded in all regression models. c: Districts that
were affected by railway construction work in a given decade (see Rey, 2003, 147–149). Observation is excluded
in all regressions covering the concerned period. p: Population data for 1800 cannot be merged reliably for
these districts. Observation is excluded in all cross-section regressions. s: The employment data cannot be
merged reliably for these districts, at least in certain decades. Observation is excluded in regressions with
sectoral composition as dependent variable covering the concerned period. b: The birth and death statistics
cannot be merged reliably for these districts, at least in certain decades. Observation is excluded in regressions
with migration or birth surplus as dependent variable covering the concerned period. h: The body height data
cannot be merged reliably for these districts, at least in certain decades. Observation is excluded in regressions
with body height as dependent variable covering the concerned period.
B. Empirical Appendix: Municipality Level
Table B.1: The Impact of Railway Access (1847–64) on Annual Population Growth Rates (1850–
1900), Cross-Sectional Estimates at the Municipal Level
OLS IV IV, First Stage
(1) (2) (3)
Railway Access 1847–64 0.41∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.10)
LCP 1847–64 0.33∗∗∗
(0.03)
Road Access 1850 0.05∗ 0.06+ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Water Access 0.07 0.07 0.13∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Log Elevation =0.25∗∗∗ =0.25∗∗∗ =0.07∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Water Power Potential 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Log Distance to Town Node =0.24∗∗∗ =0.24∗∗∗ =0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Log Distance to Steph.-Swinb. Node 0.04+ 0.04+ =0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Log Population 1850 =0.05 =0.05 0.07∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Log Area 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ =0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Town Privilege 0.36∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.07+
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
Subsequent Railway Access 0.29∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ =0.23∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
District Pop. Growth 1800–50 =1.58 =1.58 1.41
(7.45) (7.41) (2.62)
R2 0.28 – 0.39
Observations 2770 2770 2770
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. Sample: All municipalities, excluding nodes and
municipalities strongly affected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-
cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. Huber-White standard errors in
parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Robustness: Municipalities in Districts below 1 000 Meters
Table B.2: The Impact of Railway Access (1847–64) on Annual Population Growth Rates,
Cross-Sectional Estimates (Sample: Mean District Elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Long Run 10 Year Periods
1800–50a 1850–1900 1850–60 1860–70 1870–80 1880–90 1890–1900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1847–64 =0.02 0.42∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
R2 0.27 0.30 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.17
Observations 826 2018 2018 2018 2000 2000 2018
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1847–64 0.13 0.42∗∗∗ 0.12 0.34∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.38+ 0.38
(0.16) (0.12) (0.17) (0.16) (0.21) (0.20) (0.25)
Observations 826 2018 2018 2018 2000 2000 2018
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 1847–64 and Least-Cost Paths
LCP 1847–64 0.24∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
R2 0.29 0.37 0.31 0.31 0.35 0.36 0.37
Observations 826 2018 2018 2018 2000 2000 2018
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest town node (log), distance
to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water
(binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2 (log), annual district
population growth 1800–1850, and cantonal fixed effects. Sample: Municipalities of districts with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.,
excluding nodes and municipalities strongly affected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). a: Pre-railway sample
available for 4 cantons. The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne
nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
Table B.3: The Impact of Railway Access (1869–82) on Annual Population Growth Rates,
Cross-Sectional Estimates (Sample: Mean District Elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Long Run 10 Year Periods
1850–70a 1870–1900 1850–60a 1860–70 1870–80 1880–90 1890–1900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1869–82 0.19∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.17∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
R2 0.12 0.27 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.17
Observations 1669 1669 1669 1669 1653 1653 1669
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1869–82 =0.38∗ 0.43∗ =0.31 =0.45+ 0.23 0.56∗ 0.48
(0.19) (0.17) (0.25) (0.24) (0.29) (0.26) (0.32)
Observations 1669 1669 1669 1669 1653 1653 1669
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 1869-82 and Least-Cost Paths
LCP 1869-82 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
R2 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.33
Observations 1669 1669 1669 1669 1653 1653 1669
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest town node (log), distance
to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water
(binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2 (log), cantonal fixed
effects, and population growth 1850–1860 (except for columns a, where district population growth 1800–1850 is used). Sample: Municipalities
of districts with mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., excluding nodes and municipalities strongly affected by railway construction work (source:
Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne
nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Robustness: Pre-Treatment Sample
Table B.4: The Impact of Railway Access (1847–64) on Annual Population Growth Rates,
Cross-Sectional Estimates (Sample: Municipalities with Pre-Railway Data Available)
Pre-Treatment Post-Treatment
1800–37a 1837–50b 1800–50a 1850–1900c
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1847–64 0.03 =0.11 0.00 0.56∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06)
R2 0.21 0.10 0.26 0.29
Observations 903 903 903 900
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1847–64 0.13 0.24 0.15 0.95∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.30) (0.15) (0.24)
Observations 903 903 903 900
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 1847–64 and Least-Cost Paths
LCC 1847–64 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Observations 903 903 903 900
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest city (log), distance to
the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water
(binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), area in km2 (log), and cantonal fixed effects. Additional
controls, a: population in 1800 (log); b: population in 1837 (log); c: population in 1850 (log) and annual population growth 1800–1850.
Sample: Municipalities for which population data is available for the pre-railway period (four cantons: ZH, BE, SO, AG), excluding nodes
and municipalities strongly affected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost
path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. +
p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
Table B.5: The Impact of Railway Access (1847–64) on Annual Population Growth Rates,
Cross-Sectional Estimates (Sample: Municipalities with Pre-Railway Data Available and Mean
District Elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Pre-Treatment Post-Treatment
1800–37a 1837–50b 1800–50a 1850–1900c
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1847–64 0.02 =0.13+ =0.02 0.54∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06)
R2 0.22 0.11 0.27 0.29
Observations 826 826 826 826
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1847–64 0.08 0.28 0.13 0.88∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.32) (0.16) (0.26)
Observations 826 826 826 826
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 1847–64 and Least-Cost Paths
LCC 1847–64 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Observations 826 826 826 826
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest city (log), distance to
the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water
(binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), area in km2 (log), and cantonal fixed effects. Additional
controls, a: population in 1800 (log); b: population in 1837 (log); c: population in 1850 (log) and annual population growth 1800–1850.
Sample: Municipalities for which population data is available for the pre-railway period (four cantons: ZH, BE, SO, AG) and with mean
district elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., excluding nodes and municipalities strongly affected by railway construction work (source: Rey,
2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne
nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Table B.6: The Impact of Railway Access (1847–64) on Annual Population Growth Rates,
Cross-Sectional Estimates (Sample: Municipalities with Pre-Railway Data Available)
Long Run 10 Year Periods
1800–50a 1850–1900 1850–60 1860–70 1870–80 1880–90 1890–1900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1847–64 0.00 0.56∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12)
R2 0.26 0.29 0.07 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.17
Observations 903 900 903 903 898 898 900
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1847–64 0.15 0.95∗∗∗ 0.33 0.57∗ 0.70+ 0.68+ 1.28∗∗
(0.15) (0.24) (0.28) (0.26) (0.36) (0.35) (0.49)
Observations 903 900 903 903 898 898 900
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 1847–64 and Least-Cost Paths
LCC 1847–64 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
R2 0.29 0.29 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.27 0.29
Observations 903 900 903 903 898 898 900
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest city (log), distance to the
nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water (binary),
elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2 (log), population in 1850 (log),
annual population growth 1800–1850, and cantonal fixed effects. Other controls, a: population in 1800 (log) instead of 1850, and without
annual population growth 1800-1850. Sample: Excluding nodes and municipalities strongly affected by railway construction work (source:
Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne
nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
Table B.7: The Impact of Railway Access (1847–64) on Annual Population Growth Rates,
Cross-Sectional Estimates, (Sample: Municipalities with Pre-Railway Data Available and Mean
District Elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Long Run 10 Year Periods
1800–50a 1850–1900 1850–60 1860–70 1870–80 1880–90 1890–1900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1847–64 =0.02 0.54∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12)
R2 0.27 0.29 0.07 0.11 0.19 0.13 0.19
Observations 826 826 826 826 821 821 826
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 1847–64 0.13 0.88∗∗∗ 0.47 0.52+ 0.61 0.70+ 1.06∗
(0.16) (0.26) (0.29) (0.27) (0.38) (0.37) (0.51)
Observations 826 826 826 826 821 821 826
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 1847–64 and Least-Cost Paths
LCC 1847–64 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
R2 0.29 0.29 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.29
Observations 826 826 826 826 821 821 826
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest city (log), distance
to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water
(binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2 (log), population in
1850 (log), annual population growth 1800–1850, and cantonal fixed effects. Other controls, a: population in 1800 (log) instead of 1850, and
without annual population growth 1800–1850. Sample: Municipalities of districts with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., excluding nodes
and municipalities strongly affected by railway construction work (see Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path
for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.. + p<0.10, *
p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Additional Results: Displacement Effects and Heterogeneity
Table B.8: Distance to Railway (1847–64) and Annual Population Growth Rates, Cross-Sectional
OLS Estimates at the Municipal Level
Pre-Treatment Samplea Whole Switzerland
1800–50 1850–70 1850–1900 1850–70 1850–1900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rail Access 1847–64 0.04 0.12 0.39∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04)
Distance to Railway 0–2 km =0.01 =0.05 0.00 0.14+ 0.16∗∗
(0.07) (0.12) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06)
Distance to Railway 2–4 km 0.00 =0.28∗∗ =0.17∗ =0.11∗ =0.08∗
(0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
Distance to Railway 4–6 km 0.07 =0.26∗∗ =0.20∗∗ =0.15∗∗ =0.14∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
Distance to Railway 6–8 km 0.11∗ =0.31∗∗ =0.26∗∗∗ =0.15∗∗ =0.19∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
Distance to Railway 8–10 km 0.10∗ =0.13 =0.19∗ 0.02 =0.09∗
(0.05) (0.12) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04)
R2 0.27 0.13 0.30 0.18 0.29
Observations 903 903 903 2810 2790
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The municipalities with railway access are always
excluded from the groups of distance dummies. The controls used are distance to the nearest town node (log), distance to
the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to
navigable water (binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log),
area in km2 (log), annual district population growth 1800–1850, and cantonal fixed effects. Distance dummies are exclusive,
municipalities with direct railway access are not in the group of municipalities with a distance of 0–2km. The reference group
are municipalities with a distance from the railway line larger than 10 km. Sample: All municipalities of Switzerland, excluding
nodes and municipalities strongly affected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). a: pre-railway sample
available for 4 cantons. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Figure B.1: Quantile Treatment Effects of Railway Access (1847–64) on Annual Population
Growth (1850–1900), 10th to 90th Percentile.
Controls: Distance to the nearest town node (log), distance to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access
(binary), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water (binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege
(binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2 (log), annual district population growth 1800–1850, and cantonal fixed effects.
C. Empirical Appendix: District Level
Robustness: Districts with Mean Elevation below 1 000 Meters
Table C.1: The Impact of Railway Access on Annual Population Growth Rates, Cross-Sectional
and Panel Estimates (Sample: Districts with a Mean Elevat. below 1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Cross Section Panel FE Panel IV FE IV FS
1800–50 1850–1900 1850–1900 1850–1900 1850–1900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RASHR 1847–64 =0.06 0.47∗ Lag RASHR 0.44∗∗ 0.63+
(0.21) (0.18) (0.15) (0.39)
RASHR 1865–82 =0.10 0.82∗∗∗ LCPSHR 0.48∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.21) (0.09)
RASHR 1883–99 =0.28 0.41∗
(0.23) (0.21)
R2 0.48 0.58 R2 (within) 0.39 – 0.77
Observations 80 80 Observations 400 400 400
Districts 80 80 80
Notes: Dependent variable is the annual population growth rate in percent. RASHR is defined as the share of a district’s population
that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network. The controls used are distance to the nearest node (log, population
weighted), access to main road (population weighted), mean district elevation (log), population in 1850 (log), and population growth
1800–1850. The sample comprises all districts with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., except for districts including one of the 33 nodes,
and districts strongly affected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path
for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. The first stage regression is shown in the last column.
LCPSHR is the population weighted share of municipalities in a district that lie on the least-cost path. Panel estimations include district
fixed effects, year fixed effects and year-cantonal fixed effects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
*** p<0.001.
Table C.2: The Impact of Railway Access on Migration and Birth Surplus, Cross-Sectional and
Panel Estimates (Sample: Districts with a Mean Elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Cross Section (1870–1900) Panel FE (1870–1900)
Migrationa Birth Surplusb Migrationa Birth Surplusb
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RASHR 1847–64 16.24+ 1.38 Lag RASHR 4.95∗∗ 1.88+
(9.06) (1.47) (1.85) (0.99)
RASHR 1865–82 25.63∗∗ 1.51
(9.17) (1.33)
RASHR 1883–99 17.03+ =3.69
(8.91) (2.93)
R2 0.61 0.70 R2 (within) 0.42 0.36
Observations 72 72 Observations 215 215
Districts 72 72
Notes: RASHR is defined as the share of a district’s population that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network.
Dependent variable, a: A district’s net balance of migration flow, indicates inflow - outflow. b: A district’s birth surplus as a share of
average population. Railway access is measured by the share of the population that has access (municipalities with railway line) to the
railway network. The sample comprises all districts with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., except for districts including one of the
33 main nodes, and districts strongly affected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The controls used in the cross-
section estimation are distance to the nearest city (log, population weighted), access to main road (population weighted), mean district
elevation (log), population in 1850 (log), and population growth 1800–1850. Cross-section estimations include cantonal fixed effects. Panel
estimations include district fixed effects, year fixed effects and year-cantonal fixed effects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. +
p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Table C.3: The Impact of Railway Access on Sectoral Work Shares and Body Height, Cross-
Sectional Estimates (Sample: Districts with a Mean Elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Sectoral Shares (1860–1900)a Body Heightb
Agriculture Manufacturing Services 1890–1910
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RASHR 1847–64 =16.87∗∗ 11.80∗ 4.67∗∗
(5.73) (5.31) (1.66)
RASHR 1865–82 =22.95∗∗∗ 18.96∗∗ 3.91∗ RASHR 1847–82 0.59
(6.14) (5.53) (1.58) (0.39)
RASHR 1883–99 =12.04∗ 5.65 6.45∗∗∗ RASHR 1882–99 1.08∗
(5.02) (4.63) (1.39) (0.53)
R2 0.62 0.65 0.47 R2 0.77
Observations 77 77 77 Observations 79
Notes: RASHR is defined as the share of a district’s population that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network.
Dependent variable, a: Percentage point change in a district’s sectoral work share (agriculture, manufacturing, services). b: Centimeter
change in a district’s conscripts average body height between 1884/91 and 1908/12. The controls used are distance to the nearest city
(log, population weighted), access to main road (population weighted), mean district elevation (log), population in 1850 (log), population
growth 1800–1850, and cantonal fixed effects. Additionally, models in columns a control for the district’s sectoral work share in 1860
(agric., indust., services), while column b includes the district’s average body height for the 1884/91 conscription. The sample comprises
all districts with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., except for districts including one of the 33 main nodes, and districts strongly
affected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, **
p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
Table C.4: The Impact of Railway Access on Sectoral Work Shares, Panel Estimates (Sample:
Districts with a Mean Elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Panel FE (1860–1900) Panel IV FE (1860–1900)
Agriculture Manufact. Services Agriculture Manufact. Services
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Lag RASHR =6.74∗∗∗ 7.09∗∗∗ =0.35 =11.10∗ 8.33 2.76+
(1.61) (1.47) (0.50) (5.53) (5.09) (1.52)
R2 (within) 0.62 0.57 0.61 – – –
Districts 77 77 77 77 77 77
Observations 357 357 357 357 357 357
Notes: RASHR is defined as the share of a district’s population that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network.
Dependent variable: A district’s sectoral work share in percent (agriculture, manufacturing, services). The sample comprises all districts
with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., except for districts including one of the 33 main nodes, and districts strongly affected by
railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20
largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. Panel estimations include district fixed effects, year fixed effects and year-cantonal fixed
effects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
Impact of Railway Access on Body Height: Timing
Figure C.1: Impact of Railway Access on Body Height, Timing.
3 Do Words Matter? The Impact of Communication
on the PIIGS’ CDS and Bond Yield Spreads during
Europe’s Sovereign Debt Crisis*
3.1 Introduction
The European debt crisis has sparked a heated controversy on its causes, mechanics, and po-
tential solutions. This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debate by focusing on an aspect
that has – at least to my knowledge – not been analysed systematically so far: Communication
by the eurozone’s policy-makers and its effect on sovereign Credit Default Swap (CDS) and bond
yield spreads.1
Communication can alter expectations and with it market outcomes for at least two reasons
(cf. Blinder et al., 2008). In the presence of asymmetric information between policy-makers
and the public, communication can hold important information for market participants. Furt-
hermore, individuals may base their decisions on heuristics, since rational optimisation is too
complex. Communication can provide the basis for such shortcuts, and thereby directly influence
behaviour. Indeed, a number of empirical studies provide convincing evidence for the impact
of communication by central bankers on the economy (for a comprehensive survey see Blinder
et al., 2008).
Even though a substantial body of research on central bank communication has emerged,
there are hardly any studies on the impact of public statements by other institutions.2 Little is
known about the effects of public statements by decision-makers beyond the field of monetary
1As the global financial crisis evolved into a (European) sovereign debt crisis, the developments of sovereign
CDS and bond yield spreads have received heightened attention. For instance, Aizenman, Hutchison and Jin-
jarak (2013) investigate the main macroeconomic determinants of sovereign CDS spreads, whereas von Hagen,
Schuknecht and Wolswijk (2011) study cross country differences in sovereign bond yields. Both studies find that
markets have penalised fiscal imbalances more strongly after the outbreak of the financial crisis in fall 2008 than
before.
2One exception is a paper by Burkhard and Fischer (2009). The authors compare exhange rate reactions to
verbal references by the Swiss National Bank on the one hand, and calls for interventions by the IMF, OECD and
Swiss government officials on the other hand. Whereas the National Bank’s verbal interventions affect financial
markets, Burkhard and Fischer (2009) do not find any responses to statements by the other agents considered.
*This chapter partially builds on my MA-Thesis “Putting Lipstick on the PIIGS: Does Communication Affect
European CDS and Bond Yield Spreads?” and was published in the European Journal of Political Economy, Vol.
32 (2013) 412–431.
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policy. Despite this lack of empirical knowledge, it is often argued that communication plays
a crucial role in crisis management (e.g. Boin et al., 2005). Repeated calls for more verbal
discipline among European officials – in some cases one could refer to open disputes – highlight
the significance attributed to communication in dealing with the eurozone crisis.3
The question whether communication actually matters in the context of the ongoing debt
crisis, however, remains unanswered. This paper argues that the eurozone’s institutional fra-
mework and its strategy to manage the crisis cause great uncertainty among private agents,
which is why they strongly rely on policy signals by leading decision-makers. Since politicians
and central bankers cannot only intervene decisively in the economy, but also have superior
knowledge about the tools they consider appropriate to do so, a substantial level of asymmetric
information prevails. Hence, by commenting on potential policy options decision-makers can
provide valuable information to market participants. More specifically, such statements can give
important insights on the European community’s commitment to support indebted nations and
protect its creditors, which in turn can affect the behaviour of investors.
To study the impact of communication by the eurozone’s leading decision-makers, I examine
the sovereign CDS and bond yield spreads of the so-called PIIGS, namely Portugal, Ireland,
Italy, Greece, and Spain. I thereby draw on daily data for the period between January 1, 2009
to August 12, 2011 which I analyse in an EGARCH framework. The results suggest that both
hawkish and dovish statements moved financial markets during the period under consideration.
Dovish comments display a weaker pattern with respect to sign and significance than hawkish
statements, especially in the bond yield models, which seem to be less responsive than CDS
premia.
The paper starts by discussing the role of communication in the context of the European debt
crisis. Section 3.3 presents the data. Section 3.3.3 discusses the results of the main empirical
analysis and tests for robustness. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The Role of Communication in Europe’s Crisis Management
Rating downgrades of Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Ireland in early 2009 sparked growing con-
cerns about the sustainability of public finances within the eurozone. As the situation deteri-
3For instance, ECB executive board member Lorenzo Bini Smaghi accused Germany for driving up the bailout
costs, stating that “[i]n one large euro area country it was thought that public support for swift action could
be achieved by dramatizing the situation. But it was not realized that, in the mist of financial upheaval, such
words are like fanning the flames [...]” (Dow Jones, 28/05/2010). At the same time, the ECB was also critised for
its communication strategy. Whereas Jean-Claude Juncker pledged the Central Bank to “speak with one voice”
(Reuters, 01/11/2010), Chicago economist Harald Uhlig accused its President to have “ruined the reputation
of the ECB” due to the “worst communication from a central banker” that he had ever seen (Market News
International, 01/06/2010). Some statements even triggered disputes among cabinet colleagues. In September
2011, Philipp Ro¨sler, Germany’s minister of economics and technology, commented on scenarios for a Greek
insolvency. In response, Wolfgang Scha¨uble publicly rebuked him, pointing out that all matters related to the
Euro are part of the finance ministry’s responsibility. Voicing his resentment, Scha¨uble added: “I can’t help
it that others comment on these issues as well.” See Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung: “Offener Streit um Griechenland-
A¨usserungen.” First published on September 17, 2011. Online available: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/
schaeuble-gegen-roesler-der-finanzminister-ist-fuer-den-euro-zustaendig-1.1145200.
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orated further, numerous economists and politicians even questioned the survival of Europe’s
common currency. In handling these serious developments, communication could have played a
decisive role for at least three reasons.
First, the eurozone’s institutional framework provides little detail regarding tools for the
management of a debt crisis. The ‘no-bailout clause’ was formerly interpreted as ruling out
any bilateral or coordinated financial aid within the common currency area. Besides, neither
the Maastricht Treaty nor its amendments provide a legal basis for an orderly sovereign default
procedure or a member state expulsion.4 Complicating things further, the eurozone’s multilayer
decision-making process is prone to deadlocks because many rulings require unanimity. In this
context, politicians and central bankers were forced to formulate a crisis strategy from scratch,
and markets could only rely on their verbal references to anticipate potential interventions within
the common currency area.
Second, eurozone officials have been gradually taking countermeasures thereby leaving room
for continuous adjustments. Once it had become clear that Europe’s policy-makers were willing
to circumvent the no-bailout clause their further intentions regarding private sector involvements,
the EFSF’s lending power, exits and expulsions of member states, the ECB’s collateral framework
and sovereign bond buys have remained somewhat opaque. Therefore, statements on future
policy decisions may have decisively shaped the market’s perception of the EMU’s long-term
commitment to support heavily indebted countries. Given that the pricing of the PIIGS’ market
debt crucially depends on the credibility of this commitment (cf. Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011),
communication could substantially influence market outcomes.
Third, the eurozone’s institutional setup may decisively amplify the effects of verbal interven-
tions: Comparing developments in Spain and the United Kingdom, Kopf (2011) and De Grauwe
(2011) outline how the eurozone can give rise to self-fulfilling prophecies that would not occur
in countries controlling their own currency. In this respect, communication may have the poten-
tial to shift expectations such that a stabilising dynamic with falling interest rates, or, on the
contrary, a vicious circle with steeply rising debt costs is initiated.
Having argued that communication may indeed matter, the importance of a statement’s
focus needs to be briefly discussed. One can distinguish between general communication and
talk directed towards a specific country, for instance Greece. If communication has an impact
one would assume that both types of statements affect the price of Greek sovereign debt. But
what about the spreads of other peripheral countries, like Portugal, Ireland, Italy, or Spain?
General statements clearly address these countries as well, therefore one would expect a similar
impact as in the case of Greece. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that country
specific communication unfolds not only a direct impact but also affects other EMU member
states facing comparable challenges, since such messages are indicative for the eurozone’s general
commitment to support indebted countries. A recent study by Mink and De Haan (2012)
4Athanassiou (2009) examines the issue of secession and expulsion from the EU and Eurozone. While an
expulsion of a member is not possible, a country’s unilateral withdrawal would be feasible. According to the
author, such a decision would necessarily involve a parallel exit from the EU.
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Table 3.1: The Decision-Makers Considered in the Analysis
Institution Position Name
European Central Bank President J.-C. Trichet
Exec.Board Members V. Constancio (∼06/10: L. Papademos), L. Bini Smaghi,
J. Stark, P. Praet (∼05/11: G. Tumpel-Gugerell), J. Pa´ramo
National Governors E. Nowotny, G. Quaden, A. Orphanides, E. Liikanen,
C. Noyer, J. Weidmann (∼04/11: A. Weber), G. Provopoulos, P.
Honohan, (∼09/09: J. Hurley), M. Draghi, Y. Mersch, J. Bonnici,
(∼07/11: M. Bonello), K. Knot (∼07/11: N. Wellink), C. Costa
(∼05/10: V. Constancio), J. Maku´ch (∼12/09: I. Sramko), M. Kranjec,
M. Ordonez.
EU officials
Commission President J. Barroso
Financial Affairs O. Rehn (∼02/10: J. Almunia)
European Council President H. Van Rompuy
Euro Group President J.-C. Juncker
National Representatives
France President N. Sarkozy
Minister of Finance F. Baroin (∼6/2011: C. Lagarde)
Germany Chancellor A. Merkel
Minister of Finance W. Scha¨uble (∼10/2009: P. Steinbru¨ck)
Portugal, Ireland, Italy,
Greece, Spain
Head of Government G. Papandreou (∼10/09: K. Karamnlis), E. Kenny (∼03/11: B. Cowen),
S. Berlusconi, P. Coelho (∼06/11: J. So´crates), L. Zapatero
Ministers of Finance E. Venizelos (∼06/11: G. Papakonstantinou, ∼10/09: K. Karamanlis),
M. Noonan (∼03/11: B. Lenihan), G. Tremonti, V. Gaspar (∼06/11: F.
d. Santos), E. Salgado (∼04/09: P. Solbes)
Other Eurozone Members Head of Government W. Faymann, Y. Leterme (∼11/09: H. Van Rompuy), D. Christofias,
J. Katainen (∼06/11: M. Kiviniemi, ∼06/10: M. Vanhanen), J.-C.
Junckera, L. Gonzi, M. Rutte (∼10/10: J. Balkenende), I. Radicova´
(∼10/10: R. Fico)
Ministers of Finance M. Fekter (∼04/11: J. Pro¨ll), D. Reynders, C. Stavrakis, J. Urpilainen
(∼06/11: J. Katainen), L. Frieden (∼07/09:J.-C. Juncker), T. Fenech, J.
de Jager (∼02/10: W. Bos), I. Miklos (∼07/10: J. Pociatek), F. Krizanic
Note: Names of the office holders in August 2011. For the period of interest, their predecessors as well as the date of their
resignation are listed in brackets. a Statements by J.-C. Juncker are attributed to his role as Eurogroup head.
provides some support for this view: The authors show that news about a Greek bailout also
lead to abnormal returns on the bond prices of other peripheral eurozone countries suggesting
that policy signals for one specific member state also serve as a landmark in the assessment of
other troubled eurozone countries.
Finally, it needs to be determined, whose statements may have an impact on financial mar-
kets. As pointed out, a vast number of policy-makers play a decisive role in the EMU’s transna-
tional decision-making process. This study attempts to analyse the effects of communication for
the key players only. In the following, I briefly motivate my selection as presented in Table 3.1.
As the Euro’s guardian, the ECB undoubtedly plays a key role in economic crisis manage-
ment. Therefore, the analysis covers communication by all Governing Council Members who
form the Central Bank’s main decision-body.
With the exception of matters directly linked to monetary policy, national representatives
take the centre stage in crisis management. Ultimately, all landmark decisions have to be
adopted at the national level. Although each eurozone member had to approve the rescue
measures currently in place, it is evident that the two largest nations, namely Germany and
France, took the leadership in the EMU’s crisis management. Among national politicians, the
head of government and the finance minister are of particular importance, because they represent
their country as chief negotiators in economic and financial matters on the European level.
Even though arguably less influential than France and Germany, representatives of the other
eurozone member countries are included in the study as well. As their statements are covered
with lower frequency in newswire reports, they are not analysed individually but divided into
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two groups, namely the PIIGS countries and the remaining members states respectively.5
Finally, a small number of EU officials is considered as well, since they undertake various
important tasks such as coordinating the decision-making process or (unofficially) representing
the EMU. The analysis includes communication by the heads of the European Commission, the
European Council and the Euro Group as well as statements by the Commissioner for Economic
and Financial Affairs.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
In order to examine the effect of communication on sovereign CDS and bond yield spreads,
data for the period between January 1, 2009 and August 12, 2011 is analysed. Baldwin (2011)
refers to this period as phase one of the debt crisis: In January 2009, Standard & Poor’s
lowered the long-term credit ratings of Greece, Spain, and Portugal sparking discussions about
the sustainability of public finances in the eurozone. Prior to that, top European officials paid
hardly any attention to this issue or at least did not comment on it publicly. In August 2011,
it became apparent that contagion reached the core of the eurozone heralding the debt crisis’
second phase.
The Euro-denominated sovereign CDS and bond yield data, recorded daily at 18:00 CET,
was obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The CDS premia are based on mid bid-ask
spreads, whereas the bond yields rest upon bid prices. For both securities, various maturities
including 5 years, 10 years, and 30 years are analysed. The analysis on CDS premia also covers
data on contracts with 1 year maturity which was not available for government bonds. Both
CDS and bond yield spreads are calculated vis-a`-vis the analogous German securities.6
Although the paper’s statistical approach is somewhat different than the event study met-
hodology outlined in MacKinlay (1997), the underlying idea is similar: If an event, i.e. a public
statement by a top official, affects financial markets, an immediate asset price reaction should
be observable. Assuming that one can precisely identify the occurrence of events, it is pos-
sible to minimise confounding effects by narrowing the reaction window. A narrow reaction
window also supports the assumption that communication is contemporaneously exogenous, i.e.
E(t|xt) = 0, which is needed to establish consistency of the coefficients’ estimates. I compare
changes in spreads on days without communication to changes in spreads on days with relevant
statements, thereby comments outside trading hours, i.e. after 18:00 CET or at weekends, are
assumed to affect financial markets on the following trading day. The use of daily financial data
and newswire reports with time stamps allow for this procedure.
5These are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Slovakia and Slovenia. Until
January 2011 Estonia was not a member of the eurozone and is therefore excluded.
6The use of spreads vis-a`-vis a comparable risk free security is a common approach in the event study met-
hodology, if the construction of abnormal returns based on the differences between model-generated and actual
movements in the dependent variable is not possible (eg. Afonso, Furceri and Gomes, 2012). One issue is that the
benchmark security itself may be affected by communication. This aspect receives further attention in section
3.3.5.
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3.3.1 Measuring Communication
Eurozone leaders need to engineer and agree on appropriate countermeasures which potentially
take many forms. Communication is therefore not restricted to a well-known set of tools but has
a fairly wide scope with changing focuses. The following passages give an outline of the study’s
approach to create a valid measure of communication taking these complications into account.
In a first step, all relevant statements had to be gathered. To this end, I drew on Factiva,
a newswire database by Dow Jones. I scanned the Factiva database using a broad set of se-
arch terms composed of <the decision-maker’s last name> and <a crisis related key
word>.7 The set of eurozone officials considered is equivalent to Table 3.1 and a list of key
words used to scan the database is presented in the appendix (see Table A.1). Due to the
limited number of statements, all types of communication such as interviews, speeches, official
statements etc. are taken into account.
Three caveats specifically related to the use of newswire reports should be emphasized (cf.
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007; Jansen and De Haan, 2006). First, newswire services are selective
in their reporting. As I am interested in testing the market response to communication, however,
it makes sense to focus only on those comments that actually reach market participants. This
is best achieved by relying on prominent newswire agencies.8 Second, newswire services might
wrongly report or misinterpret a statement by policy makers. Again, one can argue that the
objective is to analyse the effect of communication as received by the markets. Moreover, the
vast majority of newswire reports include direct quotes, which allow the researcher and the
market participants to evaluate the content of a decision-maker’s statement without relying
on the news agency’s interpretation. Third, as the choice of search terms is restricted, some
relevant statements might be filtered out. Besides, the inclusion of rather general keywords, for
instance <Greece>, inflates the output of newswire reports, which again have to be screened
with respect to their relevance by the researcher. This might lead to the omission of relevant
statements. However, since prominent and highly visible messages should have both a higher
probability to affect financial markets and a higher probability to be selected in the filtering
process, the confounding effects of omitted statements should be rather low.
Following the collection of relevant newswire reports, their content had to quantified. To
ensure a high degree of objectivity, I applied the content-analysis technique outlined by Merten
(1995). In a first step, a randomly chosen subset of newswire reports across the entire time range
was utilised to construct a codebook. It specifies coding-instructions, that enable a quantification
of the communication’s content in the most consistent manner possible. In particular, the
codebook defines for various subject specific categories when the content of a statement can
be interpreted as a dovish policy signal, i.e. high commitment to protect private investors, or
as a hawkish policy signal, i.e. low commitment to shield creditors. The second step included
7The scan was restricted to the headline and first paragraph, so that only newswire reports focusing on the
relevant information were selected.
8The search was limited to major news agencies, including Reuters, Dow Jones Newswires, Agence France-Press
(AFP), Associated Press Newswires (AP), and Market News International (MNI).
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a quantification of each newswire report. Thereby, great attention was paid to distinguish
between the first report and its replications on subsequent days, so that double-coding of the
same information could be avoided. If the codebook did not provide a clear coding rule for
a statement, it was indicated accordingly. Lastly, all statements labelled as ambiguous were
reassessed. If it was not possible to derive an adequate quantification, the statement was dropped
from the dataset.
Finally, I constructed binary communication variables which cover either dovish or hawkish
statements on A) financial aid to the PIIGS, B) size of the financial safety net, C) expulsion of
EMU members, D) sovereign default scenarios or an enforced private sector involvement, and
E) voluntary contributions by private creditors.9 Regarding communication by central bank
officials, the indices are supplemented by the categories F) changes in the ECB’s collateral
framework and G) government bond purchases on the secondary market. These variables do not
capture whether it was a general or a country-specific statement. As argued in section 3.2, this
can be justified on the grounds that the EMU’s handling of the problem in a specific member
state can set a precedent for other countries facing similar circumstances.
If the dummy covering dovish statements takes the value 1 this indicates high commitment
by the policy-maker to support countries in financial difficulties and therewith protect creditors.
For the dummy comprising hawkish messages a coding of 1 implies that the decision-maker
shows limited commitment to guarantee the fiscal integrity of all eurozone member states. On
days without communication, both binary variables take the value 0. If a policy maker made
dovish and hawkish statements across the various dimensions considered, both dummies are
coded 1. Further information on the seven dimensions included in the communication indices
along examples of hawkish and dovish statements are provided in the appendix (Table A.1).
Based on these communication variables, Table 3.2 shows the distribution of days with verbal
policy signals by ECB officials, leading EU officials and national representatives. It reveals that
two aspects dominated the debate: In the early phase of the crisis, the question whether troubled
9 Whereas the classification of statements rejecting voluntary contributions is clear-cut, the coding of its
‘hawkish’ analogue is somewhat ambiguous: At the outset of the crisis, there was a broad agreement among
Europe’s decision-makers that one needs to prevent any damage to private holders of sovereign debt. Basically,
any form of private sector involvement was categorically rejected. Against this background, recurring requests
for ‘voluntary’ private contributions may be understood as a weakening of the previous stance, which is why
statements in support of voluntary participation by private investors could be classified as hawkish. A more
contextual appraisal would rather suggest to rate such comments as dovish: In spring 2011, when schemes for
organised voluntary contributions, e.g. the Vienna Initiative, were brought up in the debate, several policy-
makers made clear that another Greek bailout without private sector involvement was no longer an option. In
this context, voluntary contributions cannot be seen as an accentuation of the situation for private bondholders,
but rather as a ‘soft’ version of the inevitable ‘hard’ restructuring of Greek debts. Furthermore, the debate
on voluntary contributions signalled a compromise between the ‘Hawks’ and the ‘Doves’ preventing a deadlock
in EMU’s crisis management. I apply the latter (i.e. dovish) coding for two reasons. First, it seems to fit the
interpretation of market analysts better. For instance, on June 17 2012, Angela Merkel signalled that she is willing
to pursue private sector contributions on a mere voluntary basis. This was appreciated by market analysts who
commented that “Merkel’s acceptance of the Vienna initiative is somewhat of a climb down and we are moving
closer to something more concrete” (A. Schmidt, Lloyds, quoted by Reuters 17/06/2011). Second, a look at the
data reveals that statements supporting voluntary contributions are associated with declining spreads. The low
number of such statements guarantees that this partly data driven decision has only a small impact on the results.
The robustness check in section 3.3.5 also addresses this matter.
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Table 3.2: Frequency of Days with Communication: Jan. 01 2009 – Aug. 12 2011
A) B) C) D) E) F) G) A)-E)a F)-G)a
Dovish 25 0 8 14 0 - - 44 -
Germany
Hawkish 12 8 5 25 10 - - 49 -
France
Dovish 23 2 1 20 0 - - 45 -
Hawkish 1 2 0 3 5 - - 6 -
Portugal, Ireland Dovish 23 2 5 21 0 - - 47 -
Italy, Greece, Spain Hawkish 3 1 0 0 1 - - 4 -
Other Eurozone Dovish 18 3 3 10 0 - - 34 -
Members Hawkish 16 7 3 24 5 - - 41 -
Dovish 46 7 12 50 2 - - 93 -
EU officials
Hawkish 6 3 0 6 6 - - 15 -
Dovish 21 10 33 85 6 8 20 123 28
ECB
Hawkish 11 2 1 20 11 18 22 32 35
Total 205 47 71 278 46 26 42 533 63
a: A) financial aid, B) size of EFSF, C) expulsion/exit of members, D) private sector involvement, E) voluntary private sector
involvement, F) collateral framework, G) bond purchases. The last columns give the total number of days with dovish and
hawkish statements. Since communication may cover multiple dimensions, the numbers are not equal to the line total. Statements
supporting voluntary private sector contributions (column E, row hawkish) are coded as dovish signal.
countries should be granted financial aid (category A) was at the centre of debate, whereas since
May 2010 the discussion about the involvement of private creditors received most attention
(category D). Thereby, not all groups of policy-makers advanced the same view. Whereas the
EU officials and representatives of France predominantly signalled high commitment to shield
peripheral countries, especially Germany and some of the smaller eurozone members took a fairly
tough stance. Regarding communication by ECB officials, one can see a gap between ‘political
issues’ (categories A–E) and ‘ECB specific matters’ (categories F–G). In the former case, the
vast majority of statements can be classified as dovish, whereas comments on the two monetary
policy instruments were far more disputed. Since the number of statements within the specific
categories is rather low and the study focuses on the effects of communication in general, only
the overall measures of communication (cf. the two last columns in Table 3.2) are analysed in
detail. Thereby, hawkish comments by EU officials, French representatives, and politicians of
the PIIGS countries are excluded, as such statements occurred with a too low frequency.
3.3.2 Preliminary Insights: Communication and the PIIGS-Bund Spread
In order to get a picture of the main variables analysed in this study, I briefly discuss Figure
3.1 which plots the communication variables along with the unweighted average CDS spread
between Germany’s Bund and the PIIGS. As the graphical representation reveals, the intensity
of communication increased progressively over the considered period. In 2009, eurozone officials
barely commented on how to deal with the looming European debt crisis except for two short
periods early and late in the year. The level of communication reached a first peak in spring 2010,
as the danger of a Greek default could no longer be denied and potential countermeasures were
discussed. After a calm episode following the launch of the EFSF in May 2010, communication
by European policy-makers again intensified in October. It culminated in early summer 2011,
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when the terms for further financial aid to Greece were discussed. In this period, spreads between
Germany’s and the PIIGS’ CDS premia temporarily doubled, and then sharply decreased on
July 21/22, when eurozone leaders reached agreement on the second rescue package for Greece.
Similar turmoils on the sovereign bond and CDS market can be located in spring 2010, before
the European community announced the formation of its 750 billion Euros safety net.
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Figure 3.1: Average PIIGS-German CDS Spread and Communication by ECB Board Members,
EU Officials, and National Representatives
Notes: The PIIGS-German spread is based on the PIIGS’ unweighted average CDS premia with 5 years maturity. Upward bars indicate
dovish statements, downward bars indicate hawkish statements.
Let us now turn to some descriptive statistics characterising the relationship between com-
munication and the development of spreads. Table A.2 in the appendix lists the average changes
in CDS and bond yield spreads distinguishing between days with hawkish comments, days with
dovish statements, and days without communication.
This mere comparison of averages can be refined by limiting the analysis to narrow pre- and
post-event windows. In a next step, I analyse financial market movements using a two-day win-
dow definition, which means that the spread change on a day with communication is compared
to the spread change on the most recent day without such a verbal intervention, i.e. in general
the previous day.10 Besides comparing the average changes on pre- and post-event days, it is
also useful to analyse the rate of ‘success’ of an event. One potential definition for a success is
the smoothing criterion (see for example Fatum and Hutchison, 2003). According to the smoo-
thing criterion, a communication-event can be classified as a success in the context of this study if
∆si+ < ∆si− for dovish statements or ∆si+ > ∆si− for hawkish statements
where ∆si+ is the CDS or bond yield spread change on the event day and ∆si− is the respective
spread change on the associated pre-event day.11
The graphs in Figure 3.2 summarize the results of the analysis outlined above. On the one
10If one group of decision-makers made dovish (or hawkish) comments on several consecutive days (eg. t1, t2,
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Figure 3.2: A Comparison of CDS and Bond Yield Spread Changes on Days with and without
Communication, Two-Day Event Window
Notes: The CDS and bond yield spreads are computed based on an unweighted average across the four maturities considered.
t3), spread changes on these days are compared to the most recent day without such a statement (eg. t0).
11This definition is stricter than the original formulation of the smoothing criterion. The specification applied
in this study accounts for the possibility of ‘leaning with the wind’ communication, i.e. dovish statements during a
period with declining spreads or hawkish comments during a period with raising spreads (cf. Fatum and Hutchison,
2003, p. 398).
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Figure 2 Continued: A Comparison of Average CDS and Bond Yield Spread Changes on Days
with and without Communication, Two-Day Event Window
Notes: The CDS and bond yield spreads are computed based on an unweighted average across the four maturities considered.
hand, they suggest that on days with dovish communication spreads of peripheral eurozone
countries decreased faster / increased slower than in the pre-event period. On the other hand,
days with hawkish communication were associated with a faster increase / slower decrease in
CDS and bond yield spreads. Thereby, the relationship between communication of German
decision-makers and daily changes of CDS and bond yield spreads seems to be the strongest.
The average difference between the spread change on an event day and the spread change on
the respective pre-event period varies between 1 and 5 percentage points for dovish statements
and 1 to 3 percentage points for hawkish statements. At the same time, the rate of success
across the five peripheral eurozone states and various maturities adds up to about 60 percent.
Although not as strong as in the case of Germany, Figure 3.2 reveals a similar pattern for dovish
statements by French politicians, EU officials as well as leaders of smaller eurozone member
states and the PIIGS countries. In contrast, the results are less clear-cut for hawkish statements
by politicians of smaller eurozone countries, as well as for communication by ECB officials.
In the latter case, however, the results seem to depend somewhat on the distinction between
politically dominated issues (categories A–E) and ECB specific issues (categories F–G). Whereas
the relationship between spread changes and communication is weak or inconsistent regarding
statements on political matters, it is slightly stronger if one considers comments on government
bond purchases or the collateral framework only.
It has to be noted that communication events may overlap, since statements by the five dif-
ferent groups of policy-makers are analysed separately. Nevertheless, this representation gives a
first impression on the relation between communication and spread movements. The multiva-
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riate analysis in the subsequent section addresses the remaining issues, namely overlapping of
verbal interventions and inference.
3.3.3 Multivariate Analysis
Before presenting the results of the multivariate analysis, the statistical method is briefly in-
troduced. In examining the impact of statements by policy-makers I follow studies on central
bank communication by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007, 2009) and use the EGARCH frame-
work as proposed by Nelson (1991). This approach has the advantage that it corrects for the
serial correlation, skewness, and time-varying volatility of CDS and bond yield spreads. Due to
the leptokurtic distribution of the dependent variables, I choose a General Error Distribution
(GED) specification. The EGARCH (1,1) model, which is estimated separately for each country
and asset, formulates the conditional mean equation for relative changes in spreads st as
st = α +
∑
k
βkDVCMDV
k
t +
∑
l
βlHWCMHW
l
t + φXt +
max.4∑
i=1
γist−i + δD4Nov09t + t. (3.1)
CMDVkt and CMHW
l
t represent dummies for dovish and hawkish comments respectively,
whereby k and l indicate the source and type of communication, i.e. k ∈ {ECB (A–E), ECB (F–
G), EU officials, Germany, France, PIIGS, other eurozone members} and l ∈ {ECB (A–E), ECB
(F–G), Germany, other eurozone members}. This specification enables a comparison between
dovish and hawkish statements and thus allows for a detailed assessment of communication
effects. Assuming that dovish statements lower spreads whereas hawkish comments raise them,
we would expect that βkDV ≤ 0 and βlHW ≥ 0. Xt denotes a vector of controls compromising
a measure for macroeconomic surprises, two variables accounting for policy decisions on the
European12 and national level, as well as two indicators for long-term credit downgrades by
Standard & Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s. D4Nov09t is a binary variable coded one for the period
between January 1, 2009 and November 4, 2009. This dummy should account for the apparent
structural change in spread movements after Greece irrevocably sparked the escalation of the
debt crisis by revising its budget deficit from about 6 to 12 percent of GDP. Table A.3 in the
appendix provides further detail on all control variables. As I assume t∼GED(0, σ2t , ν) with ν
as tail thickness parameter,13 the conditional variance can be expressed as
log(σ2t ) = ω + θ1
(∣∣∣∣ t−1σt−1
∣∣∣∣) + θ2( t−1σt−1
)
+ θ3log(σ
2
t−1) + κDXt
+
∑
k
τkDVCMDV
k
t +
∑
l
τ lHWCMHW
l
t + ψD
4Nov09
t .
(3.2)
12All statements on days with European policy decisions are excluded in the multivariate analysis. In doing so,
one can guarantee that financial market reactions to major reforms are not wrongly attributed to communication.
Since less than 10% of the statements in the data set are affected, this modification has only a moderate impact
on the estimated coefficients.
13The GED specification includes the normal distribution if ν is equal to 2. Values below 2 indicate heavy tail
distributions. For most of the bond yield models in this study, the estimated ν lies between 1.25 and 1.5, whereas
for the CDS data the respective estimator takes often values below 1. Except restrictive assumptions are made,
ν > 1 is required to guarantee the residuals’ stationarity (cf. Rodriguez, 2010, 9). Therefore the parameter is
restricted to the default value 1.5 when its estimator’s value lies below 1.
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DXt is a vector for the controls entered as binary variables which means that they take the
value one on days of important policy decisions, macro releases or rating downgrades, and zero
otherwise.
3.3.4 Main Results
The model outputs for the reaction of sovereign CDS and bond yield spreads to communication
by national representatives, EU officials and ECB Governing Council members are presented
in Table 3.4. A summary of the results for both types of securities can be found in Table 3.3.
Overall, the findings strongly support the notion that communication has an impact on financial
markets. Across the majority of decision-makers considered in this study, the correlation between
spread changes and the communication variables is in line with expectations, particularly when
analysing CDS data. The largest effects are estimated for communication by German officials
whereas the least coherent pattern emerges for statements by representatives of the PIIGS
countries as well as the smaller eurozone members. Subsequently, I briefly review the main
findings for each group of policy-makers.14
According to the estimated models, verbal interventions by the German Chancellor and
Minister of Finance had the largest impact. As hypothesised in the earlier sections, dovish sta-
tements significantly lowered CDS and bond yield spreads, whereas hawkish statements pushed
them upwards. These findings are highly consistent across the five countries, two securities, and
four maturities considered. The coefficients associated with the two communication variables,
βˆGERDV and βˆ
GER
HW , exhibit the expected sign in 32 of the 33 base models. Thereof, in 15 models
both coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level. Given the
range of coefficients, an average impact of communication by German officials on daily spread
changes of about 1 to 2 percentage points seems plausible, whereby the estimated effects are
somewhat larger in the CDS models.
In contrast to their German colleagues French officials rarely took a hawkish position in
the public debate so that only the impact of their dovish comments are analysed. As one can
immediately see, there is a considerable difference between the model outputs for CDS and bond
yield spreads. 18 out of 19 estimations suggest that dovish statements are negatively correlated
with changes in CDS spreads. Thereby, the respective coefficient is significantly different from
zero in six out of 19 cases. However, these results do not hold when analysing bond yield spread
changes, for which no systematic correlation with the respective communication variable can
be observed. This apparent discrepancy between the results for CDS and bond yield spreads is
discussed in more detail in section 3.3.6.
Similar to the French President and Finance Minister, leading EU officials predominantly
14For the sake of brevity, the results of the variance equation are not displayed in the following sections.
Statements by representatives of Germany (hawkish and dovish), France (dovish), the smaller Eurozone members
(hawkish) and the EU (dovish) are quite strongly associated with an increase in volatility, particularly in the CDS
models. Regarding communication by officials from the PIIGS states (dovish), the smaller Eurozone members
(dovish) as well as the ECB (all types) I find a less clear-cut pattern that tends to display negative coefficients.
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Table 3.3: At a Glance: Results for the CDS- & GBY-Models, 01/01/2009 – 12/08/2011
CDS-Models Portugal Ireland Italy Greece Spain Overall βˆ: Mean
Dovish −? −? −? −? −? −? -0.0204
Germany
Hawkish +? +? +? +? +? +? 0.0191
France Dovish −? − −? − −? −? -0.0130
PIIGS Dovish + 0 + 0 − 0 0.0013
Other Dovish − − +? + − 0 0.0009
Members Hawkish 0 0 0 − − 0 -0.0051
EU Officials Dovish −? −? − − −? −? -0.0093
ECB Dovish −? − − − 0 − -0.0078
(ECB specific) Hawkish +? + +? + +? +? 0.0155
ECB Dovish + + + 0 − 0 0.0019
(political issues) Hawkish + + 0 + + + 0.0044
+? Consistently positive correlation, at least one estimate statistically significant (p<0.1); + Consistently positive correlation, at
least three estimates larger than zero; 0 Neither a consistently positive nor a consistently negative correlation; − Consistently nega-
tive correlation, at least three estimates smaller than zero; −? Consistently negative correlation, at least one estimate statistically
significant (p<0.1).
GBY-Models Portugal Ireland Italy Greece Spain Overall βˆ: Mean
Dovish −? −? −? −? − −? -0.0093
Germany
Hawkish +? +? +? + +? +? 0.0123
France Dovish 0 0 − 0 0 0 -0.0017
PIIGS Dovish −? 0 − 0 0 0 -0.0039
Other Dovish 0 0 0 0 − 0 -0.0010
Members Hawkish − 0 − −? 0 − -0.0034
EU Officials Dovish −? − −? − −? −? -0.0077
ECB Dovish −? − − − + − -0.0058
(ECB specific) Hawkish +? 0 +? + +? +? 0.0096
ECB Dovish +? +? + + 0 + 0.0048
(political issues) Hawkish 0 −? − 0 + 0 -0.0014
+? Consistently positive correlation, at least one estimate statistically significant (p<0.1); + Consistently positive correlation, at
least three estimates larger than zero; 0 Neither a consistently positive nor a consistently negative correlation; − Consistently nega-
tive correlation, at least three estimates smaller than zero; −? Consistently negative correlation, at least one estimate statistically
significant (p<0.1).
signaled high commitment to shield the peripheral eurozone countries. In all 33 models, the
coefficient associated with their dovish statements is negative being statistically significant in
twelve cases. Overall, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients suggests an average impact
on spread changes between 0.75 an 1.25 percentage points.
Another fairly clear pattern emerges from the results on ECB specific communication (cate-
gories G–H). Hawkish statements on these matters are associated with a widening of CDS and
bond yield spreads, whereby one finds statistically significant effects for Portuguese, Italian and
Spanish securities. The correlation is less strong for the dovish analogue. Except for Spanish
securities, the respective dummy produces consistently negative coefficients that are significantly
different from zero in two out of 33 models and mainly indicate an impact between −0.5 and
−1.5 percentage points.
The results for ECB statements on politically dominated matters (categories A–E) stand in
sharp contrast to these findings. A glance at Table 3.3 reveals that the estimated impact is
not only fairly inconsistent across the various countries considered but that in the bond yield
models, they also tend to contradict the general intuition outlined above.
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Finally, the correlation between market movements and the communication of national repre-
sentatives of the PIIGS states as well as the smaller EMU member states is rather inconsistent.
In the case of hawkish statements by representatives of smaller EU members, the estimates’ sign
even tend to be counterintuitive. Considering that across both groups of agents the models im-
ply a statistically significant correlation in only four out of 99 cases, the validity of the analysis
seems not endangered due to these somewhat contradictory findings.
3.3.5 Robustness Analysis
In order to assess the robustness of the results presented above, the statistical model is in a first
step re-estimated for two subsamples.15 One subsample starts on November 5, 2009 and ends
on August 12, 2011. During the ten months excluded in this first robustness check, the level of
communication was particularly low. At the same time, it is evident that the overall trend in
CDS and bond yield spreads changed in autumn 2009 after Greece adjusted its estimated budget
deficit upwards. Analysing data for this subperiod hardly affects the estimated coefficients
compared to the full sample model; therefore these results are not discussed any further.16
The second subsample starts on January 1, 2009 and ends on May 13, 2011. By excluding
the last two months from the original time series, one can rule out that the estimated effects are
mostly driven by massive fluctuations in spreads during June and July 2011 or the somewhat
ambiguous classification of statements on the voluntary involvement of private creditors in the
Greek bailout (see Footnote 9). The model outputs for this second subsample are included in
the appendix (see Table A.4). The variation in coefficients associated with hawkish comments
on ECB specific issues is the most critical change observable when this subsample is used.
In particular, the estimation output for Irish CDS and bond yield spreads indicate that the
corresponding results in the main model are substantially driven by events during the last two
months. Whereas in the full sample the correlation between hawkish ECB specific comments and
Irish spreads is almost consistently positive, four out of six coefficients switch from a positive to a
negative sign in the shortened sample. Furthermore, the size of the estimated effect drops in the
Italian bond yield models, so that the respective coefficients are no longer statistically significant.
However, the other series are affected to a much smaller extent: Although the estimated effect
size for hawkish comments on ECB specific issues decreases across many models, the restricted
sample still yields significant results for spreads of Portuguese (CDS & GBY), Italian (CDS)
and Spanish (CDS & GBY) securities. Besides, in all models for Greek spreads, the estimates
display the expected positive sign.
15Beside the robustness tests discussed in this section, I also compared the EGARCH models to the results
obtained from OLS and GARCH(1,1) estimations. For the sake of brevity, these outputs are not provided here,
but are available upon request. Compared to the OLS and GARCH models, the EGARCH estimation tends to
produce slightly more conservative results. The most notable differences concern dovish statements by France
and the ECB, which are more strongly associated with a decline in spreads when estimating GARCH and OLS
models respectively. Overall, the conclusion is not changed though: The results across all three models seem to
suggest, that statements by representatives of Germany, France, the ECB and the EU had an immediate impact
on both types of securities, whereby hawkish statements display a clearer pattern than their dovish counterparts,
especially in the bond yield context.
16The corresponding model outputs are available upon request.
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Overall, there is little evidence suggesting that varying the sample period has a strong impact
on the insights gained in the main model. Although dropping the very volatile period between
May and August 2011 alters the estimation results moderately, the qualitative interpretation
is not critically affected. One can still find clear patterns for statements by policy-makers of
Germany, France and the EU administration as well as for ECB specific communication, whereas
the results for statements by representatives of the PIIGS and the smaller eurozone members
remain rather inconsistent and often counterintuitive.
As briefly mentioned in Foonote 6, one important issue could be that the benchmark securi-
ties, namely German CDS premia and bond yields, are also affected by communication. If this
is the case, the results obtained so far have to be interpreted with caution. The model outputs
for the corresponding robustness check are included in the appendix (see Table A.5). Estimating
the effect of communication on sovereign bond yields without calculating the spread vis-a`-vis
the German Bund reveals a substantial decrease in the impact magnitude of communication
compared to the findings in the main model. Most notably, the correlation between peripheral
bond yields and dovish statements by German representatives is no longer consistently nega-
tive, except in the models for Greece (significant) and Ireland (insignificant). These results
indicate that communication may affect German bond prices inversely to bond prices of the
PIIGS countries. Indeed, regressing the benchmark bond yields on the communication variables
gives significantly positive estimates for dovish statements by German representatives, positive
estimates for dovish communication by French as well as EU officials, and negative estimates for
hawkish comments by German and ECB representatives. On the one hand, this suggests that
markets attach a higher risk to German sovereign debt when support for troubled countries is
signalled. On the other hand, this implies that the effect size of the respective estimates may
be upward ‘biased’ in the previous models. Interestingly, the inverse correlation between com-
munication and German securities outlined above does not emerge in the CDS models, which
is why using CDS premia instead of spreads vis-a`-vis Germany does not substantially alter the
main results presented so far. The following section discusses the apparent discrepancy between
the reaction of CDS premia and bond yields as well as other issues.
3.3.6 Discussion of Results
The analysis presented in this paper suggests that statements by leading eurozone officials have
the potential to move CDS and bond yield spreads. Although strongly depending on the source
and content of statements as well as the type of security considered, the multivariate analy-
sis suggests that in some cases the immediate average impact of public comments on relative
spread changes may have amounted to more than 3 percentage points. Considering that in the
same models the estimated effect of rating downgrades on daily spread changes varies between
1.5 and 2.5 percentage points, the impact of communication has to be acknowledged as fairly
substantial.17
17It is important to emphasise, that this is a mere comparison of the very short run effects. As shown in a recent
paper by Afonso, Furceri and Gomes (2012), rating downgrades affect sovereign CDS and bond yield spreads not
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Having said that, two a priori unexpected findings need two be discussed further. First,
the statistical models indicate a discrepancy in the reaction of CDS and bond yield spreads.
Comparing the estimation outputs across the two types of securities reveals that ECB specific
comments as well as communication by EU, French and German representatives tend to have a
stronger impact on CDS spreads. Although this does not hold for each communication variable,
country and maturity in the same manner, it is noteworthy that the outlined pattern can be well
observed across all subsamples considered. The gap is particularly striking regarding the effects
of dovish comments by representatives of France: whereas in the CDS models, dovish statements
by French officials are strongly associated with declining spreads, no consistent correlation can be
found in the models for bond yield spreads. Furthermore, robustness checks using CDS premia
and bond yields instead of spreads versus Germany as dependent variables also emphasise the
conclusion that the PIIGS’ CDS premia reacted stronger to communication than the respective
bond yields. A possible explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the two securities
is put forward by Andenmatten and Brill (2011) who study the sovereign CDS and bond yield
markets of peripheral eurozone countries after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. As their analysis
suggests, fluctuations in CDS spreads mostly lead movements in bond yields, a finding they
mainly explain with the higher liquidity in the CDS market of countries in financial trouble.18
Results by Afonso, Furceri and Gomes (2012, 614), who analyse the impact of sovereign credit
ratings on European CDS and bond yield spreads, also support this reasoning. They find
that bond yields react more sluggish and less strong to changes in the credit rating than CDS
spreads. Since the statistical framework of the study at hand assumes that financial markets
react immediately to communication, i.e. on the same trading day, the reaction lag of bond
yields could explain the observed differences between the two securities analysed.
Second, the statistical results reveal a more robust pattern between hawkish statements and
financial market movements than between dovish statements and spread changes. This becomes
especially apparent regarding the findings for ECB specific communication as well as the results
for German statements on bond yields in the robustness section.19 Empirical studies on the
impact of sovereign credit ratings report similiar findings suggesting that responses to positive
and negative information are asymmetric. For instance, Afonso, Furceri and Gomes (2012, 612)
find a strong reaction of both CDS and bond yield spreads to rating downgrades whereas the
reaction to rating upgrades is much more muted, especially in the bond yield models where they
cannot find significant correlations. Referring to the literature on decision making under risk
(eg. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Bowman, Minehart and Rabin, 1999), the explanation put
forward by Afonso, Furceri and Gomes (2012, 612) is that positive news have a weaker impact on
only in the first days after the announcement but rather have a long-term impact lasting several months.
18In this respect Andenmatten and Brill (2011, 299) write: “For countries considered safe, the government bond
market is in general more liquid than the sovereign CDS market [...] However, for countries in financial trouble
the bond market becomes more illiquid than the sovereign CDS market.” This observation may also explain why
dovish statements by German representatives, which basically signal higher financial outlays/risks for the core
countries, are stronger correlated with German bond yields rather than German CDS premia.
19Although the findings outline a more consistent pattern for hawkish than for dovish communication, the
statistical analysis does not strictly support different impact magnitudes between the two types of statements:
Wald-tests suggest that the absolute values of the estimated coefficients for hawkish and dovish of comments by
ECB policy-makers as well as German politicians are not significantly different from each other.
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individuals than negative news, since agents care more strongly about utility losses than about
gains of equal magnitudes.
What might additionally attenuate the estimated impact of dovish statements compared to
hawkish comments is the study’s use of dummy variables that do not control for market ex-
pectations about the content of communication.20 Regarding highly repetitive statements, for
example, its seems reasonable to assume that they have a rather low individual information
value and are therefore less likely to impact financial markets than non-repetitive comments.
This consideration may be relevant, since the number of dovish statements in the sample is more
than twice as large as the number of hawkish comments. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the
ECB’s dovish communication about sovereign bond buys and the collateral framework mainly
fell into the period following May 2010, and hence was largely limited to reassure markets about
the duration of the ECB’s rescue measures rather than providing signals on potential future
interventions. Both aspects may indicate that dovish statements had on average a lower infor-
mation value than hawkish comments, which could – at least partially – drive the asymmetric
reaction of spreads to dovish and hawkish communication in the paper’s statistical analysis.
3.4 Conclusion
In a television broadcast on the debt crisis, an exchange dealer known as “Mr. Dax”, was asked
whether financial markets react to communication by German politicians. To that he replied:
“Definitely not [...]. I think politicians overestimate themselves, if they assume that their words
have the power to unsettle traders working at an investment bank like Goldman Sachs.”21
The present paper’s objective is to answer a similar question. It examines the effects of com-
munication by ECB governing council members, EU officials, as well as national representatives
on the PIIGS’ CDS and bond yield spreads during the first phase of the European sovereign
debt crisis. The focus lies on dovish statements that signal strong determination in the rescue
of indebted countries, and hawkish statements indicating limited commitment to support the
PIIGS and protect its creditors.
The results based on a multivariate analysis in the EGARCH framework using daily data for
the period from January 1, 2009 to August 12, 2011 reject the proposition by “Mr. Dax” quoted
above. My findings suggest that hawkish comments caused an increase in spreads, whereas
statements signaling high commitment to shield peripheral eurozone countries held the opposite
effect. Dovish comments display a somewhat weaker pattern regarding sign and significance than
20Controlling for the individual information value of statements would clearly be a considerable refinement,
however, I do not do so for two reasons: First, identifying market expectations about the content of communication
is practically impossible. Second, the estimates are well behaved in the sense that not controlling for market
expectations most likely holds too conservative estimates rather than an overestimation.
21Original statement: “Das war sicherlich nicht so [...]. Ich glaube die Politik hat ein bisschen
Selbstu¨berscha¨tzung anzunehmen, dass eine Investmentbank wie Goldman Sachs in New York, dass dort die
Handelsabteilung in Unruhe gera¨t wenn in Deutschland jemand etwas sagt.” Dirk Mu¨ller as guest in the political
talkshow Gu¨nther Jauch. Die schwarz-gelbe Pleite! Kann diese Regierung noch den Euro retten? broadcasted by
Das Erste, September 13, 2011.
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hawkish comments, especially in the bond yields models, which might indicate an asymmetric
response of the sovereign bond market to good and bad news, respectively. With respect to
the source of communication, the clearest pattern is found for representatives of Germany, but
for French politicians and leading EU officials the models reveal fairly consistent correlations
too. Regarding communication by ECB officials, the statistical analysis shows that alongside
the source of a message, its content played an important role as well. Whereas no coherent
effects on CDS and bond yield spreads are found for ECB statements on matters within the
political domain, there is some evidence that communication on government bond purchases
and the collateral framework moved financial markets. No consistent pattern can be found for
communication by politicians of the smaller eurozone member countries and the PIIGS states
indicating that they received the least attention by financial markets.
A. Appendix
Table A.1: Examples of Statements by EMU Policymakers and their Classification
Dovish Signal: High Commitment Hawkish Signal: Limited Commitment
A) Financial Aid to PIIGS
Statements signaling the policy-maker’s support for a bailout of troubled
eurozone countries as well as comments confirming that a specific member
will receive financial support from the EFSF. In the pre-EFSF period,
comments suggesting that the eurozone is ready to step in for its member,
such as “we will show solidarity with indebted countries” or “we have
options to respond”, are also included in this category.
Statements rejecting coordinated financial aid within the eurozone or com-
ments emphasizing the self-responsibility of Euro members, such as “they
have to solve their own problems”. In the run-up to bailout decisions, i.e.
April 2010 or spring 2011, comments signaling reluctance to approve aid
measures, such as “the decision could still be negative” or “the measures
cannot be approved without strict conditions”, are also included in this
category.
Example: “The rules say that within the eurozone countries should not help
each other. However, if it came to a serious situation, all the eurozone coun-
tries would have to help.” (P. Steinbru¨ck, 16/02/09, Reuters)
Example:“The eurozone is a monetary zone which holds us together, [...]
there’s a no bailout system and we have to deliver on commitments we have
made.” (C. Lagarde, 29/01/10, Dow Jones)
B) Size of EFSF
Statements calling for an increase in the EFSF’s lending power as well as
comments signaling the policy-maker’s willingness to support additional
funding.
Staments voicing opposition to a raise in the EFSF’s budget as well as
comments emphasizing that the budget is adequate and a boost not ne-
cessary.
Example:“[T]he financing capacity must be reinforced and the scope of acti-
vities of the EFSF should be widened.” (J. Barroso, 12/01/11, AFP)
Example:“In our view it is not necessary at the present time to increase the
capacity of the EFSF.” (W. Scha¨uble, 14/02/2011, Reuters)
C) Expulsion/Exit of EMU members
Statements suggesting that neither an exit nor an expulsion of eurozone
members is possible/realistic or should be so in the future.
Statements suggesting that an exit or an expulsion of eurozone members
is possible/realistic or should be so in the future.
Example:“This idea [member state expulsion] would require a treaty change
and I have some reservations whether it is in line with the principles of the
founding fathers of an ever-closer union.” (O. Rehn, 14/04/10, Reuters)
Example:“We need stricter rules – that means, in an extreme emergency,
having the possibility of removing from the euro area a country that does not
get its finances in order.” (W. Scha¨uble, 15/03/10, AFP)
D) Sovereign Default / Orderly Sovereign Insolvency Procedure / Private Sector Involvement
Statements categorically ruling out sovereign defaults or enforced private
sector involvements in the rescue of eurozone members. The policy-maker
denies/opposes such scenarios both in the short- and long-term.
Statements confirming the possiblity of a sovereign default as well as calls
for orderly insolvency procedures or private sector involvements. Also
includes comments that deny a private sector role in current bailouts but
signal the speaker’s demand/support for a respective mechanism in future
interventions.
Example:“In this context [bank stress tests], it was a deliberate choice that we
will not assume a default of any EU member state and of course that’s linked
to our policy”. (O. Rehn, 20/06/11, Reuters)
Example:“Have politicians got the courage to make those who earn money
share the risk as well?[...] This is about the primacy of politics, this is about
the limits of the markets.” (A. Merkel, 24/11/10, Reuters)
E) Voluntary Private Sector Involvement / Vienna Initiative
Statements opposing any volutary private sector involvement or comments
placing a strong emphasis on the dangers associated with such measures.
Statements supporting voluntary private sector contributions are also clas-
sified as dovish communication. See footnote 9 for an explanation.
Example:“If creditors were offered terms to voluntarily lengthen the maturity
of the debt they held, the implications would be that they would lose more if
they refused [...]. Then it is not voluntary but a forced restructuring. [...] So
’soft restructurings’ do not exist.” (L. Bini Smaghi, 30/05/11, MNI)
Example:“[W]e must also convince all our partners in the financial sector to
participate. It’s a voluntary participation to maintain their commitments in
terms of credit.” (D. Reynders, 14/06/11, Dow Jones)
F) Changes in ECB’s Collateral Framework (ECB only)
Statements indicating a loosening of the ECB’s collateral rules such that
specific sovereign bonds would still meet the requirements after a potential
downgrade. Comments denying plans for a tightening of the colleteral
rules.
Statements that rule out a loosening or indicate a tightening of the ECB’s
collateral rules. Comments signaling that the ECB would no longer accept
specific sovereign bonds as collateral after a further decline in their rating.
Example:“My working assumption is that we won’t have difficulties [with the
CF], because there won’t be downgrading [...]. If it should appear that this
working assumption is too optimistic, then we would look at the situation.”
(J. Trichet, 22/03/10, MNI.)
Example:“The ECB will not change plans to tighten its collateral rules [...].
The ECB will continue to apply its collateral framework the same way to all
countries.” (L. Papademos, 18/12/09, Reuters)
G) Government Bond Purchases / Security Market Program (ECB only)
Statements indicating that sovereign bond purchases are considered as a
policy option. Following the launch of the SMP, comments suggesting that
the SMP is fully operating or statements denying that the SMP will stop
in the near future are also included in this category.
Statements that rule out any form of sovereign bond buying programs by
the ECB. Following the launch of the SMP, comments voicing opposition
to the SMP are also included in this category.
Example:“I have never said that the securities market program had been in-
terrupted. [...] It is an ongoing programme.” (J. Trichet, 04/08/11, AFP &
Reuters)
Example:Asked whether it would be an issue for the ECB to buy Greek go-
vernment bonds, Ju¨rgen Stark said it isn’t being discussed at the present.
(28/04/10, Dow Jones)
Factiva Search
The Factiva data base was scanned using terms of the following form:<The Decision-Maker’s Last Name>and<A Crisis Related Key Word>, eg.
merkel and default. The scan was restricted to the headline and first paragraph, so that only newswire reports focusing on the relevant information
were selected. Five major news agencies were considered, namely Reuters, Dow Jones Newswires, Agence France-Press, Associated Press Newswires,
and Market News International.
Key Words: bailout, bail out, bond buy(-ing), bond purchase(-ing), cds, collateral, credit event, debt, default, efsf, eurozone crisis, government debt,
greece, greek, haircut, insolvency, ireland, irish, italy, italian, portugal, portuguese, private creditor(s), private investor(s), private sector, public finances,
reform, restructure(-ing), solidarity, sovereign debt.
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Table A.2: Average Changes in Spreads on Days with and without Communication
GBY: 5y, 10y, 30y. Portugal Ireland Italy Greece Spain
CDS: 1y, 5y, 10y, 30y. CDS GBY CDS GBY CDS GBY CDS GBY CDS GBY
Dovish −0.018 −0.001 −0.016 −0.007 −0.016 0.002 −0.017 −0.012 −0.019 0.002
Germany No Com. 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.002
Hawkish 0.038 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.025 0.028 0.020 0.015 0.039 0.030
Dovish −0.001 0.002 −0.002 0.001 −0.014 −0.004 0.005 −0.004 −0.004 0.001
France No Com. 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003
Hawkish − − − − − − − − − −
POR, IRE, Dovish 0.004 −0.001 0.008 0.001 −0.007 −0.008 −0.007 −0.007 −0.002 −0.002
ITA, GRE, No Com. 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004
SPA Hawkish − − − − − − − − − −
Other Dovish −0.003 0.009 −0.014 0.002 0.012 0.005 −0.001 −0.000 −0.006 0.003
Eurozone No Com. 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.003
Members Hawkish 0.022 0.015 0.012 0.014 0.018 0.019 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.019
Dovish −0.000 −0.004 −0.009 −0.000 −0.006 −0.006 −0.004 −0.005 −0.007 −0.004
EU Officials No Com. 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.005
Hawkish − − − − − − − − − −
Dovish 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.007 −0.002 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.003
ECB (A-G) No Com. 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.003
Hawkish 0.017 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.013 0.008 0.012 0.014
Notes: Mean changes in CDS and bond yield spreads are based on unweighted averages across the various maturities considered.
Table A.3: The Control Variables
Variable Source Coding Description
Credit Rating
Development
Moody’s, Fitch,
Standard & Poor’s
-1 = Downgrade
0 = No Change
1 = Upgrade
A measure for changes in a country’s sovereign credit rating. Both credit
rating announcements and revisions in the rating outlooks from the three
main credit agencies are taken into account.
Credit Rating
Spillovers
Moody’s, Fitch,
Standard & Poor’s
-1 = Downgrade
0 = No Change
1 = Upgrade
A measure for credit rating spillovers between the 5 peripheral eurozone
countries. It accounts for any rating down- respectively upgrades among
the PIIGS, excluding the country under conisderation.
Macro News
Surprise
Bloomberg,
Forexpros.com
(release−forecast)
std.dev.(release)
The surprise component of macro news is constructed by subtracting
market expectations obtained through a survey of market participants
from the actually released figure, and normalising this difference by the
standard deviation of the actual releases. Set of macro news: GDP
(PO, IR, IT, GR, SP), the unemployment rate (IT, GR, SP), industrial
production (IT, SP), and retail sales (IT).
Domestic
Policy &
Events
Factsheets, Time-
lines, and reports by
Reuters, AFP, and
Dow Jones.
-1 = Tightening
0 = No Event
1 = Easing
Captures various political events and policy decision, which may have
led to a (de-)stabilisation in the respective country. These include go-
vernmental crises, revisions of budget deficit forecasts, and announce-
ments or parliamentary votes on economic reforms as well as austerity
programs.
Policy
Decisions on
European level
Factsheets, Time-
lines, and reports by
Reuters, AFP, and
Dow Jones.
-1 = Unsupportive
0 = No Event
1 = Supportive
Comprises information on crisis related policy decisions on the Euro-
pean level. It includes for instance changes in the ECB’s collateral fra-
mework, agreements on the EFSF or ESM, the disbursement of loans,
and interest rate decision by the ECB.
Structural
Change:
05/11/09
0=After 05/11/09
1=Until 05/11/09
A look at the Data (or Figure 3.1) reveals, that the trend of spreads
between Jan. & Oct. 2009 was slightly negative. After Greece revised
its budget deficit on 05/11/2009, one can observe a shift towards a
positive trend. The inclusion of this dummy should account for the
shift.
Autoregressive
terms
max.4∑
i=1
γist−i In order to control for autocorrelation in market movements, autore-
gressive terms up to order 4 are used in the models. In most cases, it
is sufficient to include the one-period lag of spread changes.
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4 Cities and the Structure of Social Interactions:
Evidence from Mobile Phone Data*
4.1 Introduction
Social interactions lie at the nexus of two key themes in economics: sustained aggregate growth
and the concentration of economic activity in cities. In a widely cited paper, Robert Lucas (1988)
models human capital accumulation as main driver behind economic development. Interpersonal
exchange is pivotal to the narrative of his framework, with Lucas (1988, p. 19) defining “human
capital accumulation [a]s a social activity, involving groups of people”. Through this social
learning process, human capital not only provides an internal value to its owner but also exerts
a positive externality on peers, which fosters the creation of new ideas and with it sustained
development. In reference to urban theorist Jane Jacobs (1969), Lucas (1988) suggests that
these externalities are especially prevalent in cities, which consequentially act as engines of
growth. This notion reflects one of the classic agglomeration forces described by Alfred Marshall
(1890), who argues that the dense concentration in cities facilitates the flow of information
and knowledge, since social interactions diminish over space. Although social interactions are
considered to play a decisive role for the aggregate dynamic and spatial organisation of the
economy, empirical work uncovering the alleged micro-mechanisms has remained fragmentary
at best.
This paper studies the relation between spatial structure and social interactions in order to
test fundamental assumptions underlying the agglomeration forces discussed in the literature.
The analysis builds on anonymised mobile phone calls between June 2015 and May 2016. This
allows us to examine the interplay between local characteristics and social interactions as we not
only observe comprehensive communication patterns but also location information derived from
transmitting antennas and billing data. Based on this rich dataset and concepts from the network
literature (e.g. Jackson, 2008), we investigate three main questions. First, how does geographical
distance impact social interactions? Second, what is the relation between population density and
the size of an individual’s social network? Third, does population density affect the quality /
efficiency of social interactions in terms of matching quality, clustering and network perimeter?
To answer these questions we employ link formation models in the spirit of Graham (2014) and
additionally estimate the impact of population density on various micro-level network measures.
*This chapter is joint work with Maximilian von Ehrlich.
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The sorting of individuals with specific characteristics can distort the results of both approaches.
We therefore base our inference on individuals who change their place of residence (i.e. “movers”)
to back out time constant unobservables and correctly identify the role of distance as well as
density-related externalities.
We show that distance is highly detrimental to social interactions, despite epoch-making pro-
gress in communication technologies. Contrary to the conventional view, this does not translate
into larger networks in cities compared to the periphery. Density-related externalities rather
arise in terms of network efficiency, namely better matching quality, lower clustering, and smal-
ler distance costs. We are not aware of any study that has delivered comparable evidence on
regional differences in both network size and network efficiency. Below, we discuss the main
findings with reference to the related literature.
4.1.1 Related Literature
Social Interactions and Distance. Models that incorporate knowledge and learning spillo-
vers as an agglomeration force typically assume that distance is costly to social interactions (e.g.
Glaeser, 1999). The widespread adoption of information and telecommunication technologies po-
pularised the “death-of-distance” argument (e.g. Cairncross, 2001), which raises the intriguing
question of whether these technologies will fundamentally change the structure of cities (see
Ioannides et al., 2008) or even make them obsolete (see Gaspar and Glaeser, 1998). We de-
monstrate that the social interactions recorded by mobile phones are surprisingly localised, with
more than 60 percent of ties occurring between individuals that reside within less than 10 km
distance of each other. Importantly, we aim for a causal interpretation and therefore estimate a
network formation model based on movers. This novel analysis confirms that distance is highly
detrimental to forming and maintaining social ties. A recent study by Levy and Goldenberg
(2014) uncovers similar patterns for email traffic and online social media contacts. We interpret
this as solid evidence against the death-of-distance hypothesis in the social exchange context.
Quantity of Social Interactions. Building on the assumption that distance is costly to so-
cial interactions, numerous micro-founded models of urban agglomeration economies have been
developed (cf. Duranton and Puga, 2004). One body of literature focuses on the claim that the
quantity of social interactions increases with local population density. Glaeser (1999) formali-
ses the classic idea of Marshall (1890) that individuals acquire skills by interacting with each
other. As cities are more densely populated than the hinterland, they facilitate more meetings
in his framework and thus accelerate the social learning process. Another example is that of
Sato and Zenou (2015), who model social interactions and their impact on employment outco-
mes. They propose that city residents maintain larger networks than rural dwellers, enabling
them to acquire more information on the labour market, which reduces job search frictions and
unemployment. Two empirical studies support the hypothesis that cities facilitate interpersonal
exchange. Charlot and Duranton (2004) use survey data on workplace communication in France,
while Schla¨pfer et al. (2014) examine mobile phone records for Portugal. Both studies find that
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the average number of (unique) social interactions increases with population size. However,
neither can plausibly isolate the causal impact of density from non-random sorting, as the first
paper relies on cross-sectional data and the second paper narrows down to a descriptive analysis.
Burley (2015) studies the German Socio-Economic Panel and finds that population density is
only positively correlated with an index of social interactions, as long as person specific charac-
teristics are ignored.1 Our results reinforce this finding: we also show that the positive effect of
cities compared to the hinterland vanishes, once targeted sorting of individuals is accounted for.
Given the pattern emerging from these four studies, the claim that cities produce more social
contacts than the periphery seems unfounded.2
Efficiency of Social Interactions – Matching Quality. Another strand of literature argues
that cities do not necessarily increase the quantity of social interactions but rather improve
their quality / efficiency. In the model of Berliant, Reed and Wang (2006), agents possess
differentiated types of knowledge. The effect of cities on the number of social interactions then
becomes twofold, as densely populated areas increase the number of random meetings but also
make agents more selective regarding matching quality. Hence, while cities do not necessarily
affect the number of social interactions, Berliant, Reed and Wang (2006) show that their quality
in terms of knowledge complementarity should improve with increasing population density. With
the aim of providing an empirical test for the matching channel, Abel and Deitz (2015) study
data on job searching of college graduates. They find that larger and thicker labour markets
indeed improve the matching between job advertisements and applicants’ qualifications. To the
best of our knowledge, no study to date has assessed this hypothesis with respect to social
interactions. We formulate two tests, one relying on a network formation model, and the other
analysing the social adjustment process among movers. Both approaches indicate that urban
dwellers indeed benefit from higher quality matches compared to people living in the hinterland.
Efficiency of Social Interactions – Clustering. Borrowing from the network literature, the
level of clustering / triangular relations is an additional dimension of efficiency that is sometimes
assumed to vary regionally. Granovetter (1973) famously argues that weak ties are often more
valuable in terms of information provision than strong ties. He formally defines a weak tie
as a social relation between two agents who have no overlap in their personal networks. In
contrast, strong ties involve triangular relations that bring about redundancies in the process of
information diffusion. Sato and Zenou (2015) claim that cities not only increase the number of
social interactions – as discussed above – but also give rise to a disproportionally high number
of weak tie relations that are more valuable in the job market. We calculate the clustering
coefficient (i.e. the share of triangular relations) of each agent in the data set and test whether
the level of clustering systematically varies with population density. We find that personal
1Based on US survey data, Brueckner and Largey (2008) also examine population density and social interactions
obtaining consistently negative correlations. These findings are at odds with the other studies, as they suggest
that cities are too dense from a social interaction point of view.
2Other factors that have been shown to impact the level of social interactions are homeownership (e.g. Hilber,
2010) and racial fragmentation (e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Brueckner and Largey, 2008).
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networks in cities indeed tend to be characterised by lower levels of clustering and thus have
a higher fraction of weak ties. This finding suggests that cities may facilitate the diffusion of
information, although the average number of social interactions is not necessarily larger than in
more sparsely populated areas.
The following section elaborates on the main concepts. Section 3 introduces the data used in
the empirical analysis. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the results.
Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Cities and Social Interactions: Main Concepts
We consider a directed network with N nodes each representing a unique phone customer which
we denote by i ∈ N = {1, ..., N}. Each customer has a place of residence, r, which is assigned
either on the municipality or postcode level. The number of nodes at location r is Nr, and so
with R denoting the total number of different residences, N =
∑
rNr holds. Finally, Rr is the
set of individuals living in location r.
A link between nodes i and j is denoted by gij = 1, while the absence of a link is marked
as gij = 0. The network can then be characterised by a pair (N ,G) where G = [gij ] is a N ×N
adjacency matrix. As in Graham (2014), we assume that rational agents i and j establish a link
if the net surplus from doing so is positive. This yields a random utility model of the form
gij = 1
(
X ′ijη + νi + νj + Uij ≥ 0
)
, (4.1)
where Xij is a vector of dyad attributes (i.e. pair specific characteristics), νi and νj denote
agent specific characteristics, and Uij is a randomly distributed component of link surplus. We
are particularly interested in the role of dyad attributes, which we divide into three groups: geo-
graphical distance or travel time (Tij), the number of friends i and j share (Fij =
∑N
k=1 gikgjk),
and matching (m(νi, νj , δ)). As defined in this study, higher levels of m(·) increase link surplus,
which is why we refer to it as matching quality. Importantly, it absorbs the spread between Q
individual characteristics of agent i and j, |νi − νj |, which – depending on the specific attribute
q ∈ Q – may be positively (i.e. δq > 0) or negatively correlated (i.e. δq < 0) with matching
quality. Based on these considerations we define the vector Xij as
X ′ijη = η1 · Tij + η2 · Fij(G) + η3 ·m(νi, νj , δ). (4.2)
If link-surplus is indeed a function of these three dyad-specific factors, this may have im-
portant consequences for the network topography across rural and urban areas. Provided that
distance is costly for social interactions, regional differences in population density may deter-
mine the size of an agent’s social network. This is of interest, because social contacts can foster
the diffusion of information, promote trust and thereby lower transaction costs, and facilitate
learning from peers (Jackson, 2014; Granovetter, 2005; Gui and Sugden, 2005) in addition to
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having intrinsic value for a person’s well-being (Burt, 1987). We further focus on matching and
common friends (or clustering), as they have implications for a network’s efficiency : Matching
reflects the quality of a specific contact, which incorporates various dimensions such as pro-
ductivity enhancing skill complementarity, or shared interests (e.g. Berliant, Reed and Wang,
2006). Clustering governs the informational value of a link, since contacts who share a common
friend introduce redundancies and are therefore less valuable in the information diffusion process
(Granovetter, 1973). In return, sharing mutual contacts fosters cooperative and pro-social be-
haviour, because the triangular relation can act as a reputational control and retaliation device
(Jackson, 2014).
Network Size and Degree Centrality. We first discuss the relation between population
density and the size of an individuals social network, which we measure based on degree centrality,
formally defined as
Di(G) = #{j : gij = 1}. (4.3)
The degree yields the number of distinct peers with whom agent i interacts socially and
therefore the number of sources that potentially forward valuable information. Typically, urban
economic theory (e.g. Glaeser, 1999; Sato and Zenou, 2015) presumes that cities provide a
favourable environment for social interactions and support larger network sizes, as they are more
densely populated than rural communities. The underlying argument hinges on the assumption
that the costs of social interactions increases with distance. Let us abstract from the matching
spread, m(νi, νj , δ), as well as triangular ties, Fij(G), and focus on the relationship between
distance and population density. A stylised argument is as follows: On weekdays an agent
i needs to keep her travelling costs low, and she therefore has random encounters only with
people in her municipality, j ∈ Rr. At the weekend, however, the radius of the agent’s actions
is unbounded, so that she might form ties with people living outside her place of residence,
k /∈ Rr. Since people spend more time in their residence’s vicinity, the probability to acquire
social contacts among neighbours, Pr = P (gi,j∈Rr = 1), is larger than for the rest of the
population, that is Pr > P−r = P (gi,k/∈Rr = 1). In the outlined example, the size of a person’s
social network positively depends on the population living in the neighbourhood, Nr, so that
cities support a larger degree than rural municipalities, i.e.
Di = Nr · Pr + (N −Nr) · P−r with ∂Di
∂Nr
> 0. (4.4)
While this intuitive rationale is appealing, it may be challenged from two angles, namely
from biological/anthropological and search strategic points of view.
In evolutionary biology, Dunbar (1992, 1998) has famously advocated and popularised the
social brain hypothesis. It challenges the field’s traditionally dominant view that brains evolved
to address ecological problem-solving tasks, such as foraging. Instead the social brain hypothesis
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attributes the growth in primates’ brain sizes to the computational demands of their increasingly
complex social systems. Indeed, empirical analyses reveal a close relation between neocortex
volume and mean social group size among primates. This has been interpreted as evidence that
there is a species-specific upper limit to group size that is set purely by cognitive constraints. For
humans, Dunbar (1993) calculates the upper limit to lie between 100 and 230 social contacts,
citing anthropological studies on modern hunter-gatherer societies as evidence that support
his prediction. Recent studies explore this hypothesis by analysing patterns among adults’
prefrontal cortex volume, cognitive ability, and the size of their social networks (Stiller and
Dunbar, 2007; Powell et al., 2012) or by exploiting social media user statistics (Dunbar, 2015).
In consideration of the manifold results corroborating the social brain hypothesis, one may note
that the size of a person’s network is fundamentally restricted by congenital factors. Because the
population of practically all Swiss municipalities exceeds the limit for network size as calculated
by Dunbar (1993), the number of social interactions may be independent of regional differences
in population density.
In equation (4.4) a random encounter between two persons is equivalent to establishing a
link. We now add another layer: After meeting a potential contact, agents can either accept or
reject to form a link based on the other person’s characteristics. Since forming a link consumes
time and cognitive capacity, this introduces a quality-quantity trade-off. Consequently, it may
be optimal to reject some potential contacts to wait for a better match (see Berliant, Reed
and Wang, 2006). Hence, from a search strategic perspective, higher population density may
impact network size only marginally, but it may allow for higher selectivity along dyad-specific
characteristics. This has important consequences for the analysis of social networks across
different regions. Even if densely populated areas improve social networks, the advantages may
not be in terms of size but in terms of efficiency. In this respect, matching quality between agents
i and j, m(νi, νj , δ), is of key interest, as it determines how well their interests correspond or
how fruitful the intellectual exchange between them is. Once we add the strategic component
of weighing between quality and quantity to the above mechanics, we would expect a positive
effect of population density on matching quality, or network size, or both.
Perimeter of Social Interactions and the Within-Degree. The previous line of reasoning
also has implications for the perimeter of a person’s network. Essentially, the travel time between
two agents can be considered one dimension of matching quality. Assuming that distance is costly
when maintaining a link, one would rather form a tie with a neighbour than with an identical
person living far away. Following Berliant, Reed and Wang (2006) therefore implies that high-
density locations allow people to be more selective regarding the travel distance to their contacts,
so that they can minimise travel costs induced through social interactions. Put differently, one
may expect that urban dwellers can recruit their contacts within a narrower perimeter, since
densely populated cities make high quality matches in a small area possible. In contrast, people
in rural areas face a much tighter choice in their neighbourhood, thus they likely prefer to widen
the search radius with the objective of improving their network’s quality. To analyse these
claims, we examine the degree within an individual’s neighbourhood or within-degree, formally
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defined as
DW ri (G) = #{i, j ∈ Rr : gij = 1}. (4.5)
Of course, negligible distance costs would wipe out any differences between cities and rural
areas. Costs related to distance may indeed be of secondary importance for a person with
naturally few social interactions, whereas highly sociable persons may benefit more from densely
populated areas, as recently formalised in a paper by Helsley and Zenou (2014). Consequently,
differences in network size may simply be observable due to the sorting of highly sociable types
into cities, because they gain disproportionally from low distance costs per contact.
Clustering. In a last step, we discuss regional differences in population density and their
implications for clustering in social networks. Clustering is an important network characteristic
as it can provide insights into reciprocity and information diffusion. On the one hand, high
clustering strengthens reputational concerns and with it the enforcement of social norms and
cooperation (e.g. Ali and Miller, 2009), or risk-sharing (e.g. Ambrus, Mobius and Szeidl, 2014).
On the other hand, Granovetter (1973) highlights the importance of local bridges for passing on
information. An individual with high clustering introduces redundancies in the network, which
are inefficient in terms of information diffusion. The clustering coefficient for node i is given by
Ci =
∑
j,k j 6=k gjk∑
j,k,j 6=k gijgik
, (4.6)
and measures whether an individual’s contacts form a tightly knit group (Ci → 1) or are
completely separate from each other (Ci → 0). How does population density relate to clustering?
There are two potential channels, one mechanical and the other as a consequence of differing
preferences. Figure 4.1 illustrates the mechanical rationale: Panel (a) shows a city with 16
agents, eight blue and eight red. All agents socially interact with three other agents, preferably of
the same type. Panel (b) represents a peripheral region with lower population density, therefore
the 16 agents are equally split between two municipalities. As in the city, all individuals have a
degree of three. Importantly, travelling between the two municipalities is costly, therefore agents
prefer to form links with their neighbours. Since every person has only three neighbours of the
same type, the network ends up tightly clustered. In contrast, the city makes clustering less likely,
because each urbanite can choose among seven agents of the same colour. In the way the example
is drawn, the average clustering in the city equals 0, while it amounts to 0.5 in the periphery.
As a consequence, the average path length in the city (=2.73) is lower than in the periphery
(=3.2), which accelerates the diffusion of information. Thus, low density locations should tend
to display higher clustering, simply because residents of these areas face a substantially smaller
set of suitable contacts in their direct vicinity compared to urban dwellers. In addition to this
purely probabilistic relation between density and clustering, preferences for forming links with
friends of friends, Fij(G), could be different in cities than in rural areas. Agents face a trade-
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(a) City: Average Degree=3, Mat-
ching Rate=0.833, Average Clustering=0,
Average Path Length=2.73
(b) Periphery: Average Degree=3, Ma-
tching Rate=0.833, Average Clustering=0.5,
Average Path Length=3.2
Figure 4.1: Clustering in Cities and the Periphery – An Illustrative Example
off in terms of efficient information exchange (i.e. low clustering) and benefits due to stronger
reciprocity (i.e. high clustering). The optimal balance may vary regionally due to factors that
assign a higher weight to reciprocity or information diffusion. For instance, high quality local
institutions may substitute for reciprocity or a dynamic labour market environment may support
the value of information diffusion. In addition, clusters may facilitate simultaneous interactions
with multiple persons, allowing for larger networks given a certain time constraint. If people
living in rural neighbourhoods have more geographically dispersed social networks, clusters of
friends could be a strategy to mitigate travel costs. Finally, it has been documented that people
living in peripheral areas have a higher proportion of kin ties than urban dwellers (Fischer,
1982). A preference for spending time with relatives most likely increases the clustering in an
individual’s network as relatives inevitably have an overlap in their circle of acquaintances.
4.3 Data
The main dataset used in this paper is provided by Switzerland’s largest telecommunications
operator, Swisscom AG, whose market share is 55% for mobile phones and 60% for landlines
(ComCom, 2015). The data comprises comprehensive call detail records (CDR) of all outgoing
calls made by the operator’s customers between June 2015 and May 2016. The CDRs include
the anonymised phone number of caller and callee, a date and time stamp, a binary indicator
for private and business customers, a code for the type of interaction recorded (e.g. call, SMS,
MMS), the duration of calls in seconds, and the x-y-coordinates of the caller’s main transmitting
antenna. We observe finely grained information on about 15 million calls and text messages per
day, covering 7.2 million phones, of which 2.4 million are private mobile devices.3 Along with the
anonymised CDRs, the operator also provided monthly updated customer information including
billing address, language of correspondence (German, French, Italian, English), age, and gender.
3More specifically, the data set covers 2.4 million private mobile phones, 1.9 million private land lines, 1.1
million corporate mobile phones, and 1.8 million corporate landlines.
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Figure 4.2: Degree of Urbanisation – Cities, Hinterland and Periphery
Table 4.1 summarises the socio-demographic characteristics of mobile phone customers in our
sample, while Table A.3 shows correlations between census data and our customer statistics for
various subpopulations. This comparison suggests that the data at hand is highly representative
of the Swiss population.
The phone data are complemented by various municipal statistics for 2014 provided by the
Federal Statistical Office (FSO), including population figures and the degree of urbanisation as
classified by EUROSTAT.4 Figure 4.2 shows the regional variation in urbanisation based on the
aforementioned measure. We also compute geographical distances between pairs of municipali-
ties and pairs of postcodes using ArcGIS software and shape files for administrative boundaries
published by the Federal Office of Topography. Car driving distances between centroids of mu-
nicipalities and postcode areas were kindly provided by the company search.ch. Descriptive
statistics for municipalities and postcodes are shown in Table A.1 in the appendix.
The anonymity of Swisscom customers was guaranteed at all steps of the analysis. We
never dealt with or had access to uncensored data. A data security specialist retrieved the
CDRs from the operator’s database and anonymised the telephone numbers using a 64-bit hash
algorithm that preserved the international and local area codes. He further removed columns
with information on the transmitting antenna before making the data available. Once the
anonymised data were copied to a fully sealed and encrypted Swisscom workstation, we ran the
analysis on site. To utilise information on the transmitting antenna we passed location scripts
to Swisscom personnel who executed them for us.
Our primary aim is to observe social networks, but not every instance of phone activity
reflects a social interaction in the narrower sense so that the dataset needs to be cleaned befo-
4See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/miscellaneous/index.cfm?TargetUrl=DSP_DEGURBA (last
access: 01.06.2016) for more information on the EUROSTAT DEGURBA measure.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics, Private Mobile Phone Customers
Mean SD N Min Max
Phone Usage, June 2015 – May 2016 (pooled)
Number of Calls 111.781 109.599 10 399 549 1 10 113
Duration (Minutes) 254.970 295.609 10 399 549 2 3359
Network Characteristics, June 2015 – May 2016 (pooled)
Degree Centrality 9.202 7.910 10 399 549 1 470
Within-Degree (15 Min. Radius) 7.067 7.231 10 399 549 0 221
Clustering Coefficient 0.092 0.132 10 248 923 0 1
Sociodemographics
Age 34.964 13.561 866 646 20 60
Female 0.522 – 866 646 0 1
Language: German 0.681 – 866 646 0 1
Language: French 0.270 – 866 646 0 1
Language: Italian 0.043 – 866 646 0 1
Language: English 0.006 – 866 646 0 1
Notes: The table is based on the subsample of customers with phone activity in all 12 months, which we also use in the main
analysis. Further filters as described in section 4.3. Phone usage statistics include in- and outgoing calls. The within-degree
measures network size within a radius of 15 minutes around an agent’s residence.
rehand (for a discussion see Blondel, Decuyper and Krings, 2015). In our benchmark analysis,
we filter the data as follows: First, we restrict the analysis to calls between mobile phones.
Mobile phones are personal objects and are thus representative of the social network of a single
person, while calls from fixed phones possibly resemble overlapping social networks as they are
usually shared by multiple users. For the same reason, all results are based on customers who
have registered only one active mobile phone number. Customers with multiple active numbers
typically include corporate customers, as well as parents acting as invoice recipients for their
children. Second, we limit the analysis to outgoing calls in order to cover intra-operator and
inter-operator activity equally well and to filter out promotional calls by call centres. Third,
calls with a duration of less than 10 seconds are considered accidental and are therefore excluded
from the analysis. Fourth, we drop mobile phone numbers that display implausibly low or high
monthly usage statistics, with a minimum threshold of 1 minute and a maximum threshold of
56 hours per month, respectively. This removes practically inactive numbers as well as phones
used for commercial purposes. Fifth, the analysis is limited to private mobile phones, so that
daily business calls between corporate customers do not create noise in our measures. Sixth,
some measures require address information for both caller and callee such that inter-operator
calls cannot be used in all steps of the analysis. Measures requiring location information for
the callee are therefore based on intra-operator calls only, which we weight according to the
operator’s market share at the callee’s billing address. Finally, we only use the first 28 days of
each month to make the data easily comparable across different time periods.
These steps eliminate approximately 60 percent of the calls recorded for private customers,
leaving us with around 60 million calls per month that amount to a total duration of 200 million
minutes (for details see Table A.2 in the appendix). We have performed sensitivity checks with
regards to all above mentioned dimensions to ensure that our results are robust.
Chapter 4 83
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics on Phone Usage and the Social Network
Table 4.1 shows summary statistics on the mobile phone usage of customers aged 15 to 64 for the
filtered data set.5 The average private mobile-phone users makes about three calls per day with
a cumulative duration of nine minutes. Figures 4.3a and 4.3b further show that the distributions
are markedly right-skewed.
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Figure 4.3: Histograms of Phone Usage Statistics & Network Characteristics for June 2015.
The network of private mobile phone interactions uncovered by the data exhibits characte-
ristic features of other socially generated networks documented in the literature (Jackson and
Rogers, 2007; Watts, 1999): Small diameter and short average path length between pairs, “fat
5Due to privacy concerns, we worked with decimal age-brackets. This means that a customer aged 24 was
assigned to the 20-bracket, while a customer aged 25 belongs to the 30-bracket.
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tails” in the degree distribution, and substantial clustering.
To gain insights into the diameter and the average path length, we randomly select 100
individuals and calculate the length of the shortest paths connecting every other private mobile
phone users in the data. The mean path length in the sample is 5.6, with the longest path
having a length of 12 (1 out of 246 mio.); the histogram plotted in Figure 4.3f reveals that 88
percent of dyads are separated by 6 or fewer links. This fits strikingly well with the “small-
world”-hypothesis first formulated by Milgram (1967) and the early empirical evidence based
on a chain letter experiment conducted by Travers and Milgram (1969).
As Figure 4.3c illustrates, the degree distribution in our social network exhibits “fat tails”,
so that there are more nodes with relatively high and low degrees, and fewer nodes with medium
degrees, than one would find in a network where links are formed uniformly. The average degree
in our monthly data is approximately 9, with the vast majority having a degree below 20 and
some hub-agents reaching network sizes of 100 links or more. As reported in other studies on
social networks, the probability distribution is well fitted (R2 = 0.92) by a power-distribution,
P (D) = cD−ϕ, with parameter estimates of ϕˆ = 3.86 and cˆ = 5.96.
The clustering coefficient, which measures the tendency of linked nodes to have common
neighbours, is, on average, 0.092, with more than 75 percent of the individuals in the dataset
having a non-zero clustering coefficient (see Figure 4.3e). Considering the low density of our
network (≈ 0.00002), the observed clustering is evidently larger than in a benchmark network
where links would have been generated by an independent random process.
4.4 Identification
In order to analyse the impact of geography and location characteristics on the structure of
social interactions we conduct two complementary identification strategies. The first aims to
identify factors that predict the likelihood of individuals i and j forming a link and is referred
to as network formation. In particular, this approach allows us to study the effects of distance
between i’s and j’s place of residence on the probability that they form a link. It further enables
inference on the preference for triadic relations. The presence of network overlap may influence
the likelihood that i and j establish a link as the returns may be higher or lower if it involves
mutual contacts. Moreover, we study whether homophily – the process of matching on common
characteristics – is prevalent in the data.
The second approach, to which we refer as network topography, estimates the effect of local
characteristics on individual-level network measures. This relates to the equilibrium outcome of
network formation at different places and allows us to examine the impact of location specific
attributes on social networks.
Sorting of individuals with specific characteristics can affect the results of both approaches.
As we observe the full social network for one year we can exploit changes in the address of mobile
phone customers; this enables us to isolate the role of systematic sorting and to obtain causal
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estimates of geography and population density on network formation and network topography.
4.4.1 Network Formation
We observe the social network’s adjacency matrix Gt = [gij,t] in each month t ∈ {1, ..., 12}.
Following Graham (2014), we specify the probability that two nodes i and j form a link as
gij,t = 1(βgij,t−1 + T ′ij,tη1 + F
′
ij,t−1η2 + Z
′
ijρ+ φ1Di + φ2Dj +m(ξi, ξj , δ) + Uij,t ≥ 0) (4.7)
where vector Tij,t measures the distance between agent i and j based on their residence and
workplace, Fij,t−1 is a vector of dummies to discretise the number of contacts agents i and j share
in common, Zij is a vector of dyad-specific time invariant covariates, Di and Dj capture static
differences in sociability based on both parties’ logarithmised long-term degree, and m(ξi, ξj , δ)
is a symmetric matching function of unobserved node specific heterogeneity.6 We assume that
Uij,t is independent and identically distributed and has mean zero such that we can estimate a
linear probability model of the form:
gij,t = βgij,t−1 + T ′ij,tη1 + F
′
ij,t−1η2 + Z
′
ijρ+ φ1Di + φ2Dj +m(ξi, ξj , δ) + Uij,t. (4.8)
In particular, the distance measures represented by vector Tij,t comprise the log travel time
between agents i’s and j’s residence as well as a dummy for same workplace. The latter equals
one if they predominantly use antennas within the same 5 km radius during business hours. We
discretise the number of common friends, such that we obtain two dummy variables contained
in Fij,t−1: The first indicator equals one, if agents i and j share at least one common social
contact, while the second indicators equals one if agents i and j share at least two common
contacts.7 The dyad-specific covariates in vector Zij include three dummy variables indicating
same age, same gender and same language.
The model in (4.8) also accounts for matching based on unobservables as reflected by
m(ξi, ξj , δ). Those that favourably match in terms of unobservable characteristics ξ feature
a higher likelihood to form a link. These unobservables may bias our estimates of the cross
sectional model in (4.8). If individuals with common unobservable attributes are more likely to
cluster regionally and thus live closer together, our distance measure will be negatively correla-
ted with the error term. A within-transformation will take out time invariant factors that affect
the matching quality, i.e.
gij,t − g¯ij =β(gij,t−1 − g¯ij) + (Tij,t − T¯ij,t)′η1 + (Fij,t−1 − F¯ij)′η2 + Uij,t − U¯ij , or
g¨ij,t =βg¨ij,t−1 + T¨ij,tη1 + F¨ ′ij,t−1η2 + U¨ij,t.
(4.9)
6Note that the number of mutual contacts, Fij,t−1, enters with a lag. This implies that agents
form/maintain/dissolve links myopically, as if all features of the previous period’s network remain fixed. As-
suming this structure, eliminates contemporaneous feedback, which can problematic for inference (see Graham,
2014).
7We discretise the number of mutual friends, because the continuous measure yields imprecise (yet significant)
estimates. We also tried specifications with three or more common friends dummies, which turned out insignificant.
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In equation (4.9) the transformed residual, U¨ij,t, is necessarily correlated with the lagged depen-
dent variable, g¨ij,t−1, because both are a function of U¯ij . Therefore, OLS estimates of equation
(4.9) are not consistent for the parameters of interest. We therefore follow Angrist and Pischke
(2009) and estimate models including the lagged dependent variable but not the fixed effects,
as in equation (4.10a.), and then compare the results to estimates obtained from a fixed effect
regression without the dynamic component, as in equation (4.10b.):
a. gij,t =βgij,t−1 + T ′ij,tη1 + F
′
ij,t−1η2 + Z
′
ijρ+ φ1Di + φ2Dj + Uij,t
b. g¨ij,t =T¨ij,tη1 + F¨
′
ij,t−1η2 + U¨ij,t.
(4.10)
These two models have a useful bracketing property, that bounds the causal effect of interest.
With respect to the geographical distance between two agents, we expect that the fixed effect
estimates are upwardly biased, while the lagged dependent model yields a downwardly biased
estimate (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p.245–247). We also estimate equation (4.10a.) within
a Logit framework in order to account for the dichotomous nature of the data.
A practical issue that arises with estimating the outlined network formation models is the
size of the adjacency matrix that potentially includes (2 · 106)2 unique pairs of agents. It is
neither computationally feasible to estimate the models based on all these pairs nor necessary
for obtaining consistent estimates of the parameters of interest as is shown by Manski and
Lerman (1977), and Cosslett (1981). Since we have complete information on the network we
can use a stratified sample and adjust the estimates with the respective sampling weights. Our
choice-based sample results from an endogenous stratified sampling scheme where each stratum
is defined according to the individual responses, that is the binary values taken by the response
variable gij,t.
8 This sampling structure requires the availability of prior information on the
marginal response probabilities which is in our setting available due to the full observation of
Gt.
4.4.2 Network Topography
We estimate the effect of location characteristics on the individual-level network measures for-
mally defined in section 4.2: degree, within-degree, and clustering coefficient. Below, we lay
out the estimation strategy for degree centrality noting that specifications for all other network
measures follow analogously.
Following the earlier notation, the econometric models involve measures of degree centrality,
Dit, as dependent variable and location specific covariates at the place of residence denoted by
Lr. Hence, we specify the benchmark model as
Dir,t = α+ L
′
r,tβ +X
′
ir,tγ + λt + λ
l
r + ir,t, (4.11)
8The main motivation behind this approach is usually the possibility of oversampling rare alternatives, which
can improve the accuracy of the econometric analysis but also reduce survey costs. However, in our case we
undersample those dyads with gij,t = 0 in order to enhance computational efficiency. One disadvantage is that
most specification tests for non-linear models are not computable with sample weights.
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where Xir,t is a vector of individual characteristics (i.e. commuting distance, language, dummy
for belonging to language minority, gender, and age), λt stands for month fixed effects, and λ
l
r
denotes language region fixed effects. The location vector Lr,t includes indicators for EURO-
STAT’s harmonised definition of functional urban areas which distinguish between the urban
core, the hinterland and peripheral regions. Alternatively, we measure local density using the
number of private mobile phone customers within 15 minutes travel time from the respective
place. Unlike municipal population statistics this measure has the advantage that it is indepen-
dent from administrative boundaries.
In a next step, we address the issue of individual sorting on unobservables across locations.
If the most sociable individuals systematically sort into high-density places, equation (4.11)
would yield upwardly biased estimates of the density externality. Compared to the pooled OLS
specification, we add an individual fixed effect in order to disentangle the density externality
and the sorting effect, i.e.
Dir,t = µi + L
′
r,tβ +X
′
ir,tγ + λt + λ
l
r + ir,t. (4.12)
Note that this model identifies the effects on the basis of movers i.e. those who changed their
place of residence between July 2015 and April 2016. These are about 147’000 individuals in
the unfiltered data or 6% of the operator’s private customers (see Table A.4). One concern
in introducing fixed effects is that movers may differ systematically from the population. Like
reported in other studies that adopt a similar identification strategy (e.g. D’Costa and Overman,
2014), movers in our data are on average younger than non-movers. Apart from age, Table A.5
shows that differences in both individual characteristics as well as phone usage behaviour and
network properties are sufficiently small between both groups.
4.5 Results
The results section is structured as follows: We begin by discussing the main results for the
network formation model. Our focus is on the question of whether distance is costly to social in-
teractions (section 4.5.1). In a second step, we analyse differences in network size across regions,
to test the hypothesis that cities promote social interactions (section 4.5.2). We then proceed
to investigate, whether population density affects the efficiency of networks. To draw conclu-
sions regarding network efficiency, we analyse the perimeter of social networks (section 4.5.3),
examine regional differences in matching quality (section 4.5.4), and finally aim to gain insights
regarding clustering (section 4.5.5).
4.5.1 The Role of Distance and Other Determinants in Tie Formation
It is instructive to begin by looking at plain descriptives. Figure 4.4 plots the share of ties along
the share of potential contacts by radius. Considering that almost 50 percent of bilateral ties
are formed within a 5 km perimeter that covers on average less than 1 percent of the population,
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this illustrates the rapid decline of social interactions across space.
Figure 4.4: Share of Social Ties and Population by Radius
Of course, this approach does not account for biases due to spatial sorting of similar types. We
therefore proceed to the network formation models, outlined in the previous section. Table 4.2
presents the result for the linear probability model. All coefficients were multiplied by 10’000
and therefore can be interpreted as basis points. This means that a coefficient equalling one
translates to a marginal increase in P (gij,t = 1) of a hundredth percentage point. The first two
columns display pooled OLS estimations, the middle columns report pair fixed effects models,
and the last two columns show lagged dependent variable specifications. In all models estimated,
the travel time between two agents enters negatively, implying that distance is indeed costly
when forming and maintaining a link. Columns (2), (4) and (6) reveal that tie formation is
actually a convex function in distance; the log of travel time enters strongly negative, while the
squared term is positive. Their relative magnitudes suggest that the negative effect of distance
completely fades at approximately 90 minutes driving distance.
In addition to being neighbours, working in the same area also increases the likelihood that
two persons form a link. The coefficient for the dummy variable “Same Workplace”, which equals
one if agents i and j predominantly use antennas within the same 5 km radius during business
hours, ranges between 0.07 and 0.1. Hence, working in close proximity increases the probability
of forming a tie by about 0.1 basis point, which is roughly ten times the estimated effect of
speaking the same principal language. Taken together, distance in terms of both residence and
workplace are costly to social interactions.
In order to analyse preferences for triadic closure or clustering, we discretise the number of
common friends, such that we obtain two dummy variables: one indicating that agents i and j
share at least one common social contact, and the other indicating that they share at least two
common contacts. The coefficients for both “Common Contact” variables are highly significant.
Column (2) shows that the probability of forming a link with another person increases by up to
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Table 4.2: LPMs of Network Formation, Monthly Data for June 2015–May 2016.
Pooled OLS Panel FE Lagged Dependent Var.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Travel Timeij,t) -0.112
∗∗∗ -0.942∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.479∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.053) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.024)
Ln(Travel Timeij,t)
2 0.104∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003)
Same Workplaceij,t 0.166
∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.002) (0.014)
Same Languageij,t 0.017
∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
> 0 Common Contactsij,t−1 213.822∗∗∗ 11.840∗∗∗ 100.943∗∗∗
(10.101) (0.928) (4.866)
> 1 Common Contactsij,t−1 2257.176∗∗∗ 145.633∗∗∗ 1024.429∗∗∗
(331.296) (35.656) (159.448)
gij,t−1 5231.433∗∗∗ 4973.641∗∗∗
(2.929) (34.689)
Const. 0.545∗∗∗ 2.079∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 1.060∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.114) (0.002) (0.038) (0.000) (0.052)
R2 0.001 0.054 0.001 0.001 0.275 0.288
Further Controls No Yes No No No Yes
Pair FE No No Yes Yes No No
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Groups – – 2,584,869 2,582,702 – –
Observations 30,996,082 27,238,673 30,996,082 27,238,673 28,411,817 27,238,673
Notes: The sample covers movers who used their phone every month at least once. All coefficients of the linear probability
models are multiplied by 10000, and therefore can be interpreted as basis points. Further controls include the degree for
both agents (log), dummies for same gender and same age, as well as the absolute age difference between agents i and j.
Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
22 percentage points, if one shares at least two common contacts. As one would expect, the esti-
mates are considerably smaller in column (4), which controls for matching quality by employing
dyad-specific fixed effects. Nonetheless, the additional link-surplus of 1.5 percentage points due
to triangular relations – as obtained in the most conservative specification – is quantitatively
substantial. Agents clearly value triadic relations, which explains the evidently non-random
clustering in this network, as discussed in section 4.3.1.
Overall matching quality between two agents is not observable, but the regressions in column
(2) and column (6) account for socio-demographic (dis)similarities that are incorporated in the
matching concept, namely dummies for same language, same gender and same age, as well as
the absolute age difference between customers i and j. If we abstract from potential omitted
variable bias and assume that m(·) is a linear and additive function, the interpretation of the
estimated coefficients in terms of matching is as follows: By definition
∂E[gij |m(·)]
∂m(·) > 0, therefore
sign(ρˆq) = sign(δq) holds. Accordingly, a positive (negative) sign not only implies an increase in
the probability that two agents socially interact, but also a positive (negative) relation in terms
of matching quality. Our results unambiguously point toward homophily, which is the well
documented tendency of individuals to bond with similar others (e.g. McPherson, Smith-Lovin
and Cook, 2001; Currarini, Jackson and Pin, 2009). For instance, individuals who share the
same principal language are on average more likely to form a tie than individuals with different
language preferences. The same holds true regarding age and gender (results not shown).
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Table 4.3: Logit Models of Network Formation, Monthly Data for June 2015–May 2016.
Pooled Logit Lagged Dependent Var.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Travel Timeij,t) -1.410
∗∗∗ -0.877∗∗∗ -1.131∗∗∗ -0.976∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.049) (0.001) (0.005)
Same Workplaceij,t 0.893
∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.013)
Same Languageij,t 1.813
∗∗∗ 1.685∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.005)
> 0 Common Contactsij,t−1 7.363∗∗∗ 4.786∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.070)
> 1 Common Contactsij,t−1 2.323∗∗∗ -0.018
(0.352) (0.071)
gij,t−1 12.218∗∗∗ 9.868∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.029)
Const. -7.357∗∗∗ -12.951∗∗∗ -8.958∗∗∗ -11.170∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.249) (0.007) (0.026)
Pseudo R2 0.138 0.376 0.492 0.527
Further Controls No Yes No Yes
Pair FE No No No No
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30,996,082 27,238,673 28,411,817 28,411,817
Notes: The sample covers movers who used their phone every month at least once. Further controls include the degree of
both agents (log), dummies for same gender and same age, as well as the absolute age difference between agents i and j.
Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
The OLS results suggest that spatial proximity, the presence of common friends, and demo-
graphic similarity increase the likelihood that two individuals interact. We also estimate Logit
models to accommodate for the binary dependent variable and check the robustness of these
results. Since the incidental parameter problem can induce severe bias in the Logit fixed effects
estimates (e.g Lancaster, 2000), we only show results for the pooled Logit model and the lagged
dependent variable model. Moreover, the squared distance term is excluded due to convergence
issues, which should be a minor problem given the Logit estimator’s inherent non-linearity. The
results in Table 4.3 are qualitatively almost identical to the OLS results in Table 4.2, except
for one of the common friends dummies, which turns out insignificant in column (4). Hence, in
terms of qualitative interpretation the main results are very robust with respect to modelling
choice.
We now inspect the functional relation between distance and tie formation in more detail.
Figure 4.5a displays the predicted probability for gij = 1 based on various specifications. Fi-
gure 4.5b plots the relative probability for gij = 1 compared to the base probability at a distance
of 15 minutes travel time. Although the models differ somewhat regarding the level prediction,
they consistently reveal a convexly decreasing relation between link formation and distance.
Overall, the graphs illustrate that the effect of distance on social interactions is highly localised;
the probability of forming a link is about twice as large for neighbours than for people living 10
minutes apart. This probability continues to fall quickly up to a distance of 30 minutes, beyond
which the negative effect of travel time flattens out.
Summarising this comprehensive evidence, we have been able to demonstrate that distance
is highly detrimental to social interactions. If distance between two individuals did not impose
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(a) Level (b) Ratio, Base Distance = 15 min.
Figure 4.5: Probability to Form a Tie: Prediction Based on OLS and Logit Models
Notes: Same Workplace=0, Common Contacts=0, Degree=mean, Same Gender=1, Same Age=1, Age Diff=0, gij,t−1=0,
FE=0.
costs on their social exchange, it would be difficult to argue that regional differences in population
density should impact the topography of social networks. In such a – with respect to distance
– frictionless world, cities and rural villages would offer an identical environment for social
interactions as all people could choose from the same pool of potential contacts without there
being any costs due to remoteness.
In what follows, we examine whether distance costs indeed lead to significant differences
in the topography of social networks across urban and rural areas. First, we examine the
consequences regarding network size, and then we turn our attention to network efficiency.
4.5.2 Cities and Network Size
A number of urban economic theories argue that cities are favourable to social interactions and
support larger networks. As discussed in section 4.2, the underlying idea is that people living in
densely populated areas encounter more potential contacts, and accordingly establish a larger
number of valuable social ties. So far, we have presented evidence suggesting that distance is
indeed costly to forming and maintaining a tie, which is a necessary condition for the hypothesis
of larger networks in cities.
In order to directly test the hypothesis, we estimate a series of pooled OLS models, which are
reported in Table 4.4. We use two sets of key explanatory variables, including the trichotomous
classification for urbanisation by EUROSTAT (i.e. urban core, hinterland, periphery) as well as
a continuous measure for population density. The latter is defined as the log of the population
living within a 15-minute radius of an individual’s postcode area. Network size is measured on a
monthly basis as degree centrality, i.e. the number of unique contacts an individual calls during
one month.
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Table 4.4: Regional Differences in Network Size, Monthly Data for June 2015–May 2016.
Pooled OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hinterland (vs. Cities) -0.024∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Periphery (vs. Cities) -0.011∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Ln(Pop. Density) -0.012∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Ln(Pop. Density)2 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.067 0.067 0.068
Further Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Language Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,117,645 10,117,522 10,117,522 9,353,794 9,353,679 9,353,679
Notes: The sample covers customers who used their phone every month at least once. Further controls include commuting
distance, language, dummy for belonging to language minority, gender, and age. Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10,
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
Columns (1) and (4) contain the results for the discretised measure of urbanisation, the
former excluding and the latter accounting for individual controls in the regression. Agents who
live in the hinterland or periphery have on average a smaller network than city residents. The
correlations are statistically highly significant, with an average difference of -1.1 to -1.7 percent
when comparing the urban core to the periphery, and -2.4 to -2.5 percent when comparing the
urban core to the hinterland.
The continuous population density measure in columns (2) and (5) is negatively correlated
with network size. This unexpected result is due to non-linearities, as the results in columns (1)
and (4) already indicate; although the hinterland has a higher population density than peripheral
municipalities, the hinterland coefficient is significantly smaller than the periphery coefficient.
When a squared-term is included, the results indeed reveal a convex relation between population
density and network size, with the marginal effect of population density turning positive around
its mean value.
Overall, these findings lend support to the hypothesis that dense urban areas facilitate social
interactions, backing earlier studies that report a positive correlation between the level of urba-
nisation, the volume of phone calls, and network size (e.g. Charlot and Duranton, 2004; Schla¨pfer
et al., 2014). So far it is unclear, however, whether the effect has a causal interpretation or is
driven by the sorting of high sociability types to urban centres.
In a next step, the regressions include individual fixed effects to back out any person specific
characteristics and thereby eliminate the sorting channel. Consequently, inference is now based
on customers who changed their billing address during the 12 months period covered. Columns
(1) to (3) of Table 4.5 display results for the baseline fixed effects regression, while columns
(4) to (6) show a robustness check based on people who changed their residence by at least 30
minutes driving time. The results stand in stark contrast to the plain OLS regressions and clearly
reject the hypothesis that cities have a causal impact on network size. All coefficients related to
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Table 4.5: Regional Differences in Network Size, Monthly Data for June 2015–May 2016.
FE: Full Sample FE: Moving Distance > 30min.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hinterland (vs. Cities) 0.000 -0.006
(0.003) (0.006)
Periphery (vs. Cities) 0.000 -0.001
(0.004) (0.007)
Pop. Density -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006
(0.001) (0.012) (0.002) (0.017)
Pop. Density2 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
Further Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Groups 60,514 60,514 60,514 16,874 16,874 16,874
Observations 669,825 669,825 669,825 185,676 185,663 185,663
Notes: The sample covers movers who used their phone every month at least once. Further controls include commuting
distance and a dummy for belonging to language minority. Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 ***
p<0.001.
regional differences in population density are practically zero and statistically insignificant.
Figure B.1 in the appendix plots the degree of movers over time. It shows that agents
expand their social network in the three months prior to moving, and then revert to their initial
level within two months. To test the robustness of our results with respect to this dynamic,
we re-estimate the fixed effects models for movers who changed their residence by at least 30
minutes driving time and successively exclude periods around the moving month. Table B.1 in
the appendix shows that only 2 out of 20 coefficients turn out statistically significant at the 10
percent level. Hence, these additional results do not alter the conclusion from the benchmark
analysis in Table 4.5.9
It seems, then, that the correlation between population density / urbanisation and network
size is fully driven by the sorting of above-average sociable people to the urban core and cannot be
attributed to the positive externalities of people living close together. A variance decomposition,
which computes the contributions of individual fixed effects, local fixed effects, and time specific
factors to the total variance of Di,t, also supports the conclusion that regional differences play
a small role in explaining differences in network size. Individual components contribute 73.0
percent to the overall variance of degree centrality, while local factors only explain 2.3 percent.
9One further concern may be that urban dwellers use messenger apps more frequently than people in rural
areas, which could lead to a downward bias in the population density / city dummy estimates. Although we can
not rebut such concerns with absolute certainty, they seem unsubstantiated for two reasons. First, messenger
apps and mobile phone calls are most likely complements not substitutes. We decompose messenger usage along
gender and language region, based on a survey conducted by comparis.ch in 2014. It shows that messenger
apps are more often used among men than women and are more widespread in French-speaking than German-
speaking regions. The same ranking unfolds for network size. If anything, this indicates that the two media are
complements not substitutes. Additionally, a paper on workplace communication by Charlot and Duranton (2006)
shows that telephone usage is complementary to all other modes of communication studied, including face-to-face
communication, letter correspondence, email traffic, and internet usage. Second, we conduct a series of robustness
checks, in which we control for an individual’s communication preference based on his monthly text message–call
volume ratio. These robustness checks do not alter the results.
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The remaining variation can be attributed to time specific factors (0.3%) and to the residual
(24.4%), i.e. individual and time variant components.
This analysis provides evidence that the correlation between population density and network
size is primarily driven by the sorting of highly sociable people to urban centres. Sociability
may thereby refer to the mental capability of maintaining social ties, as suggested by the social
brain hypothesis (e.g. Dunbar, 1998), and/or to personality traits, as advocated by Asendorpf
and Wilpers (1998). This raises the question of why people with an above-average sociable
predisposition move to cities. One evident explanation could be that cities provide a favourable
environment for social interactions, which does not manifest itself in terms of network size but
rather with respect to network efficiency. If this were the case, individuals with a preference
for and capability of maintaining large networks would disproportionally benefit from moving
to cities, which could explain the sorting pattern uncovered in the above analysis.
4.5.3 Cities and the Perimeter of Social Networks
We begin the discussion of network efficiency by examining variations in network perimeters
across regions. Everything else being equal, an agent is better off the less distant his social
contacts live, simply because he will incur lower travel costs. Since people residing in cities have
a larger pool of potential contacts within close proximity, one would expect them to recruit their
social contacts within a narrower perimeter to minimise travel costs.
Figure 4.6: City versus Hinterland / Periphery – Density Plot
for Social Ties by Radius.
Notes: The density plot starts at 1 km; links spanning shorter distances (mostly
links within the same postcode) were assigned a value of 1 km.
We analyse the impact of population density on the perimeter of an individual’s network
in three steps. First, we discuss descriptive evidence based on a density plot for social ties by
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Table 4.6: Regional Differences in the Perimeter of Social Networks, Monthly Data for
June 2015–May 2016.
a. Network Formation Pooled OLS Panel FE
Cities & Distance (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Distanceij,t) -0.068
∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(Distanceij,t) × Cityi,t -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Distanceij,t) × Pop. Densityi,t -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.054 0.054 0.001 0.001
Further Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pair FE No No Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Groups – – 2,582,702 2,582,702
Observations 27,238,673 27,238,673 27,238,673 27,238,673
b. Network Topography Pooled OLS Panel FE
Cities & Within-Degree (15 min.) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Hinterland (vs. Cities) -0.111∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.010)
Periphery (vs. Cities) -0.208∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.012)
Population Density 0.086∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.004)
R2 0.049 0.056 0.010 0.018
Further Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE No No Yes Yes
Language Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Groups – – 60,514 60,514
Observations 9,353,794 9,353679 669,825 669,812
Notes: The sample covers movers who used their phone every month at least once. a. Controls in network formation
models: Dummies for same workplace, same language, common contacts, degree of both agents (pooled OLS), same gender
(pooled OLS), same age (pooled OLS), and the absolute age difference between agents i and j (pooled OLS). b. Controls
in network topography models: Commuting distance, language minority dummy, gender (pooled OLS) and age (pooled
OLS). Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
radius and location type (i.e. cities versus hinterland/periphery). Second, we use the network
formation model to test whether urban dwellers value distance differently than people living in
less densely populated areas. Third, we calculate the within-degree, which measures network
size within a radius of 15 minutes around an agent’s residence, to analyse whether it varies
systematically with population density.
Figure 4.6 plots the density of social ties by radius and location type. In comparison to
individuals living in the hinterland or periphery, urban dwellers evidently have a larger mass of
social contacts within a 7 km radius, and fewer contacts beyond. This supports the hypothesis
that living in a city can lower the costs incurred from social interactions with distant contacts.
In order to examine this claim further we use the network formation model and interact the
log of distance with either population density or the city dummy. The top panel of Table 4.6
reports the output of the augmented network formation model, with columns (1) and (2) dis-
playing the OLS results and columns (3) and (4) showing the pair fixed effect estimates. All
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specifications suggest that urban dwellers incorporate distance costs more strongly in their valu-
ation than people living in peripheral areas. The interaction terms yield statistically significant
negative effects, but are quantitatively relatively small.
Finally, we resort to our network topography model using the within-degree, DW ri , as de-
pendent variable. The bottom panel of Table 4.6 reports the outputs of this approach, with
columns (1) and (2) displaying the OLS results and columns (3) and (4) showing the indivi-
dual fixed effect estimates that account for the sorting of highly sociable individuals to urban
areas. As hypothesised, the within-degree is largest in urban areas and positively correlated
with population density. This holds true for both the plain OLS estimates, as well as the indi-
vidual fixed effects results. According to our causal estimates from the individual fixed effects
specification, urban dwellers have on average a 10 percent larger within-degree than individuals
residing in the hinterland, and a 23 percent larger within-degree than people living in perip-
heral areas. The results also show that doubling population density leads, on average, to a 6.8
percent higher within-degree.10 While population density is hardly relevant for overall network
size, it has considerable explanatory power regarding the number of close-range contacts. The
variance decomposition also reveals that regional factors explain more than twice as much of
the within-degree variance (4.9%) than the variance in network size (2.3%).
Densely populated areas evidently shrink the perimeter of an individual’s social network,
in the sense that a larger fraction of her social contacts are likely to live in close proximity.
Considering that distant social contacts are costly, this consequently suggests that urban dwellers
bear fewer costs from social interactions than people living in sparsely populated areas. This
could – at least partly – explain why sociable people sort into cities, as they disproportionally
benefit from this channel and therefore have a higher willingness to pay for housing in cities than
less sociable types. This result may also be interpreted as better matching in cities, because
geographical distance is essentially one dimension of matching quality. We further explore
matching quality across regions in the following section.
4.5.4 Cities and Matching
Since matching quality cannot be directly observed, we propose two indirect tests for the hypot-
hesis that matching quality improves with population density. In one test we resort to the
network formation model, while the second test is based on the network topography approach.
We begin with the network formation model, or more specifically with the fixed effect spe-
cification given in equation (4.10b.): The pair fixed effect absorbs any dyad-specific constant
factors that either raise or lower the surplus of interaction for the involved agents. Hence, it
primarily captures matching quality, m(·), which governs the value obtained from forming a link
with another person. If agents living in cities indeed benefit from better matching quality, we
would expect that fixed effects associated with their actually formed links are higher than the
equivalent fixed effects calculated for agents living in rural areas. To test this claim, we first
10As for the degree, we re-estimate the fixed effects models and successively exclude periods around the moving
month. Table B.2 in the appendix shows that this does not affect the results.
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Table 4.7: Regional Differences in the Matching Quality
a. Network Formation Full Sample Moving Distance > 30min.
Cities and Matching (Predicted FE) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Hinterlandi,t -55.595
∗∗∗ -59.265∗∗∗
(5.928) (11.127)
Peripheryi,t -145.315
∗∗∗ -117.816∗∗∗
(6.451) (11.832)
Pop. Densityi,t 34.954
∗∗∗ 17.834∗∗∗
(1.856) (2.815)
Constant 2492.994∗∗∗ 2085.201∗∗∗ 2466.674∗∗∗ 2232.319∗∗∗
(492.036) (115.281) (250.231) (84.219)
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Observations 11,616,147 11,692,984 3,089,595 3,116,907
b. Network Topography Full Sample Moving Distance > 30min.
Cities and Matching (Social Adaption) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Citypost 0.327∗∗∗ 0.090
(0.046) (0.056)
Citypre -0.449∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.044)
Pop. Densitypost 0.227∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013)
Pop. Densitypre -0.326∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.020)
Constant 1.009∗∗∗ 1.801∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 1.256∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.176) (0.037) (0.194)
R2 0.047 0.078 0.259 0.263
Further Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 28,871 28,871 7,887 7,801
Notes: Dependent Variable in Panel a.: Predicted dyad specific fixed effect from network formation model outlined in
equation (4.10b). Dependent Variable in Panel b.: The number of post-move contacts at the post-move place of residence
over the number of post-move contacts at the pre-move place of residence. Controls in Panel b.: Number of contacts at
new address prior to moving, commuting distance, dummy for belonging to language minority, gender and age . Standard
errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
estimate equation (4.10b.), and then regress the predicted pair fixed effects for the subsample of
active links (i.e. gij = 1) on population density at agent i’s place of residence. Because we focus
on movers to back out any distance-related effects, the estimates yield the impact of population
density weighted by duration of stay.11 We obtain strong positive and significant effects for
population density in column (2), and negative effects for residents of peripheral municipalities
in column (1). Restricting the sample to customers with a minimum driving distance of 30
minutes between their old and new addresses does not affect the results. This backs the claim
that densely populated areas lead to favourable matching outcomes.
In the next step, we reassess the hypothesis by returning to the network topography approach.
If people change their residence, we would expect them to keep up with some of their previous
contacts and replace others with individuals living in their new neighbourhood. Since distance
makes social interactions costly, only highly valuable contacts at the old place of residence
11As a robustness check, we also restrict the sample to movers who change their residence but stay within the
same class of municipalities, i.e. moving from city to city or from hinterland to hinterland. As Table B.4 in the
appendix reveals, this does not alter the results.
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are worthwhile to maintain. Furthermore, if one encounters very good matches at the new
place of residence, the replacement of pre-existing ties with new contacts should advance more
quickly. We therefore examine whether this social adjustment process systematically varies with
population density at the pre- and post-move residence. Specifically, we estimate
DW
rpost
i,post
DW
rpre
i,post
= α+ βrpost · Lrposti + βrpre · Lrprei +X ′iγ + %DW rposti,pre + i, (4.13)
where the ratio DW
rpost
i,post/DW
rpre
i,post reflects the number of post-move contacts at the post-move
place of residence over the number of post-move contacts at the pre-move place of residence.
The main explanatory variables are population density and the trichotomous classification for
urbanisation at mover i’s new address (L
rpost
i ) and old address (L
rpre
i ), complemented with a
measure for the number of pre-move contacts at the new address (DW
rpost
i,pre ), and individual level
characteristics Xi.
12 The results reported in the bottom panel of Table 4.7 are based on address
changes between October 2015 and January 2016, a pre-move window covering June 2015 to
August 2015, and a post-move window covering March 2016 to May 2016. As hypothesised, the
fastest social adjustment process is observed for people who move from the periphery to the city,
while movers who lived in urban areas before changing their address keep comparatively large
shares of their pre-move contacts. Since maintaining spatially distant contacts is costly, this
suggests that contacts formed in cities generate on average a higher surplus and are therefore
more likely to be maintained. Hence, this test further supports the hypothesis that densely
populated areas improve matching quality.
So far, our results suggest that high population density in cities does not lead to larger social
networks, but rather improves their efficiency in terms of narrower perimeters and matching
quality. We are not aware of any paper providing evidence on regional differences in social
matching quality, which is a key factor underlying the main agglomeration forces as formally
discussed in Duranton and Puga (2004).
4.5.5 Cities and Clustering
The final network property that we examine is clustering. Agents face a trade-off in terms
of efficient information exchange (i.e. low clustering) and benefits related to reciprocity (i.e.
high clustering). The optimal balance may vary regionally due to factors that alter this trade-
off. Additionally, one would expect that more populous neighbourhoods display lower average
clustering, simply because randomly established links are less likely to form triadic structures
when the pool of potential contacts grows larger. To test the first claim, we resort to the
network formation model. Even if there is no evidence that urban dwellers value triadic relations
differently than people living in rural communities, the mechanical relation between population
density and clustering may lead to measurable regional differences. If this is the case, the
12Instead of controlling for the pre-move contacts at the new address, we also re-estimate the model for a
subsample of customers that move to a location where they have no prior contacts, i.e. DW
rpost
i,pre = 0. This does
not alter the conclusion, as the results in Table B.4 (Panel b.) in the appendix show.
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Table 4.8: Regional Differences in the Transitivity of Social Networks, Monthly Data for June
2015–May 2016.
a. Network Formation Panel FE
Cities & Common Friends (3) (4)
> 0 Common Contactsij,t−1 17.337∗∗∗ 16.477∗∗∗
(1.268) (1.058)
> 0 Common Contactsij,t−1 × Cityi,t -3.681+
(2.009)
> 0 Common Contactsij,t−1 × Pop. Densityi,t -1.745+
(0.957)
R2 0.001 0.001
Further Controls Yes Yes
Pair FE Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes
Groups 2,582,702 2,582,702
Observations 27,238,673 27,238,138
b. Network Topography Pooled OLS Panel FE
Cities & Clustering (1) (2) (3) (4)
Hinterland (vs. Cities) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Periphery (vs. Cities) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Population Density -0.004∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.000)
R2 0.022 0.022 0.001 0.001
Further Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE No No Yes Yes
Language Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Groups – – 60,507 60,507
Observations 9,252,183 9,252,183 664,343 664,330
Notes: The sample covers movers who used their phone every month at least once. a. Controls in network formation
models: Dummies for same workplace, same language, common contacts, degree of both agents (pooled OLS), same gender
(pooled OLS), same age (pooled OLS), and the absolute age difference between agents i and j (pooled OLS). b. Controls
in network topography models: Commuting distance, dummy for belonging to language minority, gender (pooled OLS) and
age (pooled OLS). Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
network topography approach should be able to uncover them.
We begin with the network formation model and interact the dummy for common contacts
with either population density or the city dummy. In order to back out spurious clustering due
to the grouping of similar types, we focus on the pair fixed effects specification. The top panel of
Table 4.8 reports the results for these regressions. In both specifications, the interaction terms
are negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Hence, this analysis suggests
that sharing a common link is valued less by urban dwellers than by residents of peripheral areas.
Magnitude wise the impact is fairly substantial, as it amounts to approximately 20 percent of
the effect attributed to the common contact dummy. While sharing a common contact increases
the probability of forming and maintaining a link by 17.3 basis points, the effect is only 13.7
basis points among city residents.
Given the results of the network formation analysis, we expect lower clustering in cities
than in peripheral areas. First, city residents seem to value triadic relations less than people
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living in peripheral areas. Second, the larger pool of potential contacts lowers the likelihood of
triadic relations, at least if there is some randomness in the link formation process. The bottom
panel of Table 4.8 displays the results of the network topography analysis with clustering as the
dependent variable. Both the pooled OLS regressions in columns (1) and (2), as well as the fixed
effects specifications in columns (3) and (4) suggest that cities attenuate network clustering. The
effect ranges between -0.010 and -0.014 in the pooled OLS regressions, which is roughly 11 to
15 percent of the sample mean. The difference between city and hinterland / periphery drops
by 80 percent in the fixed effects specifications, but remains significant at the 5 percent level or
higher.13
Despite the evidence that population density has no impact on the number of social interacti-
ons, cities may facilitate the diffusion of information due to below-average clustering. This can
have important consequences for local labour markets, as discussed in Sato and Zenou (2015),
for example. In conjunction with the findings on network size, matching quality and distance
costs, this suggests that cities may encourage not a larger number but rather more valuable
social interactions.
4.6 Conclusion
The results of this study suggest that that cities provide a superior environment for social
interactions, which is fundamentally important to the mechanics of classic agglomeration forces.
Contrary to many theoretical models, the advantages of densely populated areas do not translate
into larger social networks but rather into improvements in terms of matching quality, smaller
distance costs, and a favourable structure for information diffusion (i.e. lower clustering).
Evidently, modern communication technologies do not render cities obsolete. Our analysis
has illustrated that they remain important as catalyst of valuable social exchange and, conse-
quently, as potential engines of growth. From a policy perspective, this result provides micro-
level evidence for the positive externalities of densely populated areas, which should be taken
into account, for example, in the design of zoning policies, or the pricing of mobility.
There are many potential extensions of the work described in this paper. First and foremost,
a quantification of the effects in monetary terms would be insightful, and – in our opinion – would
be the first attempt to plausibly identify the causal link between density, social interactions, and
a measure of productivity / output. Second, we focused exclusively on private social interactions,
thus it would be fruitful to examine whether the same conclusions apply to networks from
business communication. Third, we barely scratched the surface of the information available in
the mobility data recorded from transmitting antennas. Such data would allow, for instance, to
thoroughly test the influential claim by social scientist Robert Putnam (2000) that commuting
causes an erosion of social capital.
13Successively excluding periods around the moving month, as done in Table B.3, yields occasionally insignificant
results for the Hinterland dummy, but overall the same pattern as in the benchmark model emerges.
A. Appendix: Data
Descriptive Statistics – Municipalities and Postcode Areas
Table A.1: Main Descriptives for Municipalities and Postcode Areas
Mean SD Min Max
Municipal Level (N=2322)
Area in km2 17.412 31.434 0.327 438.562
Population (from 2010 Census) 2396 3397.175 12 384786
Market Share of Swisscom 0.577 0.096 0.090 0.997
Degree of Urbanization
Core 0.035 – 0 1
Periphery 0.336 – 0 1
Hinterland 0.629 – 0 1
Main Language
German 0.628 – 0 1
French 0.295 – 0 1
Italian 0.065 – 0 1
Rhaeto-Romanic 0.012 – 0 1
Distance: Municipality i to j (km) 107.611 58.955 0.581 348.644
Travel Time: Municipality i to j (min.) 134.004 66.897 0.692 433.696
Postcode Level (N=3201)
Area in km2 12.927 19.215 0.014 242.904
# Customers within 15 min. Radius 14683 16818.31 50 107549
Distance: Postcode i to j (km) 111.931 59.501 0.336 353.852
Travel Time: Postcode i to j (min.) 142.804 69.033 0.283 453.508
Sources: Municipal and postcode areas from Swisstopo; municipal population, language shares, and degree of urba-
nisation from Federal Statistical Office; car travel times from search.ch; number of private mobile phone customers
from Swisscom. Data from postcodes and municipalities with less than 50 customers were deleted due to privacy
concerns.
Phone Usage Statstics
Table A.2: Call Duration (in Mio. Minutes) between June 2015 to May 2016
Phone Activity (in Mio.) Call Duration (in Mio. Minutes)
MP-Calls SMS Landline Total Filtered MP-Calls Landline Total Filtered
Jun. 2015 166.3 90.9 64.3 321.6 66.0 351.2 296.2 647.4 222.4
Jul. 2015 157.3 91.9 57.8 307.0 62.0 324.8 271.1 595.9 202.2
Aug. 2015 153.6 89.0 59.7 302.3 60.3 337.0 283.6 620.6 211.3
Sep. 2015 153.8 85.2 61.9 300.9 61.6 343.0 294.2 637.2 216.9
Oct. 2015 133.6 76.3 59.9 269.8 53.7 307.5 284.8 592.3 192.6
Nov. 2015 138.1 77.7 62.1 277.9 56.5 333.1 298.5 631.6 208.7
Dec. 2015 154.1 79.1 61.6 294.8 62.0 347.4 298.1 645.5 218.5
Jan. 2016 155.7 78.5 62.0 296.2 61.0 376.0 312.4 688.4 235.5
Feb. 2016 167.6 77.5 60.6 305.7 66.3 393.3 299.6 692.9 246.7
Mar. 2016 163.3 74.9 58.6 296.8 65.4 378.1 286.8 664.9 240.3
Apr. 2016 164.2 70.7 59.9 294.8 65.7 378.8 286.1 664.9 241.1
Mai 2016 161.1 68.6 55.9 285.7 64.9 353.5 264.6 618.1 228.3
Notes: These figures base on phone usage statistics of 2.4 million private mobile phones.
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Descriptive Statistics – Individual Level
Table A.3: Share of Variance in Census Population Explained by Number of Customers
All Male Female German French Italian
Age All 0.987 0.984 0.988 0.992 0.990 0.893
Age 20 0.945 0.946 0.944 0.960 0.946 0.916
Age 30 0.953 0.955 0.951 0.953 0.973 0.765
Age 40 0.968 0.963 0.971 0.983 0.993 0.875
Age 50 0.985 0.982 0.984 0.993 0.988 0.914
Age 60 0.990 0.988 0.987 0.994 0.984 0.922
Notes: These figures base on customer information of active phones during June 2015 and the most recent census conducted
by the Federal Statistical Office in 2010.
Table A.4: Number of Private Mobile Phone Customers with a Change in Residence
DEGURBA Classification of Movers
Distance City to Hint./Peri. Within
Month All > 30min Hint./Peri. to City Hint./Peri. No Change
July 13880 4461 1468 1858 2864 7690
August 14212 4572 1431 1930 2923 7928
September 15636 4842 1584 2044 3160 8848
October 15673 4795 1572 2052 3229 8820
November 14820 4612 1537 1977 3070 8236
December 14053 4202 1396 1836 3229 7592
January 13292 4432 1194 2207 2708 7183
February 13705 4333 1275 2033 2807 7590
March 15171 4671 1501 2060 3181 8429
April 15838 4873 1529 2111 3234 8964
Notes: Movers are identified based on address changes in the customer database. Columns 3 to 6 document the moving
pattern along the DEGURBA classification.
Table A.5: Comparing Non-movers to Movers, Main Descriptive Statistics
Non-Movers Movers
Mean SD N Mean SD N Difference
Phone Usage Statistics, June 2015 – May 2016 (pooled)
Number of Calls 110.525 109.039 9 564 636 126.170 114.84 834 913 -15.646
Duration (Minutes) 250.840 293.322 9 564 636 302.285 316.835 834 913 -51.445
Network Characteristics, June 2015 – May 2016 (pooled)
Degree Centrality 9.164 7.912 9 564 636 9.633 7.875 834 913 -0.468
Within-Degree 7.163 7.266 9 564 636 5.971 6.721 834 913 1.192
Clustering Coefficient 0.092 0.134 9 423 136 0.081 0.114 825 787 0.011
Sociodemographics - Private Mobile Phones
Age 35.307 13.734 797 053 31.038 10.624 69 593 4.269
Female 0.522 – 797 053 0.527 – 69 593 -0.005
Language: German 0.680 – 797 053 0.703 – 69 593 -0.023
Language: French 0.271 – 797 053 0.251 – 69 593 0.020
Language: Italian 0.043 – 797 053 0.039 – 69 593 0.004
Language: English 0.006 – 797 053 0.007 – 69 593 -0.001
Notes: The table is based on the subsample of customers with phone activity in all 12 months, which we also use in the main
analysis. Further filters as described in section 4.3. Phone usage statistics include in- and outgoing calls. The within-degree
measures network size within a radius of 15 minutes around an agent’s residence.
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Figure B.1: The Degree prior and after Moving
Robustness Checks: Degree
Table B.1: Robustness – Cities and Network Size, June 2015–May 2016.
Excluding Months around Change of Residence, i.e. t = 0
Moving Distance All Months t 6= 0 -2 ≤ t ≥ 2 -3 ≤ t ≥ 3 -4 ≤ t ≥ 4 -5 ≤ t ≥ 5
at least 30 min. (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hinterland (vs. Cities) -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.017+ -0.012 -0.015
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.020)
Periphery (vs. Cities) -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.027
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.024)
R2 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.011
Groups 16,874 16,868 16,808 16,743 16,681 16,535
Observations 185,644 167,761 138,883 113,106 90,018 69,675
Population Density -0.006 -0.008 -0.011 -0.048+ -0.030 -0.094
(0.017) (0.019) (0.023) (0.027) (0.038) (0.061)
Population Density2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
R2 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008
Groups 16,874 16,868 16,808 16,743 16,680 16,534
Observations 185,644 167,749 138,872 113,097 90,011 69,670
Further Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The sample covers movers (minimum moving distance 30min) who used their phone every month at least once.
Column (1) excludes the moving month; column (2) excludes the moving month and the first month prior and after moving;
and so on. Further controls include commuting distance and a dummy for belonging to language minority. Standard errors
in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Robustness Checks: Within-Degree
Table B.2: Robustness – Cities and the Within-Degree, June 2015–May 2016.
Excluding Months around Change of Residence, i.e. t = 0
Moving Distance All Months t 6= 0 -2 ≤ t ≥ 2 -3 ≤ t ≥ 3 -4 ≤ t ≥ 4 -5 ≤ t ≥ 5
at least 30 min. (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hinterland (vs. Cities) -0.038∗ -0.039∗ -0.049∗ -0.058∗ -0.049 -0.084+
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.025) (0.032) (0.046)
Periphery (vs. Cities) -0.132∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.028) (0.036) (0.053)
R2 0.012 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.012
Groups 16,874 16,868 16,808 16,743 16,681 16,535
Observations 185,676 167,761 138,883 113,106 90,018 69,675
Population Density 0.076∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015)
R2 0.016 0.019 0.021 0.020 0.018 0.013
Groups 16,874 16,868 16,808 16,743 16,680 16,534
Observations 185,663 167,749 138,872 113,097 90,011 69,670
Further Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The sample covers movers (minimum moving distance 30min) who used their phone every month at least once.
Column (1) excludes the moving month; column (2) excludes the moving month and the first month prior and after moving;
and so on. Further controls include commuting distance and a dummy for belonging to language minority. Standard errors
in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
Robustness Checks: Clustering
Table B.3: Robustness – Cities and Clustering, June 2015–May 2016.
Excluding Months around Change of Residence, i.e. t = 0
All Months t 6= 0 -2 ≤ t ≥ 2 -3 ≤ t ≥ 3 -4 ≤ t ≥ 4 -5 ≤ t ≥ 5
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hinterland (vs. Cities) 0.002+ 0.002+ 0.002 0.004∗ 0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Periphery (vs. Cities) 0.002+ 0.003∗ 0.003∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.008+
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.01
Groups 16,870 16,863 16,802 16,735 16,670 16,518
Observations 183,896 166,130 137,489 111,965 89,099 68,953
Population Density -0.001+ -0.001+ -0.001+ -0.001+ -0.001+ -0.003∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Groups 16,870 16,863 16,802 16,735 16,669 16,517
Observations 183,896 166,118 137,478 111,956 89,092 68,948
Further Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The sample covers movers (minimum moving distance 30min) who used their phone every month at least once.
Column (1) excludes the moving month; column (2) excludes the moving month and the first month prior and after moving;
and so on. Further controls include commuting distance and a dummy for belonging to language minority. Standard errors
in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Robustness Checks: Matching
Table B.4: Robustness – Regional Differences in the Matching Quality, Robustness
a. Network Formation Full Sample Moving Distance > 30min.
Cities and Matching (Predicted FE) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Hinterlandi,t -101.581
∗∗∗ -44.090
(-6.316) (-0.905)
Peripheryi,t -381.461
∗∗∗ -252.426∗∗∗
(-20.221) (-4.952)
Pop. Densityi,t 88.509
∗∗∗ 56.085∗∗∗
(17.412) (6.019)
Constant 5447.207∗∗∗ 4439.930∗∗∗ 5346.683∗∗∗ 4718.905∗∗∗
(414.239) (88.771) (121.435) (54.765)
R2 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
Observations 1,631,708 1,646,566 30,6798 313,072
b. Network Topography Full Sample Moving Distance > 30min.
Cities and Matching (Social Adaption) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Citypost 0.308∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.056)
Citypre -0.231∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.045)
Pop. Densitypost 0.184∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
Pop. Densitypre -0.145∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗
(0.016) (0.031)
Constant 0.738∗∗∗ 0.304+ 0.754∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.176) (0.282) (0.033)
R2 0.017 0.041 0.018 0.005
Further Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,718 5,718 3,108 3,194
Notes: Dependent Variable in Panel a.: Predicted dyad specific fixed effect from network formation model outlined in
equation (4.10b). Dependent Variable in Panel b.: The number of post-move contacts at the post-move place of residence
over the number of post-move contacts at the pre-move place of residence. Controls in Panel b.: Number of contacts at
new address prior to moving, commuting distance, dummy for belonging to language minority, and Romansh region),
gender and age . Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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